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ABSTRACT 
The financial liberalisation programme is a quintessential, and perhaps the most 
controversial, component of the on-going economic and structural reforms in 
developing countries like India and Pakistan. A key objective of the financial 
liberalisation programme in India and Pakistan is to encourage and enable 
commercial banks to improve their efficiency so that they can augment financial 
intermediation between savers and borrowers. This study employs non-parametric 
data envelopment analysis to examine whether the efficiency of commercial banks in 
India and Pakistan improved between 1990-1998, a period characterised by far- 
reaching changes brought about by the economic and structural reforms. We find that 
the banking industry in both India and Pakistan exhibited considerable technical 
inefficiencies during the period. In the case of India, an average bank could improve 
its efficiency by at least 11 %. In the case of Pakistan, an average bank could improve 
its efficiency by at least 18%. This improvement in efficiency could lead to a more 
efficient intermediation as banks would be able to channel more funds from savers to 
borrowers with their given resources. We find that the efficiency of the banking 
industry in both the countries improved after the implementation of the financial 
liberalisation in the early 1990s. In India, the efficiency of all three groups - public, 
foreign, and domestic private - improved over the years. On the other hand, public 
sector banks in Pakistan witnessed limited or no improvement in their efficiency. In 
both the countries, our findings suggest that foreign banks attained the highest 
improvement in their efficiency after the financial liberalisation. In the case of India, 
we find a positive relationship between the level of competition and bank efficiency. 
We also find that governments' fiscal deficits had a negative relationship with the 
efficiency of banks in both the countries. We propose that high fiscal deficits create 
an environment in which banks find it difficult to utilise their resources efficiently. In 
India, a positive relationship between the efficiency and size of banks is found. On 
the other hand, a negative relationship is found in the case of the Pakistani banking 
industry. We propose that in Pakistan, public sector banks have become too large 
and complex to adapt quickly to the changes due to the economic and structural 
reforms. We argue that, to enable large public sector banks to adapt to the changes 
due to the reforms, the authorities need to do more to reduce huge non-performing 
loans in the asset portfolios of these banks. 
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Chapter 1- The Efficiency of Banks in India and Pakistan: 
Background, Research Methods, and the Structure of the 
Study 
1.1 - Introduction 
During the early 1950s and 1960s, the 'development economists' formulated 
economic models to explain the causes of underdevelopment, and devised policy 
prescriptions to foster economic growth in developing countries (see Meier and 
Stiglitz, 2001). According to these models, capital accumulation was crucial for rapid 
economic growth (see, for example, Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurske, 1952; Lewis, 
1954; Hirschman, 1958). As markets in developing countries were considered as 
prone to failure, excessive government intervention in mobilising and allocating 
scarce resources was advocated. In the case of the financial sector, it was argued that 
financial institutions in developing countries were exacerbating income inequalities 
by channelling financial resources to large business groups only (see Caprio et al., 
1994). Therefore, strict government controls over the operations of financial 
institutions were implemented in order to channel financial resources to the so-called 
priority sectors (agriculture, for instance), which were considered essential for an 
equitable economic growth. 
However, based on the policy prescriptions of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, after decades of excessive government regulations and state- 
determined resource allocation, the implementation of economic and structural 
reforms (ESRs) endeavours to create a market friendly economic environment in 
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developing countries (Williamson, 2000). These ESRs are based on the belief that 
the excessive government interventions have failed to enhance economic growth, and 
have created inefficiencies into almost all sectors of developing countries (see 
Stiglitz, 2002). These ESRs primarily include: fiscal reforms, investment 
liberalisation, trade reforms, and financial liberalisation. 
The financial liberalisation programme includes: a deregulation of exchange and 
interest rates controls, reduction in state-determined credit policies, a gradual 
privatisation of public sector banks, reduced restrictions on the entry and operations 
of foreign and domestic private financial institutions, reduction in banks' required 
reserve ratio, and the liberalisation of the capital account (see Caprio et al., 1994). 
An important objective of the financial liberalisation programme is to enhance the 
efficiency of financial institutions - especially that of commercial banks - in utilising 
their resources so that these institutions augment financial intermediation and, 
therefore, contribute to the process of economic growth (see Shaw, 1973; McKinnon, 
1973; Fry, 1995,1997). 
India and Pakistan initiated very similar economic and structural reforms in the late 
1980s. These reforms were primarily directed toward four important areas, namely, 
fiscal policy, investment policy, foreign trade policy, and financial sector policy (see 
Ahluwalia, 1999a; Zaidi 1999). The main focus of the financial liberalisation 
programme was to strengthen the commercial banking industry by underpinning 
prudential regulations, limiting the state-directed credit policies that had been 
extensively used by the government to finance priority sectors, relaxing the interest 
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rate ceilings on deposits and loans, privatising public sector banks, and allowing the 
entry of private financial institutions. 
Like in other developing countries, an offici all y- stated objective of the financial 
liberalisation programme in India and Pakistan is to enhance the efficiency and 
productivity of commercial banks in order to reduce the costs associated with the 
intermediation of scarce financial resources between savers and borrowers (see 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2003; SBP, 2000). The emphasis on the commercial banking 
industry is due to the fact that in India and Pakistan, as in other developing countries, 
most of the intermediation between savers and borrowers is conducted by 
commercial banks; other financial institutions and markets play a relatively 
insignificant role (see Fry, 1995). Therefore, we submit, it is imperative to examine 
whether the efficiency of commercial banks has actually improved after the 
implementation of the financial liberalisation programme. With this in mind, we 
outline the objectives of the present study. 
1.2 - Objectives of the study 
Although the ESRs in India and Pakistan were initiated in the early 1990s, little 
academic research has gone into the empirical investigation of the impact of these 
reforms on the efficiency of commercial banks. A similar dearth of empirical 
research exists for other developing countries (see Isik and Hassan, 2003). To the 
best of the author's knowledge, although a few studies have sought to evaluate the 
efficiency and productivity of banks in India, the time period examined by most of 
these studies, as we shall see in chapter 3, is not long enough to shed light on the 
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impact of the liberalisation programme. Similarly, in the case of Pakistan, only one 
study has measured the inter-temporal variations in the efficiency of banks. 
The present study attempts to contribute to the literature on bank efficiency by 
examining the efficiency and productivity of commercial banks in India and Pakistan 
during 1990-1998, a period characterised by far-reaching changes brought about by 
the ESRs. We seek to examine: 
I- Are commercial banks in India and Pakistan inefficient in 
intermediating between borrowers and savers? 
2- If yes, what is the extent of inefficiency? 
3- Has the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan improved 
after the implementation of the ESRs? 
4- Is the efficiency of public sector banks lower (higher) than 
that of private sector banks? In other words, is private 
ownership more efficient than state ownership? 
5- Is the efficiency of foreign banks, which are considered as 
bringing new technology and managerial skills, higher than that 
of domestic banks? 
6- Do three key elements of the ESRs - fiscal reforms, 
investment liberalisation, and the financial liberalisation - 
positively influence the efficiency of banks? 
In addition, our comparative analysis attempts to examine whether similar policies 
implemented in the two countries have similar impacts on the efficiency of the 
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commercial banking industry. The techniques employed to answer these questions 
are outlined below. 
1.3 - Research Methods 
In the present study, we employ frontier techniques to measure the efficiency of 
commercial banks. As outlined in chapter 3, various parametric and non-parametric 
techniques have been used in the empirical literature to measure the efficiency of 
financial institutions. Following the studies reviewed in chapter 3, chapter 5 employs 
non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to calculate the efficiency of banks 
in India and Pakistan. Furthermore, we also employ parametric stochastic frontier 
analysis to check the robustness of our results. 
Chapter 6 augments the analysis of chapter 5 by extending the basic DEA model 
following Bhattacharyya et al. 's (1997) grand-frontier DEA approach. In addition, to 
examine factors that may explain variations in the efficiency of banks over space and 
time, we employ the so-called two-step procedure. In the two-step procedure, we 
regress the efficiency scores obtained from the DEA on various bank-specific factors 
(e. g. bank size) and external environmental factors (e. g. competition). Two 
econometric techniques are used in this regard, namely Ordinary Least Squares and 
Generalised Method of Moments. It should be mentioned at the outset that this study 
does not claim to advance the theory underlying the techniques used in this study 
(i. e. data envelopment analysis, stochastic frontier analysis, ordinary least squares, 
and generalised method of moments). Our objective is purely applied in nature. 
However, two important contributions of the present study are: (1) to propose various 
hypotheses regarding a possible relationship between bank efficiency and four 
5 
environmental variables associated with the ESRs in developing countries; and (2) to 
use the generalised method of moments to rectify the endogeneity problem in the 
regression analysis examining the relationship between bank efficiency and various 
internal bank-specific factor (e. g. size). We shall discuss these issues in some detail 
in chapter 3 and chapter 6. 
1.4 - Data 
As we review in chapters 3 and 5, the frontier techniques require data on inputs and 
outputs of banks. The data for commercial banks in India are obtained from the 
website of the Reserve Bank of India. The website contains data on all domestic, as 
well as, foreign banks operating in India during the 1990s. In the case of Pakistan, 
the data are obtained from the Banking Statistics of Pakistan published annually by 
the State Bank of Pakistan. Data on macroeconomic variables related to fiscal 
reforms, investment liberalisation, and the financial liberalisation are extracted from 
World Development Indicators 2003 by the World Bank, Key Indicators 2004 by the 
Asian Development Bank, and the Indian Economic Survey published by the Indian 
Ministry of Finance. 
1.5 - Structure of the study 
Chapter I- The efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan - Background, 
research methods, and structure of the study 
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Chapter 2- Financial liberalisation in developing countries - An overview 
This chapter provides a very brief overview of the early theoretical and empirical 
literature on the financial liberalisation in developing countries. This chapter sets the 
agenda for the next chapters by arguing that most of the early empirical literature on 
the financial liberalisation attempts to examine the macroeconomic impact of the 
liberalisation, and only recently researchers have started looking at the impacts of the 
financial liberalisation on the efficiency of banks in developing countries. 
Chapter 3- Productive efficiency: Meaning, measurement, and empirical 
evidence on banks in developed and developing countries 
What do we mean by the efficiency of a firm? Are firms always efficient? How can 
we empirically determine whether a firm is efficient or not? To answer these 
questions, this chapter starts with the traditional neoclassical theory of the firm that 
ignores the possibility of the internal inefficiency of finns. The transaction 
costs/property right approach, the behavioural theory of the finn, and the X- 
efficiency theory of the firm are then briefly discussed. These theories highlight 
situations where firms may not be able to utilise their resources efficiently. 
Parametric and non-parametric frontier techniques are reviewed. These techniques 
enable us to measure the efficiency of a firm relative to other similar firms. Recent 
empirical literature on the efficiency of banks in developing countries is then 
reviewed. 
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Chapter 4- Economic and structural reforms in India and Pakistan during the 
1990S 
This chapter describes various components of the ESRs in India and Pakistan during 
the 1990s. Emphasis is placed on the implementation of the financial liberalisation 
programme that transformed the commercial banking industry in both the countries. 
This chapter also measures the performance of the commercial banking industry in 
terms of deposit mobilisation, credit provision, profitability, competition, asset 
diversification, and non-frontier based efficiency (i. e. using financial ratios). 
Chapter 5- The efficiency and productivity of banks in India and Pakistan 
during 1990-1998 using DEA 
Some technical details of how the DEA can be used to measure technical efficiency 
and total factor productivity change are provided. Technical efficiency and total 
factor productivity change are measured for three groups of commercial banks in 
India and Pakistan, namely public sector banks, domestic private banks, and foreign 
banks. Technical efficiency for each year is measured relative to the frontier of that 
year. As the measurement is sensitive to the input-output specification (see chapter 
3), two alternative input-output models are used. The robustness of the calculated 
efficiency scores is checked by examining their relationship with non-frontier based 
financial ratios and with efficiency scores obtained from parametric stochastic 
frontier analysis. 
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Chapter 6- Factors explaining the variations in the efficiency of banks in India 
and Pakistan 
This chapter employs the two-step procedure to examine factors that may explain 
inter-temporal and intra-temporal variations in the efficiency of banks in India and 
Pakistan. We regress the efficiency scores obtained through the DEA on various 
bank-specific variables (e. g. size) and external environmental variables (e. g. the level 
of competition) by using the method of ordinary least squares and generalised 
method of moments. Another contribution of this chapter is that we present, and test, 
hypotheses regarding the possibility of a relationship between banks' efficiency and 
four environmental variables that are associated with the ESRs in India and Pakistan. 
These variables are: fiscal deficits, investment liberalisation, competition in the 
banking industry, and the presence of foreign banks. 
Chapter 7- Summary, conclusions and limitations 
This chapter summarises and concludes. The main findings of the present study are 
outlined. Some policy implications are discussed. The limitations of the study are 
also highlighted. 
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Chapter 2- The Financial Liberalisation in Developing 
Countries: An overview 
2.1 - Introduction 
After decades of state-directed resource allocation, many developing countries 
initiated economic and structural reforms (ESRs) in the early 1980s and 1990s'. 
These ESRs are based on the belief that years of interventionist policies invoked by 
non-benevolent, corrupt, and rent-seeking authorities have created distortions and 
inefficiencies into almost all sectors of developing countries (see Krueger, 1990; 
Chaudhri, 1990). Therefore, to make social and economic institutions work for the 
process of economic development, it is argued, radical reforms are needed in order to 
make developing countries more market friendly by reducing the role of the state in 
mobilising and allocating scarce economic resources. 
The financial liberalisation has been a quintessential, and perhaps the most 
controversial, component of the on-going ESRs in developing countries (see 
1 It is argued that these ESRs are based on the policy prescriptions of the so-called 'Washington 
Consensus' (see Williamson, 1990). In his original paper, Williamson coined the term 'Washington 
Consensus' to refer to the lowest common denominator of policy advice being offered by the 
Washington-based institutions (i. e. the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). This 
includes: (1) fiscal discipline; (2) a redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields offering 
both high economic returns and potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health care, 
primary education, and infrastructure; (3) tax reforms; (4) interest rate liberalisation; (5) a competitive 
exchange rate; (6) trade liberalisation; (7) liberalisation of inflows of foreign direct investment; (8) 
privatisation of state owned enterprises; (9) deregulation to abolish barriers to entry and exit of private 
firms; and (10) strengthening rules to protect private property rights. However, as Williamson (2000) 
contends, in the recent development policy circles the term 'Washington Consensus' has been 
wrongly used to signify extreme 'neo-liberalism' and 'market fundamentalism' (see, for example, Ito, 
1999). 
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Williamson, 2000). Until the early 1960s and 1970s, a less than the socially optimal 
level of resource allocation was considered as the primary weakness of financial 
institutions in developing countries 2. It was argued that financial institutions in 
developing countries were exacerbating income inequalities by channelling financial 
resources to large business groups only and were hesitant to finance sectors 
considered as the drivers of a socially equitable economic growth (e. g. agriculture 
and small scale industries) (see Sen and Vaidya, 1998; Arun and Turner, 2002). 
Therefore, in order to mitigate this perceived problem 3, governments in developing 
countries initiated a policy of strict controls over the direction and price of scarce 
financial resources mobilised and allocated by financial institutions (especially by 
the commercial banking industry). 
However, with the advent of the 1980s debt crises 4 and the publication of the seminal 
work of McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), the policy of excessive government 
interventions in the financial sector - usually known as 'financial repression' - came 
under attack. The opponents of financial repression argued that excessive 
government interventions had repressed the domestic financial system in developing 
countries, and made this sector inefficient in mobilising and allocating scarce 
financial resources (see McKinnon, 1973 and Shaw, 1973). Therefore, to enhance the 
efficiency of financial institutions, the financial liberalisation programme was 
2 See Fry (1995,1997) for discussion. 
3 It should be noted, however, many economists at that time argued that to attain high level of 
economic development in the long-run, short term inequality was inevitable (see, for example, 
Papanek, 1967). 
4 The crises began when on August 12,1982, Mexican minister of finance informed the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) that Mexico would be unable to meet its August 16 obligation to service $80 
billion debt. For a review factors leading to the debt crisis, see FDIC (1997) and Cline (1995). 
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proposed. As noted in chapter 1, the financial liberalisation includes: freeing up 
exchange and interest rates controls, reduction in state-determined credit policies, a 
gradual privatisation of public sector banks, the entry of new domestic private banks 
and non-bank financial institutions, reduced restrictions on the entry and operations 
of foreign banks, reduction in banks' required reserve ratio, and the liberalisation of 
capital account (see Caprio et al., 1994). The aim of this chapter is to present a brief 
review of the literature on the emergence of this financial liberalisation paradigm. 
Towards this end, the rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 highlights 
the literature on the relationship between the financial sector and economic growth, 
and on the early development economics literature that favoured state-directed 
resource allocation. Section 3 presents theoretical arguments for and against the 
financial liberalisation paradigm, and presents some early empirical evidence on the 
macroeconomic impacts of the liberalisation. Section 4 sets the agenda for the next 
chapters by arguing that until recently little attention has been paid to the impact of 
the financial liberalisation, and other components of the ESRs, on the internal 
productive efficiency of commercial banks in developing countries. Section 5 
concludes. 
2.2 - From financial repression to financial liberalisation 
2.2.1 - Financial institutions and economic growth 
The idea of a possible relationship between the operations of financial institutions, 
especially banks, and the economic activity of a society is not new. For example, as 
early as 1767, Sir James Steuart suggested that to stimulate 'industriousness' in the 
economy, authorities would have to either draw metallic money out of its hoards or, 
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even better, rely on the creation of paper money by 'banks' 5. Other influential social 
scientists and economists, such as Thorstein Veblen and John Maynard Keynes, also 
highlighted the role that financial institutions could play in augmenting the level of 
investment in the economy (see Veblen, 1965; Keynes, 1936). 
However, it was Joseph Schumpeter's 'Theory of Economic Development' (1934) 
that explicitly theorised the importance of the credit-extending role of financial 
institutions in fostering the process of economic development, and laid down the 
foundations for future theoretical and empirical research. The main drivers of 
economic development, according to Schumpeter, are discontinuous changes in the 
economic environment brought about by random entrepreneurial innovations with 
the help of smooth credit markets. Schumpeter's theory views financial 
intermediaries, bankers in particular, as key economic agents to uphold 
entrepreneurs' innovatory activities: 'The banker ... is essentially a phenomenon of 
development ... He makes possible the carrying out of new combinations, authoritises 
people, in the name of society as it were, to form them. He is the ephor of the 
exchange economy' (Schumpeter, 1934, p. 74). 
The contemporary theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of financial 
institutions on the economic growth of developing countries owes much to the 
seminal work of Gurley and Shaw (1955), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973). 
These studies suggest that financial institutions in developing countries could 
enhance economic growth by increasing the rate of capital formation through the 
'institutionalisation of savings'. That is, financial institutions in developing countries 
5 Cited in Itoh and Lapavitsas (1999) 
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could foster economic growth by mobilising savings and then channelling these 
funds to borrowers for capital formation. More recent studies, based on the 
theoretical framework of the so-called 'new growth theory' 6, suggest that financial 
institutions contribute to economic growth by enhancing the efficiency of capital 
employed in the economy through a reduction in transaction costs associated with the 
intermediation process and through a reduction in the problems due to pervasive 
information asymmetries between savers and borrowers (see Levine, 1997)7. 
2.2.2 - The early development economics and the origin of financial repression 
The two World Wars played an important role in the dissolution of the European 
colonial power and the emergence of a large number of politically independent states 
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (see Myrdal, 1968, chapter 4). The chronic 
economic problems - especially high unemployment and poverty - in these newly 
independent states reinvigorated the debate on the economic well-being of masses. 
The 'development economists' formulated grand models to explain the causes of 
6 See Aghion and Howitt (1998) for a review of literature on the new growth theory. 
7 These models usually assume that individuals can choose between unproductive assets (e. g. 
consumer good) and an investment in a firm. The investment is illiquid as it takes time to become 
productive. However, the expected returns from the investment are higher than the return from an 
inventory of unproductive asset. In the presence of uncertainty, some individuals could be forced to 
liquidate or abandon the investment in firms before it become productive (Bencivenga and Smith, 
1991). Therefore, individuals may not be willing to hold investment in firms and all their wealth 
would be held as unproductive assets. This would, in turn, be detrimental for the process of economic 
growth. In such a situation, financial institutions, particularly banks, enable individuals to hold 
deposits which banks then invest in currency and capital (i. e. investment in firms). By exploiting the 
law of large number, banks, unlike individuals, ensure that they never have to liquidate capital 
prematurely. In addition, financial institutions specialise in pooling funds and acquiring information 
that enables them to allocate acquired funds to its highest value, so raising the average return to 
capital. Thus, the presence of financial institutions could lead to higher accumulation and efficiency of 
capital (see (Bencivenga and Smith 1991; Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990; Greenwood and Smith 
1993; King and Levine 1993a, 1993b; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). 
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underdevelopment, and devised policy prescriptions to help developing countries to 
catch-up with developed countries 8. These early models envisaged rapid capital 
accumulation as a necessary and, in many cases, sufficient condition for economic 
growth (see Rosenstein -Rodan, 1943; Nurske, 1952; Lewis, 1954; Hirschman, 1958). 
Many of the early development economists advocated extensive government 
intervention in allocating scarce economic resources to foster economic growth. 
Broadly speaking, governments in developing countries were considered as objective 
and benevolent guardians of their societies. Markets, on the other hand, were 
9 considered as prone to failure due to 'structural rigidities' . Therefore, unlike in 
developed economies, markets in developing countries were assumed to be ill- 
equipped to promote capital accumulation in socially beneficial sectorslo. 
The policy prescriptions of the early development economics models were highly 
influential in promoting governments' excessively interventionist stance toward the 
domestic financial sector. It was argued that financial institutions and markets in 
developing countries had to play a crucial role in fostering equitable economic 
growth in developing countries, but their main weakness, it was argued, was less 
than socially optimal levels of capital provisions". Caprio et al. (2001, pp. 4-5) 
8 For review of development economics, see Meier (2001), Cypher and Dietz (1997), Adelman 
(2001). 
9 Structural rigidities in this context means a lack of responsiveness to price signals and incentives. 
10 These models were also influenced by the success of Keynesian activism in fighting the Great 
Depression, and the success of the Marshal Plan to rehabilitate the post-war Europe (see Meier, 2001). 
11 The emphasis on socially optimal allocation of credit through government intervention can be 
traced back to Marquis de Condorcet in 18th century. Condorcet argued that to eliminate poverty, it 
was preferable for authorities to direct credit to poor so that the rich capitalist class could not exploit 
them (cited in Hunt, 1979). 
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describe the origin of excessive government interventions in the financial sector - i. e. 
the financial repression - as follows: 
The fad of financial repression was associated with the rise of populism, 
nationalism, and statism. Populist opinion thought of interest rate controls 
as way of redistributing income. Private bank loans to large business 
houses or foreigners were standard populist or nationalist targets. A 
desire to avoid excessive concentrations of power in a few private hands, 
or to ensure that the domestic financial system was not controlled by 
foreigners who would be insensitive to long-term national goals, were 
familiar aspects of this type politics. Social goals could, it was thought, 
be attained more easily if the activities of major financial institutions 
were not purely profit driven. 
Due to these nationalistic views and the alleged structural rigidities of markets in 
developing countries, governments in many of these countries intervened heavily in 
their domestic financial sectors 12 by introducing, inter alia, high reserve 
requirements on depository institutions, low interest rate ceilings on loans and 
deposits, state-directed credit policies to channel funds to 'priority sectors', 
nationalisation of financial institutions, and restrictions on the entry/operations of 
foreign financial institutions to restrict the level of competition for nationalised banks 
(see Fry, 1995). In a nutshell, the official objective of these interventions was to 
synchronise the functioning of the domestic financial sector with the overall 
economic planning designed by the government. 
12 This is not to suggest that governments in developed countries do not intervene in their financial 
sector. However, unlike in developed countries, the objective of financial repressionist policies was to 
determining the optimal price and direction of financial resources in order to meet governments' 
investment and growth targets. 
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It is argued that initially the objective of these government interventions in the 
financial sector was to engage in 'financial restrictions' rather than financial 
repression (see Fry, 1995, p. 20-22). Financial restrictions encourage financial 
institutions from which governments can expropriate significant seigniorage. 
Therefore, governments in developing countries encouraged commercial banks 
because 'reserve requirements and obligatory holding of government bonds can be 
imposed to tap this source of savings at zero or low-interest cost to the public sector. 
Private bond and equity markets are suppressed through transaction taxes, stamp 
duties, special tax rates on income from capital, and unconducive legal framework, 
because seigniorage cannot be extracted [. ]' (Fry, 1995, p. 20-21). However, in many 
developing countries, while the need for social control of the domestic financial 
sector provided the rationale for the financial restrictions, the subsequent 
intensification of these policies was due in great part to finance governments' 
growing fiscal deficits by borrowing from financial institutions at state-determined 
low interest rates (Sen and Vaidya, 1998). 
2.2.3 - The case for the flnancial liberalisation 
As mentioned above, the early development economists suggested that markets in 
developing countries were prone to failure, and advocated extensive government 
interventions. However, although the rationale for government interventions was to 
resolve market failures, the results were often government failures that created 
distortions and inefficiencies in almost all sectors of developing countries (see World 
Bank, 1983; Sirinivasan, 1985; Krueger, 1990). These 'government failures', which 
became evident with the advent of the debt crisis of 1980s, led to the revival of the 
mainstream neoclassical approach to economic development that criticised the price 
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distortions - especially in labour markets, financial sector, and foreign exchange 
rates - due to excessive government interventions, and advocated radical reforms to 
make developing countries more market-oriented (see Little, 1982). The policy 
implications were to correct the price distortions by moving away from inward 
looking state-directed strategies toward a liberalised market-oriented system - the 
'Washington Consensus' (see Adelman, 2001). 
Based on the Washington Consensus, the recent decades have witnessed the 
implementation of the multifaceted financial liberalisation programme in many 
developing countries across the globe (see Cho and Khatkhate, 1989; Caprio et al., 
1994,2001; Fanelli and Medhora, 1998). The proponents of the financial 
liberalisation programme argue that due to excessive government interventions, the 
financial system in developing countries has contracted and the efficiency of 
financial institutions has deteriorated, which, in turn, has led to widespread bank 
insolvency and poor economic growth. 
a- McKinnon and Shaw 
The case against government intervention in the financial sector of developing 
countries was first put forward by Ronald McKinnon (1973) and Edward Shaw 
(1973). According to McKinnon and Shaw, the liberalisation of the financial sector 
from government administered interest rate and credit allocation policies accelerates 
the rate of economic growth in developing countries. The essential feature of the 
McKinnon-Shaw framework is its emphasis on the role of financial institutions as 
intermediaries between savers and borrowers. According to McKinnon and Shaw, 
saving is a positive function of real interest rates on deposits and real rates of growth 
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in output, while the investment function responds negatively to the effective real loan 
rate of interest and responds positively to the growth rate (McKinnon 1973; Shaw 
1973). 
When interest rate ceilings are in place, the amount of deposits mobilised for 
investment is low (i. e. banks' liabilities contract), which, in turn, decelerates the rate 
of economic growth. Therefore, even when there are investment opportunities, the 
economic growth of financially repressed developing countries is constrained by the 
amount of loanable funds (McKinnon 1973: 56-62; Shaw 1973: 78-82). Also, when 
ceilings on loan interest rate are present, entrepreneurs with low return projects, who 
were previously deterred from requesting bank loans, enter the market. An increase 
in interest rates (to the market-clearing level) due to the liberalisation leads to an 
increase in the amount that people are willing to hold as financial assets by 
decreasing the holdings of foreign assets and non-financial (unproductive) assets 
such as cash, gold, commodities, land, etc. This, in turn, augments the resources 
available for investment. This is further enhanced if the cost of intermediation by 
banks were kept low by having a competitive banking structure and minimum 
taxation on financial intermediation. Despite these similarities, however, there are 
some differences in McKinnon's (1973) and Shaw's (1973) models. 
McKinnon's (1973) model hinges upon on two assumptions: (1) all economic agents 
are confined to self-finance, and (2) investment opportunities are indivisible. 
Following Keynes' finance motive, McKinnon argues that all potential investors 
must accumulate money balances prior to their investment. In this case, the lower the 
opportunity cost of accumulating real money balances or higher the real deposit rate 
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of interest, the greater is the incentive to invest. McKinnon suggests that as the 
outside financial resources are usually inaccessible in developing countries, interest 
rate ceilings adversely affect the level of investment and, therefore, the rate of 
economic growth. McKinnon's model highlights the 'complementarity' between 
money and physical capital. That is, to accumulate physical capital, investors have to 
increase their money balances, and to provide incentive for this increase in money 
balances, deposits rates need to be high enough. Thus, the financial liberalisation 
creates more incentives to save and invest, which, in turn, fosters economic growth. 
Unlike McKinnon, Shaw (1973) allows the possibility of debt financing and discards 
13 the 'complementarity' between money and physical capital . Shaw (1973) 
emphasises the role of 'debt-intermediation and institutionalisation of savings' 
through financial institutions in improving resource allocation. The financial 
liberalisation enhances financial intermediation between savers and borrowers by 
creating more incentives to save and invest. According to Shaw, financial 
intermediation is repressed and sub-optimal when, in order to subsidise priority 
sectors, governments in developing countries impose interest rate ceilings. In a 
liberalised environment, financial intermediaries raise real returns to savers and 
lower real costs to borrowers by reducing risk through diversification, reaping 
economies of scale in lending, and increasing operational efficiency. In addition, 
raising interest rates also deters entrepreneurs from undertaking low-yielding 
investments. 
13 Molho (1986) argues that models of McKinnon and Shaw need not be viewed as incompatible with 
one another because most projects are financed partly with own funds (as in McKinnon) and partly 
with borrowed funds (as in Shaw). Therefore, the two models complement each other. 
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b- Extensions of the McKinnon-Shaw framework 
Since the seminal work of McKinnon and Shaw, a number of formal economic 
models have been formulated that advocate the financial liberalisation in developing 
countries. In these models, money demand is a function of the real deposit rate of 
interest. When deposit rates are fixed by the government, i. e. when financial 
repressionist policies are in place, a higher inflation rate reduces demand for money 
in real terms. This decline in demand for money reduces the liabilities of the banking 
system, and, therefore, dries up the supply of credit for investment in productive 
capital. Thus, a ceiling on interest rates reduces the accumulation of productive 
capital, which, in turn, lowers the rate of economic growth (Cho 1988; Kapur, 1992; 
14 Fry 1978) . 
Even if the deposits and loan rates of interest were allowed to be freely determined, 
excessive reserve requirements create financial repression because banks' ability to 
augment capital accumulation through credit provision is restricted. Overall, the 
policy implications of the McKinnon-Shaw school are that 'economic growth can be 
increased by abolishing institutional interest rate ceilings, by abandoning selective or 
directed credit programs, by eliminating the reserve requirement tax, and by ensuring 
that the financial system operates competitively under conditions of free entry (Fry 
1995, p. 60)'. 
14 See Fry (1995: chapter 3) for a comprehensive review of the extensions of McKinnon-Shaw 
framework. 
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c- Critics of the financial liberalisation 
Various economists, especially the Structuralists, have criticised the policy 
implication of the financial liberalisation framework (see, for example, Taylor, 1983; 
van Wijnberegen, 1983; Studart, 1995). According to the Structuralists' models, the 
financial liberalisation, characterised by an increase in interest rates, leads to a 
decline in investment (Taylor, 1983; van Wijnbergen, 1983; Buffie, 1984). 
The central presumption of these models is that the unofficial market is more 
efficient in allocating financial resources than the formal financial sector (e. g. 
commercial banks). The financial liberalisation, which expands the size of the formal 
financial sector at the expense of the unofficial market, reduces the amount of credit 
available for investment because of the reserve requirements in the formal financial 
sector. Such reserve requirements constitute a leakage in the process of financial 
intermediation through commercial banks. Therefore, the Structuralists suggest that 
the financial liberalisation is detrimental for economic growth because it reduces the 
total credit availability in the economy (see Taylor, 1983; Buffie, 1984). 
Van Wijnbergen (1983) argues that the benefits of the financial liberalisation are 
crucially dependent on a hidden assumption that time deposits are a closer substitute 
to 'unproductive' assets not providing any intermediation, such as gold or cash, than 
they are to assets providing more rather than less intermediation than the banking 
system, such as deposits and loans in the unofficial market. If an increase in time 
deposits due to an increase in interest rate dries up funds in the unofficial market, 
rather than substituting unproductive assets, then such an increase may not be useful 
for economic growth. 
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d- From financial repression to robust financial restriction 
More recently, a new strand of literature has emerged that takes a more balanced 
approach towards the role of government in the financial sector in developing 
countries. This strand of literature, though criticizing financial repression, advocates 
robust government restrictions on the domestic financial sector in developing 
countries. For example, Stiglitz (1993,1994) and Stiglitz and Honohan (2001) 
suggest that purely market-based financial intermediation may not always lead to a 
socially efficient allocation of financial resources due to the presence of asymmetric 
infon-nation, which is a pervasive phenomenon in the financial sector because 
borrowers inherently know more about their projects than do the lenders of funds. 
Stiglitz (1994) suggests that the presence of information asymmetries may lead to 
market failures because, as lenders face both moral hazard and adverse selection, 
they may ration credit at less than market clearing prices to reduce their risk. Also, 
Stiglitz suggests that costly information may lead to suboptimal monitoring because 
financial institutions may assume that depositors are not monitoring them, and, 
therefore, have incentives to undertake high-risk projects. In addition, in the event of 
one bank's failure, depositors may assume, due to costly information, that there is a 
high risk for other banks to fail. This could lead to large deposit withdrawals, which, 
in turn, could make banks insolvent. In the presence of such market failures, Stiglitz 
(1993,1994) argues, government intervention in the domestic financial system is 
justified, and some amount of financial repression may be beneficial until advanced 
stages of the economic development are achieved. 
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Stiglitz and Honohan (2001) also advocate government interventions in the financial 
sector. However, they recognise that the objective of these interventions should not 
be to bend the functioning of the financial sector toward detailed goals of overall 
economic planning (i. e. like in the era of financial repression when governments 
decided the direction of financial resources). Rather, the purpose of these 
interventions should be to 'recognise the externalities involved in bad banking, and 
informational limitations of regulation' and to 'restrain financial practitioners from 
generating the type of severe economic damage that has recently been all too evident 
in inadequately regulated financial system (Stiglitz and Honohan 2001, p. 53)'. To 
this end, this strand of literature favours restrictions on interest rates on loans and 
deposits, restrictions on the portfolio selection of banks, and restrictions on the entry 
of new private sector banks. 
2.3 - Does financial liberalisation work? 
The multifaceted nature of the financial liberalisation makes the empirical 
measurement of its impact rather difficult. In addition, the dissimilar pre-reform 
socio-economic environment of countries that implemented the financial 
liberalisation policies make the comparison of success or failure of these policies 
very complicated. Also, as the financial liberalisation is usually accompanied by 
other socio-economic reform - fiscal reforms, for instance - it is 'virtually 
impossible to isolate the effect of financial components of the refon-n package (Fry 
1995, p. 179)'. Some researchers, usually the Structuralists and Post-Keynesians, 
criticize the financial liberalisation programme for generating financial crises in 
Latin America and East Asia. Others argue that the failure of the financial 
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liberalisation in some regions is due to the years of financial repression that has left 
the financial system in developing countries poorly prepared for a liberalised regime. 
2.3.1 - Some macroeconomic empirical evidence on the impact of the financial 
liberalisation 
Until the late 1990s, most of the empirical evidence on the effects of the financial 
liberalisation was based on aggregate macroeconomic data. This literature constitutes 
country case studies as well as cross-country regression analysis 15 . As the empirical 
literature on macroeconomic impacts of the financial liberalisation is vast, and as the 
main objective of the present study is to examine the impact of the financial 
liberalisation on the efficiency of banks, here we provide only a very brief review of 
the macroeconomic empirical literature. 
a- The financial liberalisation and savings 
One way of examining the impact of the financial liberalisation is to evaluate the 
impact of changes in interest rates on the level of savings in the economy. The basic 
idea is that the financial liberalisation, which leads to higher real interest rates, 
should stimulate savings in the economy. These increased savings, in turn, provide 
resources for investment and economic growth (see Bandiera et al., 2000). The first 
step in measuring the impact of the financial liberalisation through increased saving 
is to examine the interest elasticity of savings. That is, whether changes in interest 
rates influence the savings behaviour of individuals. In this regard, the recent reviews 
by Srinivasan (1993) and Fry (1995, section 8.2) conclude that there is no consensus 
on the interest elasticity of savings. This disagreement, Fry (1995, p. 158) suggests, 
15 See, for example, the edited volumes by Caprio et al. (1994,2001), and Fanelli and Medhora 
(1998). 
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4springs from different measure of savings and real interest rates, different theoretical 
models, different econometric techniques, different samples of developing countries, 
and different time periods'. 
In a recent study, Bandiera et al. (2000), using principal components, construct 25- 
year time series indices of the financial liberalisation in 8 countries, namely Chile, 
Ghana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Bandiera et al. 
(2000) employ both country-by-country estimation and panel data estimation to 
examine the impact of the financial liberalisation on savings. They conclude that 
there is no strong, and reliable, interest-rate effect on savings. 
b- The financial liberalisation and investment 
Another way of examining the role of the financial liberalisation is to see whether it 
influences the level of investment in the economy. Like the relationship between 
savings and the financial liberalisation, there is no consensus on the relationship 
between the level of investment and the financial liberalisation. For example, 
Dernetriades and Devereux (1992) 16 find a positive, though insignificant, effect of 
negative real interest rates on investment in a pooled time-series for 63 developing 
countries over the period 1962-1990. They conclude that financial repression, by 
lowering the marginal cost of borrowing, stimulates investment. In contrast, Dailami 
and Giugale (1991) find a positive relationship between real interest rates and private 
investment ratios in Columbia and India over the period 1965-1985. 
" Cited in Fry (1995, section 8.3). 
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c- The financial liberalisation and economic growth 
A simple way of examining the impact of the financial liberalisation is to evaluate 
whether or not it is accompanied by a higher rate of economic growth. However, as 
mentioned earlier, it should be noted that due to the multifaceted nature of the ESRs, 
including the financial liberalisation programme, it is virtually impossible to attribute 
any change in economic growth to any particular components of the reforms process. 
Various studies try to examine the effect of the financial liberalisation by using a 
reduced-form equation in which real interest rates are used as a proxy for the 
financial liberalisation or repression (i. e. positive real interest rate for the financial 
liberalisation and negative for financial repression). 
World Bank (1989) divides 34 developing countries in three groups: the first group 
exhibit positive real deposit rates, the second moderately negative (less than 0 but 
greater than -10), and the third group displays highly negative deposit rates (lower 
than -10). The study finds that economic growth, proxied by GDP growth, 
in the 
countries with highly negative real deposit rates is considerably lower than the 
growth in the countries with positive real deposit rates. Therefore, the World Bank's 
study suggests that financial repression, which represses the interest rate, is 
detrimental for economic growth. 
Fry (198 1) suggest that on average I percentage point increase in the real deposit rate 
(due to the financial liberalisation) on interest towards its competitive free-market 
equilibnum level is associated with a rise in the rate of economic growth of about 
half of percentage point. For 53 countries over the period 1960-85, Roubini and Sala- 
i-Martin (1992) also find some evidence suggesting that countries with real interest 
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rates less than -5% in the 1970s experienced growth rates that averaged 1.4 
percentage points less than growth rates in countries with positive real interest rates. 
d- The financial liberalisation and financial fragility 
In a recent paper, Demirgtiq-Kunt and Detragiache (2001) attempt to investigate the 
connection between the financial liberalisation and financial fragility. Their main 
argument is that the 'financial liberalisation, by giving banks and other financial 
intermediaries more freedom of action, can increase the opportunities to take on risk, 
thereby increasing financial fragility ... If prudential regulation and supervision are 
not effective at controlling bank behaviour and realigning incentives, [the] 
liberalisation may increase financial fragility well above what is socially desira e 17 
(Demirgiiq-Kunt and Detragiache, 2001, p. 96). 
To identify the impact of the financial liberalisation on financial fragility, Demirgtiq- 
Kunt and Detragiache (2001) estimate the probability of banking crises using a 
multivariate logit model, and test the hypothesis that a dummy variable capturing 
whether the financial system is liberalised or not significantly increases the 
probability of a crises when other factors are controlled for. DemirgUq-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2001) find that, besides low GDP growth, high inflation, adverse terms 
of trade, high real interest rates, the probability of banking crises is strongly 
positively correlated with the financial liberalisation. This may suggest that the 
financial liberalisation is a significant factor leading to banking sector fragility. In 
addition, they find that the effect of the financial liberalisation on banking fragility 
17 Some risk is not bad as high risk, high return investments may dominate low risk, low return 
ventures (Demirgtiq-Kunt and Detragiache, 2001, p. 96). 
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does not appear to be characteristic of the immediate aftermath of change in policy, 
but rather 'it manifests itself only over time' (p. 105). 
2.3.2 - Prerequisites and sequencing of the financial liberalisation programme 
The above brief discussion on the empirical relationship between the financial 
liberalisation and economic performance suggests that there is no clear evidence on 
whether the financial liberalisation is beneficial for developing countries. Moreover, 
some studies even suggest a negative relationship between the financial liberalisation 
and economic performance. To support the financial liberalisation paradigm in the 
presence of this controversial empirical evidence, it is argued that: 
'[t]he basic problem lies in the perverse reaction to higher interest rate by 
insolvent (or non-profit-motivated) economic agents - governments, 
firms or individuals. By definition, an insolvent agent (one whose 
liabilities exceed its assets) or 'distress borrower' is unable to repay its 
loans. Hence, it is not deterred from borrowing by higher cost. It simply 
continues, if it can, to borrow whatever it needs to finance its losses. 
These inevitably increase with an increase in the interest rate which 
drives up the agent's cost of servicing loans (Fry, 1997, p. 758)'. 
For example, in a widely cited paper, Diaz-Alejandro's (1985) attempts to examine 
the failure of the financial liberalisation programme in several Latin American 
countries, especially in Chile, during the 1960s and 1970s. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) 
suggests that the key reasons for this failure were, inter alia, transfer of ownership of 
public sector banks to private owners without investigating the credentials of these 
new owners, lack of proper supervision, credibility of government's announced 
policy of not bailing out the failing financial institutions, and huge capital inflows in 
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the presence of appreciating exchange rates. To avoid such a situation, many recent 
studies have commented on 'prerequisites' and 'sequencing' of a successful financial 
liberalisation programme (see Nsouli et al., 2001). Fry (1995,1997) suggests the 
following prerequisites for a successful financial liberalisation programme: 
Adequate prudential regulation and supervision of commercial banks, 
implying some minimal level of accounting and legal infrastructure. 
2- A reasonable degree of price stability. 
3- Fiscal discipline taking the form of a sustainable government 
borrowing requirement that avoids inflationary expansion of reserve 
money by the central bank either through direct domestic borrowing by 
the government or through the indirect effect of government borrowing 
that produces surges of capital inflows requiring large purchase of 
foreign exchange by the central bank to prevent exchange rate 
appreciation. 
4- Profit-maximi sing, competitive behaviour by the commercial banks. 
5- A tax system that does not impose discriminatory explicit or implicit 
taxes on financial intermediation. 
Besides these prerequisites, appropriate sequencing of the overall economic and 
structural reforms is essential to achieve the underlying objectives of the financial 
liberalisation, as well as the other elements of the reforms. The sequencing of 
reforms refers to the order in which either macroeconomic policy actions or specific 
reforms are introduced. Sequencing involves the order in which reforms are 
undertaken across sectors (for example, whether fiscal adjustment or stabilisation 
should be prerequisites for introducing current account liberalisation or decontrolling 
prices) and the order in which reforms are undertaken within sectors (for example, 
whether in the case of capital account liberalisation, foreign direct investment or 
short-tenn capital flows should be liberalised first) (see Nsouli et al., 2001). In the 
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case of developing countries, many papers suggest that the financial liberalisation 
should precede capital account liberalisation (especially short-tenn capital) and 
follow fiscal and monetary stabilisation (see McKinnon, 1991; Edwards, 1990). This 
recent strand of literature on the prerequisites and sequencing of the financial 
liberalisation suggests that there is no question that financial repression inhibits 
growth, the debate in economics should concentrate on how to devise a programme 
that can help a transition from financial repression towards the financial 
liberalisation. 
2.4 - The financial liberalisation and the efficiency of commercial banks in 
developing countries 
As noted in chapter 1, a key stylised fact of the financial sector in almost all 
developing countries is that most of the intermediation between savers and borrowers 
is carried out by commercial banks. The size of other financial institutions and 
market is insignificant relative to that of the commercial banking industry (Fry, 
1995). Given the importance of commercial banks in developing countries, it is 
imperative to examine how efficient these inten-nediaries are in performing their 
functions. 
The early theoretical and empirical literature on banks in developing countries 
emphasised their 'allocative efficiency', and endeavoured to examine whether the 
financial liberalisation process has enhanced this efficiency (see, for example, 
Schiantarelli et al., 1994). This literature emphasises the inherent information 
asymmetries in financial markets, i. e. borrowers have more information on their 
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investment in comparison with lenders' 8. The empirical studies, therefore, attempt to 
examine whether financial intermediaries could minimise these information 
asymmetries through infon-nation gathering and monitoring. In this context, Jaramillo 
et al. (1992), using a panel of 420 Ecuadorian firms, examine the allocative 
efficiency of banks before and after the implementation of the financial 
liberalisation. They find that, ceteris paribus, the flow of funds to technically more 
efficient firms increased after the liberalisation. Therefore, they argue that the 
financial liberalisation enhanced banks' allocative efficiency as banks become more 
efficient in differentiating between good and bad borrowers. 
Starting in the late 1990s, following the empirical literature on financial institutions 
in developed countries, a new strand of literature has emerged that attempts to 
examine the 'productive' efficiency of banks in developing countries. The productive 
efficiency of a firm refers to its ability to 'determine optimal mix of inputs' 
(price/allocative efficiency), and 'optimally utilise the determined inputs' (technical 
efficiency)19. One key function of commercial banks in developing countries is 
intermediation between savers and borrowers, i. e. mobilising funds and lending the 
acquired funds to borrowers (see Fry, 1995, p. 294). Therefore, productive efficiency, 
in the context of banking firms, refers to their ability to intermediate with given 
18 The information asymmetries could lead to 'adverse selection' and 'moral hazard' problem. 
Adverse selection is the problem that occurs before a loan is negotiated. While moral hazard problem 
arises after the loan is advanced (see Stigliz and Weiss, 198 1). 
19 These concepts, and parametric and non-parametric frontier techniques to measure them, will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapter. It should be noted that unlike the early empirical literature 
that referred to the 'allocative efficiency' of financial institution as their ability to lend to projects with 
highest returns, the use of the term 'allocative efficiency' in this recent literature is related to the 
production process of banks. In rest of this thesis, we will use the term 'allocative efficiency' to refer 
to determination of the optimal set of inputs. 
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resources. Given the importance of commercial banks in developing countries, it is 
important for policy makers, academics, and bank managers to examine the 
productive efficiency of these intermediaries because: 
"Greater [productive] efficiency might be expected to lead to 
improved financial products and services, a higher volume of funds 
intermediated, greater and more appropriate innovations, a generally 
more responsive financial system, and improved risk-taking 
capabilities if efficiency gains are channelled into improved capital 
adequacy position" (Gardener, 1995, p. 7). 
The examination of the productive efficiency of commercial banks is especially 
germane to those developing countries that initiated the economic and structural 
reforms to eliminate the alleged distortions and inefficiencies created by the decades 
of state-interventionist policies. Also, Fry (1995, p. 322) suggests that the failure of 
the financial liberalisation programme in many developing countries is due to high 
intermediation cost that banks in these countries incur. The high intermediation cost, 
we submit, could be due to low productive efficiency of banks in determining the 
optimal set of inputs and optimal utilisation of these inputs to carry out their 
intermediation function. Therefore, it is important to measure the efficiency of banks 
in developing countries, and to examine whether the financial liberalisation process 
has enabled and encouraged banks to improve their resource utilisation. 
However, until the late 1990s, little empirical research had gone into the measurement 
of the productive efficiency of banks in developing countries before and after the 
implementation of the financial liberalisation. At least two reasons could be 
forwarded for this lack of research. First, as reviewed in the previous sections, the 
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main emphasis of early empirical studies on the financial liberalisation in developing 
countries was 'macroeconomic' impacts of the financial liberalisation. That is, the 
early empirical studies endeavoured to examine how the financial liberalisation 
influenced the level of savings, investment, domestic private credit, or economic 
growth in developing countries. Second, as recent studies have noted, the empirical 
literature on the efficiency of financial institutions has been largely directed towards 
the financial institutions in developed countries, especially in the US (Berger and 
Humphrey 1997, Isik and Hassan 2003). In addition, the unavailability of 
microeconomic data on the annual accounts of banks, which are required to employ 
the contemporary frontier techniques to measure banks' efficiency, could have 
contributed to this lack of empirical investigation. 
Following the empirical studies on the impact of financial deregulation in the United 
States and Europe, a handful of recent studies have measured the productive 
efficiency of banks in developing countries, and some of these studies have sought to 
examine whether the financial liberalisation has had any impact on the measured 
efficiency. This strand of literature suggests that the financial liberalisation can 
influence the productive efficiency of banks by altering the market structure of the 
banking industry and by changing the regulatory framework under which banks 
operate. Market structure consists of the degree of competition, concentration, and 
demand for services provided by banks. Changes in the regulatory framework refer 
to deregulation of interest rates and priority sector lending, reduction in reserve 
requirements, and so forth. We will review these recent empirical studies in some 
detail in the next chapter after reviewing the frontier techniques that they employ to 
measure the productive efficiency of banks. In addition, we will review the 
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transaction costs/property rights approach, the behavioural theory of the firm, and the 
X-efficiency theory to understand why firms might not be able to utilise their 
resource efficiently. 
2.5 - Summary and conclusion 
The economic and structural reforms in developing countries primarily include fiscal 
reforms to curtail governments' budget deficits, reductions in tariffs on international 
trade, dismantling of barriers on private (domestic and foreign) investment, 
privatisation of state-owned-enterprises, and the financial liberalisation. This chapter 
presented a very brief review of the theoretical and early empirical literature on the 
financial liberalisation in developing countries. 
Prior to the financial liberalisation, governments decided the direction and price of 
financial resources. However, with the seminal work of McKinnon and Shaw, these 
policies of heavy government interventions confronted strong criticism: it was 
argued that the governments' interventions had repressed the domestic financial 
system in the developing countries, and made this sector inefficient in mobilising and 
allocating scarce financial resources. To enhance the efficiency of the domestic 
financial sector in mobilising and allocating financial resources, the financial 
liberalisation was proposed. 
We argued that until the late 1990s, the empirical literature on the financial 
liberalisation largely concentrated on evaluating the macroeconomic impacts of the 
liberalisation, and little attention was paid to the empirical investigation of the impact 
of the financial liberalisation programme on the productive efficiency of individual 
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financial institutions operating in these countries. The reason for this, we argue, was 
that the early literature - empirical as well as theoretical - implicitly considered 
financial institutions as 'rational profit maximising agents' that respond objectively 
to the changes in environment (e. g. increased competition) brought about by the 
financial liberalisation process, and exert maximum effort to utilise their resources. 
Starting in the late 1990s, some empirical studies have empirically investigated 
whether the financial liberalisation influences the productive efficiency of financial 
institutions operating in developing countries. In the next chapter, we turn to this 
more recent literature. 
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Chapter 3 - Productive Efficiency: Meaning, Measurement, and 
Empirical Evidence on Banks in Developed and Developing 
Countries 
3.1 - Introduction 
The previous chapter briefly reviewed the early theoretical and empirical literature 
on the financial liberalisation programme in developing countries. It was argued that 
most of the early empirical literature was primarily concerned with macroeconomic 
changes - changes in the level of savings and investments, for instance - brought 
about by the liberalisation programme. Starting in the late 1990s, a new strand of 
literature has emerged that, following the empirical literature on the efficiency of 
banks in the US and Europe, attempts to examine the impact of the liberalisation on 
the internal productive efficiency of banks in developing countries. This recent 
literature hypothesises that the implementation of the financial liberalisation 
programme encourages and enables banks to improve their resource utilisation by 
reducing government interventions and by creating a flexible and competitive 
environment in which banks have more control over their inputs and outputs. This 
chapter reviews this recent empirical literature. 
Before reviewing this literature, however, we briefly discuss various theories of the 
firm. The aim of this discussion is to highlight the fact that the traditional 
neoclassical theory of the firm, which views the firm as a unified rational economic 
agent, ignores the issue of the internal efficiency of the fin-n. We briefly discuss the 
transaction costs/property rights approach, the X-efficiency theory of the finn, and 
the behavioural theory of the firm, which enable us to understand why firms may not 
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be able to utilise their resources optimally. We then discuss frontier techniques that 
enable one to determine empirically whether a firm is efficient relative to other 
similar firms. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the theories of 
the firm and highlights why firms may not be able to utilise their resources 
efficiently. Section 3.3 reviews five frontier techniques used to measure the 
efficiency of firms, and outlines various approaches used to specify inputs and 
outputs to measure the efficiency of banks using these frontier techniques. Section 
3.4 reviews the empirical literature on the efficiency of banks in developing 
countries. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 - Internal productive efficiency and the theory of the firm 
3.2.1 - The concept of efficiency in economics 
Since the late nineteenth century, the Business and Management literature has paid 
considerable attention to the efficient utilisation of resources by firms (see Witzel, 
2002). For example, leading figures of the Scientific Management literature, such as 
Frederick Winslow Taylor, emphasised measuring and improving the efficiency of 
firms by breaking down their operations into component parts, and then studying 
each component and looking for areas where improvements (i. e. reduction in inputs 
and/or increase in outputs) could be made (Taylor, 1911). In contrast, economics has 
traditionally endeavoured to expound the 'allocative efficiency' of markets. That is, 
how efficiently markets allocate scarce resources using the price mechanism; the 
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internal productive efficiency of firms was traditionally considered as an issue for 
engineers rather than economists (see Henderson and Quandt, 1980)'. 
However, starting with the seminal theoretical work of Koopmans 2 (1949,1951)and 
Debreu (1951), and the empirical work of Farrell (1957), a plethora of economic 
research endeavours to explain the internal productive efficiency of firms. Within 
this contemporary economics literature, the efficiency of a firm is usually 
decomposed into the firm's ability to (1) 'determine optimal mix of inputs according 
to their marginal productivity given the prices of their inputs', and (2) 'utilise the 
determined mix of inputs to produce the optimal level of outputs' (see, Farrell, 
1957). The former is known as 'allocative/price efficiency', while the latter is known 
as the 'technical efficiency' of the firm 3. 
It should be noted that the contemporary empirical literature considers efficiency as a 
relative, rather than absolute, phenomenon as it measures the ability of the firm to 
determine and utilise inputs relative to an estimated/calculated optimal standard of 
performance 4. Also, it should be noted that to establish whether the fin-n is efficient 
relative to any specified standard of performance, one needs to specify, in advance, 
the inputs and outputs of the firm. This may be easy for manufacturing firms that 
1 As Pigou stated '... it is not the business of economists to teach woollen manufacturers how to make 
and sell wool, or brewers how to make and sell beer' (quoted in Koopmans' Noble Prize lecture). 
2 Tjalling Koopmans' influential work on optimal utilisation of resources won him the Nobel Prize in 
economics in 1975. 
3 The allocative efficiency in this context refers to allocation of resources within firm rather than 
allocation of resources by markets using the price mechanism. 
' In section 3.3, we will review the Frontier Techniques that measure relative efficiency of firms by 
constructing a 'benchmark' production frontier obtained through either econometric estimation of 
cost/profit/production function or piece-wise linear combination of input-output ordered n-tuples of 
homogenous firms in a given sample. 
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employ a standard measurable input, say machine hours, to produce a standard 
measurable output. However, there are cases when a precise definition of firms' 
inputs and outputs is not available. This issue, as we shall see in section 3.4.4, is 
particularly relevant to the measurement of the efficiency of banking firms. 
3.2.2 - The traditional neoclassical theory of the firm 
The standard neoclassical theory views the firm as a 'rational economic entity' 
striving to maximise a well-defined objective function, usually profit maximisation 
(see Henderson and Quandt, 1980; Cyert and March, 1992). Towards this end, the 
fin-n transforms input(s) into output(s) in the face of a technological I y-determined 
'production function' or the 'state of the art'. The production function in this context 
is a known relation between factors of production and their corresponding outputs. 
Assuming that the firm is operating in a perfectly competitive market, maximisation 
of profit (i. e. the equilibrium position) is achieved by deten-nining the optimal mix of 
inputs by equating the marginal product and marginal cost of the factors of 
production, and output is determined by equating marginal cost with marginal 
revenue (where marginal revenue in perfect competition is given by a perfectly 
elastic demand curve). 
Other characteristics of this traditional neoclassical theory of the firm are (see De 
Alessi, 1983, p. 65): (1) transaction costs are zero (e. g. the costs of obtaining 
information about alternatives and of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing 
contracts are zero); (2) adjustment is instantaneous (i. e. the firm is assumed to make 
quick costless adjustments to any changes in its external environment); (3) all 
resources are fully allocated and privately held (i. e. the issue of agency between 
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owner and manager is assumed away); (4) owners allocate resources to productive 
purposes purely in response to pecuniary incentives; and (5) any shirking by owners 
and employees (including managers) is ruled out. This representation of firms reveals 
little curiosity regarding the internal productive efficiency because firms, by 
assumption, always exhibit allocative efficiency as they determine the optimal mix of 
inputs according to the marginal cost and marginal product of their inputs, and 
exhibit technical efficiency as they optimally utilise the determined mix of inputs 
according to a known production function 5. 
3.2.3 - Extensions of the traditional theory of the firm 
One key reason for the lack of emphasis on the internal operations of firms within the 
traditional theory is the implied asymmetry between the demand side of the 
microeconomics theory, which lays emphasis on individual consumers as the 
ultimate building block of consumer theory, and the supply side of the theory, which 
lays emphasis on the firm as the ultimate building block of production theory and not 
the individuals associated with the firm (see De Alessi, 1983; Ricketts, 2002). The 
firm in this tradition, as discussed above, is a mere production function converting 
inputs into outputs. However, starting in the 1950s, dissatisfaction with this 
simplistic view of the firm grew. It was argued that, unlike the neoclassical theory's 
representation of the firm as a unified rational entity, 
5 This theory of firm under perfectly competitive environment has been elaborated by taking into 
account different market conditions, such as imperfect competition. These elaborations, while 
consider various market conditions, retain the basic framework and decision-making process within 
firms. That is, firms are considered as rational economic entities constantly equating all costs and 
benefits in a changing external environment. 
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'[t]he modem "representative firm" is a large, complex organisation. Its 
major functions are performed by different divisions more or less 
coordinated by set of control procedures. It ordinarily produces many 
products, buys and sells in many different markets. Within the firm, 
information is generated and processed, decisions are made, results are 
evaluated, and procedures are changed. The external environment of the 
firm consists, in part, of other firms with comparable characteristics. If 
the market completely determined the firm's economic behaviour, these 
internal attributes would be little more than irrelevant artefacts. But the 
market is neither so pervasive nor so straightforward. ' (Cyert and March, 
1992, p. 2; emphasis added). 
Therefore, to take into account this complex nature of the firm, economists have 
extended the simplistic view by recognising the firm as a nexus of contracts among 
various 'opportunistic' individuals. The most influential amongst these extensions 
are: the transaction costs/property rights approach, the behavioural theory of the firm, 
and the X-efficiency theory (see Cyert and March, 1963; Leibenstein, 1979; Alchian 
and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975). The first two approaches endeavour to 
explain various organisational phenomena (such as, why do firms exist? what are the 
benefits of different organisational structures? What are the impacts of various 
patterns of property rights? ). The third approach, however, only concentrates on the 
presence of the so-called X-inefficiency (i. e. less than optimal utilisation of 
resources) in firms. As the literature on these theories is vast, here we only present a 
very brief overview that will enable us to see why firms may not always be able to 
utilise their resource efficiently. 
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a- The behavioural theory of the firm 
The behavioural theory by the Carnegie School endeavours to explain how firms 
make economic decisions regarding inputs, outputs, prices, investments, and so forth 
(see March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1992). Unlike the traditional 
neoclassical theory of the firm, which views the firm as a unified rational agent 
striving to maximise its profits, the behavioural. theory views the firm as a coalition 
of various participants such as owners, managers, employees, investors, customers, 
and so forth (see Dourna and Schreuder, 1998, chap. 6). Basic to the idea of the 
coalition is the expectation that individual participants may have substantially 
different preference orderings (i. e. goals). These participants receive payments from 
the firm and, in return, contribute to the operations of the firm. The payments to and 
demands of the participants are in the form of a variety of money Payments, 
perquisites, policies, personal treatments, and private commitments. 
As we noted earlier, in the neoclassical theory of the firm, the firm is assumed to 
have a single well-defined objective, usually profit maximisation. In the behavioural 
theory, as the firm is viewed as a coalition of individuals with conflicting goals, this 
standard neoclassical approach of defining the finn's goal breaks down. One key 
feature of the behavioural theory is its emphasis on the formation of the goals of the 
firm through a bargaining process among the individual participants. The bargaining 
power of each participant depends on his/her contributions towards the coalition. 
Therefore, unlike in the neoclassical theory, the firm in the behavioural theory may 
not have a single clearly defined objective. 
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This way of looking at the firm's goals is particularly relevant to our study of the 
efficiency of banks in the context of developing countries because banks in 
developing countries sometimes seem to follow multiple, and often conflicting, 
goals. For example, on the one hand, banks in developing countries provide services 
(e. g. loans and deposits) to earn profits. On the other hand, governments in 
developing countries usually require banks to channel their mobilised fund to the so- 
called priority sector at low interest rates. Towards this end, governments influence 
banks' objectives either directly (i. e. through nationalisation) or indirectly (i. e. 
through various policy directives). In both the cases, governments are influential in 
determining the asset portfolio of banks in developing countries and, hence, the goal 
of banks. 
The effort of individuals working within a bank to achieve one goal may not result in 
the accomplishment of the other goal. For example, if, on government's directions, 
banks try to maximise the amount of loans to priority sectors at low interest rates, 
their earnings may decline. Therefore, even if banks are efficient in generating 
earning assets (including loans to priority sectors), they may not be efficient in 
generating revenues from these assets. In this context, we submit, the implementation 
of the financial liberalisation programme could play a key role in reducing 
governments' influence on the objectives of banks through (1) a gradual privatisation 
of public sector banks, and (2) a gradual elimination of directed credit schemes and 
interest rate ceilings. In chapter 5 and 6, we will see how the efficiency of banks 
varies when two different input-output models are considered: one based on banks' 
income-based objective and other based on loan-based objective. Furthermore, we 
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will examine whether the efficiency of banks from the two models has converged 
during the post-financial liberalisation era. 
Another relevant feature of the behavioural theory is the presence of 'organisational 
slack'. Within the behavioural theory, the coalition among various participants is 
viable only if the payments made to these participants are adequate to keep them in 
the firm (i. e. according to their aspiration level). If resources exist to meet all the 
demands of these participants, and those resources are distributed so as to meet the 
demands, the coalition survives. The coalition's demands are analogous to the factor 
prices in the traditional theory of firm. However, in the behavioural theory, Cyert and 
March (1992) suggest, as the information on actual factor prices is hard to obtain, 
easily misinterpreted, and often unreliable, there is usually a disparity between the 
resources available to the organisation and the payments required to maintain the 
coalition. This difference between total resources and total necessary payments is 
called the organisational slack. In conventional economic theory slack is zero (i. e. an 
input is employed if and only if its marginal product exceeds its marginal cost, 
assuming that marginal product and marginal cost is known). This is not the case in 
the behavioural theory. Furthermore, Cyert and March (1992) suggest that when the 
environment becomes less favourable for the coalition (e. g. due to increased 
competition), resource scarcity brings on a renewed bargaining and tends to cut 
heavily into the excess payments that existed earlier. However, this 'does not 
necessarily mean [that] slack is deliberately created for such stabilising' because 
slack arises from the bargaining and decision process within the firm 'without 
conscious intent on the part of the coalition members to provide stability to the 
organisation' (Cyert and March, 1992, p. 41-44). 
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This feature of the behavioural theory could be relevant to this studý- when we 
compare the efficiency of public sector banks and private sector banks before and 
after the initiation of the financial liberalisation programme in India and Pakistan. 
Prior to the liberalisation, public sector banks were required to extend their branch 
network to rural and sub-urban areas. Also, as public sector banks hired on the basis 
of political affiliation of applicants, their staff grew rapidly prior to the liberalisation. 
The higher expenses of public sector banks due to these factors could be considered 
as the organisational slack i. e. excessive expenses that could be reduced without 
hampering banks' operations. Prior to the liberalisation, public sector banks had a 
guaranteed market because of the lack of competition due to governments' 
restrictions on the operations of private sector banks (domestic and foreign). 
Therefore, the slack continued to persist. However, after the initiation of the financial 
liberalisation, public sector banks in India and Pakistan, as well as in many other 
developing countries, are expected to rationalise their resource use to survive the 
competition from private sector banks. Therefore, it could be argued that with 
increasing competition, the organisation slack in public sector banks would decline. 
Another feature of the behavioural theory that is relevant to the internal productive 
efficiency of the firm is that of 'organisational choice'. According to the traditional 
neoclassical theory, the firm 'maximises', i. e. it decides after a careful calculation of 
the costs and benefits of all available alternatives. This is based on two assumptions: 
(1) the firm knows about all the available alternatives, and (2) the firm is able to 
compare the costs and benefits of these alternatives. According to the behavioural 6- 
theory, the firm has to make decisions under the conditions of partial ignorance (see 
March and Simon, 1958; Dourna and Schreuder, 1998). Instead of maximising, the 
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firm in the behavioural theory is engaged in 'satisficing, i. e. doing the best to 
survive comfortably instead of exploring all the alternatives (see Simon, 1955). 
Also, in contrast to the traditional theory, individuals (i. e. the participants in the 
coalition) in the behavioural theory exhibit 'bounded rationality' (Simon, 1955). This 
means that, due to cognitive limitations, the participants may not be able to evaluate 
the costs and benefits of all the available alternatives. The presence of bounded 
rationality and satisficing behaviour could also be one cause of relative productive 
inefficiency of firms. 
b- The transaction costs/property rights approach 
The property rights approach extends the traditional neoclassical theory of the firm in 
at least three important ways (see Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972; De Alessi, 1983; 
Dourna and Schreuder, 1998; Ricketts, 2002). First, instead of a unified rational 
entity, the firm is viewed as a coalition of opportunistic individuals, who are assumed 
to maximise their utility subject to the limits established by the existing 
organisational structure. The objectives of individuals working inside the firms may 
be different from the profit maximising objective of the firm. The assumption of 
opportunism suggests that some economic actors are "self-interest seeking with 
guile" (Williamson, 1975, p. 26) 
Second, unlike the neoclassical theory, transaction costs are recognised as being 
greater than zero. That is, it is recognised that, due to adverse selection and moral 
hazard, the costs of obtaining information about various alternatives and of 
negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing contracts are not zero. 
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Third, this strand of literature takes into account the effects of various patterns of 
property rights on the decision-making behaviour of individuals associated with the 
firm. This, in turn, influences the resource allocation and utilisation within the firm. 
The pattern of property rights is important because 
'[t]he value of any good exchanged depends, ceteris paribus, on the bundle 
of property rights that is conveyed in the transaction. For example, the 
worth of a house to an individual will be relatively greater if the bundle of 
property rights acquired contains the right to exclude gasoline stations, 
chemical plants, etc. from the immediate vicinity of the house. It follows 
that the set of various property rights held over resources enters into the 
utility function of the decision maker. Consequently, a change in the 
general system of property relations must affect the way people behave 
and, through this effect on behaviour, property rights assignments affect 
the allocation of resources, composition of output, distribution of income, 
etc. ' (Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972, p. 1139; emphasis added). 
This extension of the theory of the firm by recognising the firm as a coalition of 
opportunistic individuals, and by taking into account positive transaction costs and 
the impact of different patterns of property rights can enable us to understand why 
firms may exhibit productive inefficiency. For example, Oliver Williamson (1963) 
highlights the possible effects of managerial discretion on the resource allocation 
decisions within firms. In Williamson's framework, managers of the firm, instead of 
maximising profits of the firm, maximise their own utility, which depends on salary, 
security, power, status, prestige, professional excellence, and so forth. Williamson 
then introduces the concept of 'expense preference' according to which, managers 
are not neutral towards different kinds of costs, i. e. some types of expenses are 
preferred over others. In particular, 'staff expenses, expenditures for emoluments, 
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and funds available for discretionary investment have value additional to that which 
derives from their productivity' (Williamson, 1963, p. 1034). This utility 
maximisation by the firm's managers through their expense preference may augment 
the firm's costs without increasing outputs, which, in turn, impede the firm's ability 
to allocate and utilise resource in an efficient manner. 
In their influential paper, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) suggest that the essence of the 
firm is that it permits people to work as a team. They suggest that, in an organisation 
(i. e. firm) a failure to reward without regard to the productive effort of individuals 
will distort the incentive to engage in any productive effort. The organisation, 
therefore, is required to 'meter input productivity' and 'meter rewards". If 
organisation meters poorly, with rewards and productivity only loosely correlated, 
then productivity will be smaller. In the traditional neoclassical theory, Alchian and 
Demsetz (1972) argue, rewards of inputs are allocated, without any costs, according 
to their marginal productivity. However, 'team production' makes metering costly 
because '[i]n team production, marginal products of cooperative team members are 
not so directly and separably (i. e. cheaply) observable' (p. 780). That is, within a 
team, 'production is not a sequence of identifiable stages by which a series of 
intermediate products are gradually transformed into final output. Rather, the final 
output is the joint result of the combined efforts of all the inputs working at the same 
time' (Ricketts, 2002, p. 98-99). 
Within the firm, if it were costless to detect the behaviour/productive effort of 
individual members of the team, nobody would have an incentive to shirk, because 
6 By metering, Alchian and Demsetz refer to measurements and control. 
49 
nobody could impose cost of his/her shirking on the other member of his/her team. 
The shirking by one member of the team may affect the productivity of the other 
member of the team. However., 'since costs must be incurred to monitor each other, 
each input owner will have more incentive to shirk when he works as part of a team, 
than if his performance could be monitored easily or if he did not work as a team 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972, p. 780). In the presence of metering costs (i. e. 
monitoring, detecting, and policing costs) each individual has more incentive to shirk 
and to take more leisure (one argument of his/her utility function) rather than 
engaging in the productive effort. Therefore, the presence of opportunistic behaviour 
and transaction costs may hinder the optimal resource utilisation that is otherwise 
attainable. 
If shirking is to be checked, someone must have both the right to monitor the 
performance of team members and sufficient incentive not to shirk himself. To this 
end, he must possess specific property rights including: (1) the right to receive the 
residual after all other inputs have been rewarded, (2) the right to terminate and 
revise the membership of the team, and (3) the right to sell these two rights (see 
Furubotn and Pejovich, 1972). This bundle of property rights defines ownership of 
the classical capitalist firm. Alchian and Demsetz then discuss, by considering how 
the attenuation of the basic property rights affects the actions of decision makers, 
metering costs in different organisational forms, such as profit-sharing 
firms, 
corporations, and non-profit firms. This emphasis on the private property rights could 
be useful in explaining differences in the efficiency, if any, of public sector and 
private sector banks. 
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c- The X-efficiency theory of the firm 
In a series of papers, Leibenstein suggested that firms might not always engage in 
optimal utilisation of their inputs. Leibenstein called this under-utilisation of inputs 
the 'X-inefficiency', where X represents an unknown factor responsible for a non- 
allocative type of inefficiency within firms (see Frantz, 1997). Leibenstein (1966, 
1979) argued that the traditional neoclassical theory of the firm, which considered 
firms as a mere mathematical relationship between inputs and outputs, did not 
explain why firms might under-utilise their outputs. To explain this so-called X- 
inefficiency of firms, Leibenstein formulated his X-efficiency theory. 
According to Leibenstein, X-efficiency differs from, and contributes to, the 
traditional theory of the firm in five ways (see Table 3.1). First, unlike the traditional 
theory, Leibenstein's X-efficiency theory focuses on individuals working in the firm 
rather than considering the firm as a unified entity striving to maximise profits. 
Second, Leibenstein assumes that individuals exhibit 'selective rationality'. 
According to the 'selective rationality' assumption, individuals, on the one hand, 
want to adhere to standards and strive to be attentive and calculating to attain the 
maximum. Leibenstein refers to this aspect of individuals' personality as the 
4 superego function (i. e. the part of the mind that acts as a self-critical conscience, 
reflecting social standards)'. On the other hand, sometime individuals select to 
engage in a decision-making behaviour that is not calculative and attentive. 
Leibenstein refers to this aspect as the 'id function (i. e. the part of the mind in which 
innate instinctive impulses and primary processes are manifest)'. The X-efficiency 
theory postulates that, on average, each individual is influenced by both the functions 
in a way that leads to a compromise between the two. 
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Third, the X-efficiency theory assumes that labour contracts are incomplete. That is, 
the payment side of a labour contract is clearly specified but the effort side is not. 
Consequently, due to this incomplete labour contract, workers have discretion over 
how much effort they want to put into their work (Frantz, 1997). Fourth, Leibenstein 
assumes that functional relations are surrounded by inert areas within which changes 
in certain values of independent variables do not result in changes in dependent 
variables. Finally, Leibenstein assumes that, within the firm, there is a conflict of 
interest between agents and principals (e. g. managers and employees). 
With these five elements, Leibenstein attempted to explain that firms might not 
always utilise their resources efficiently because firms' managers are not 'completely 
in command of the full spectrum of the decision-making process. Management must 
cope with each worker's motivation preference, and in some instances the latter are 
so complex, even at points contradictory, that a 'best' outcome is not more than 
management's collective (but no less subjective) conclusion that it has done as much 
as it can, and whatever that was it was good enough to keep the firm economically 
afloat' (Dean and Perlman, 1998). 
Within the X-efficiency theory, the utilisation of resources depends primarily on the 
level of effort of individuals within the firm. The level of effort depends on internal 
pressure (i. e. pressure from peers or managers) and external pressure (e. g. pressure 
due to increasing competition). In the context of our study, it could be argued that the 
increase in the level of competition in the commercial banking industry brought 
about by the entry of new private (domestic and foreign) banks, as well as the entry 
of non-bank financial institutions, could enhance the level of pressure on individuals 
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operating within banks. This, in turn, could influence the level of internal efficiency 
(i. e. X-inefficiency) of banks in India and Pakistan. 
Table 3.1 -A comparison of the X-efficiency theory and the 
neoclassical theory 
Components X-efficiency Theory Neoclassical theory 
Units Individuals Households and firms 
Psychology Selective rationality Maximisation or minimisation 
Contracts Incomplete Complete 
Effort 
Inert areas 
Agent-principal 
Discretionary variable 
Important variable 
Differential interest 
Assumed given 
None 
Identity of interests 
Reproduced from Leibenstein (1979, p. 3) 
3.3 - The measurement of efficiency using frontier techniques 
The previous section suggests that the traditional theory of the firm does not explain 
why firms may not be able to utilise their resources efficiently. We then reviewed the 
property rights/transaction costs approach, the behavioural theory of the firm, and the 
X-efficiency theory of the firm. These theories highlight some situations when the 
firm may deviate from the optimal resource utilisation. However, whether the firm is 
efficient or inefficient in reality is an empirical question because it requires a 
comparison between the actual operations of the firm and some best practice 
benchmark. In this section, we review the frontier techniques that enable one to 
evaluate the efficiency of firms relative to an estimated/calculated production frontier 
using actual data on the inputs and outputs of firms in a sample. 
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3.3.1 - Frontier techniques to measure efficiency 
The contemporary empirical literature on the measurement of efficiency builds on 
the seminal paper of Farrell (1957). As highlighted earlier, according to Farrell 
(1957), the efficiency of a firm is composed of 'technical efficiency' and 
6price/allocative efficiency' (see, Fdre, Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994; Lovell, 1993; 
Coelli et al., 1998). Allocative/price efficiency refers to the finn's ability to 
determine the optimal mix of inputs given the prices of inputs that minimises 
(maximises) their cost (profit). The technical efficiency of the firm, on the other 
hand, refers to managers' ability to utilise the determined set of inputs. That is, to be 
technically efficient a firm must minimise (maximise) its inputs (outputs) given 
outputs (inputs). Following Farrell (1957), we use Figure 3.1 to explain the 
distinction between the two efficiency concepts (see Coelli et al., 1998). 
Assume an industry in which firms use two inputs, x, and X2, to produce a single 
output, y. Furthermore, assume that constant returns to scale hold. The assumption of 
constant returns to scale allows the production technology to be represented using the 
unit isoquant, i. e. input(s) per one unit of output (xj/y = XI and x2ly = X2). Later on, 
we will relax this assumption to explain the difference between pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency. The curve AA' represents the given 'technology' or 
'state of the art' that shows the technical relationship between inputs and outputs (i. e. 
an isoquant). All the firms in the industry that produce according to this given state 
of the art (i. e. firms that are on the isoquant) are technically efficient. Now, assume 
that given this isoquant that represents optimal utilisation of inputs, we want to 
evaluate the efficiency of a firm that operates at point R. The technical efficlency of 
this firm can be measured by evaluating the distance between point R and the 
54 
isoquant representing the fully efficient firms. That is, the distance DR, which 
denotes the amount by which the two inputs can be proportionally reduced without 
affecting the level of output, represents the technical efficiency of the firm. 
Mathematically, the technical efficiency (TE) is given by: 
TE = ODIOR 
This TE takes a value between 0 and 1, where I represents the optimal utilisation. 
Clearly, the firm operating at point R is technically inefficient as it could reduce the 
amount of inputs to produce one unit of output. 
X" 
s 
0 
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Efficiency 
In the economics literature, technical efficiency refers to the ability of management 
to organise, manage, and coordinate its inputs in a way that maximum output can be 
obtained. If 'we were to observe two identical firms with same scale of operation, 
using the same technology and same combination of inputs to produce a homogenous 
product, then difference in output produced could only be explained by difference in 
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the way the two firms were operated, i. e. managed and organised' (Mayes et al., 
1994, p. 14). 
The concept of technical efficiency does not consider the prices of inputs and, 
therefore, does not consider whether firms in an industry are allocating their inputs in 
the optimal proportion. Allocative efficiency considers the prices of inputs, and 
assumes that firms are profit maximising or cost minimising rational agents. 
Allocative efficiency 'involves selecting that mix of inputs (e. g., labour and capital) 
which produce a given quantity of output at minimum cost' (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 5). 
In Figure 3.1, assuming that the prices of the two inputs are known, the line SS' 
denotes the isocost line. The allocative efficiency (AE) of the firm operating at point 
R involves measuring the distance between G and D as this distance represents the 
reduction in the production cost of the firm. Mathematically, AE is given by the 
ratio: 
AE = OGIOD 
The combination of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency is known as overall 
(I economic efficiency'. Thus, technical efficiency only requires input-output data, but 
economic efficiency also requires price data. 
Technical efficiency can be decomposed into two components: pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency (see Thanassoulis, 2001; Coelli et al., 1998). This 
decomposition of technical efficiency into pure technical efficiency and scale 
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efficiency rests on the economic concept of economies and diseconornies of scale 7. A 
scale efficient firm produces at a point where constant returns to scale hold. The 
decomposition of technical efficiency into scale efficiency and pure technical 
efficiency can be illustrated using Figure 3.2 (see Coelli et al., 1998, p. 4). 
V 
Y2 
Y1 
x 
Figure 3.2 assumes that one input, X, is used to produce one output, Y. The 
production frontier is represented by the curve F'. Unlike in the Figure 3.1, the 
assumption of constant returns to scale is not imposed on the production frontier F. 
The production frontier exhibits increasing returns to scale (economies of scale) until 
the point C, constant return to scale at point C, and decreasing returns to scale 
(diseconomies of scale) beyond C. A firm producing at point D produces output y, 
using input x. This firm is technically inefficient due to two reasons. First, it exhibits 
7A production function exhibits constant returns to scale if proportionate increase in all inputs causes 
output to increase in the same proportion. A production function is subject to increasing return to scale 
(or economies of scale) if a proportionate increase in all inputs results in a more than proportionate 
increase in output. A production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale (or diseconornies of 
scale) when a proportionate increase in all inputs results in a less than proportionate increase in output 
(see Waldman and Jensen, 2001). 
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Fignu-e 3.2: Pure tecluxical efficiency and sc, -de efficiency 
pure technical inefficiency as it is not utilising its given inputs efficiently by not 
producing at the production frontier F. If input x is fully utilised, the firm should 
produce at the point A. Second, at point D, the finn is scale inefficient as it is not 
producing at the constant returns to scale represented by the 450 line. At point A, 
although the firm operates at the efficient production frontier, it exhibits decreasing 
returns to scale. That is, at point A, the finn is pure technically efficient, but it is 
scale inefficient. 
As apparent from this brief discussion, the empirical investigation of whether a firm is 
efficient or not hinges upon (1) the knowledge of the 'production frontier' representing 
the optimal utilisation of resources, and (2) the measurement of deviation from the best 
practice frontier. The frontier techniques discussed below enable one to achieve these 
two tasks. Based on the assumptions made about the shape of the best practice frontier, 
the treatment of random error in the estimation process, and the distributions assumed 
for inefficiency and random error, the frontier techniques employed in the literature 
can be classified into two groups: parametric techniques and non-parametric 
techniques 8. Some technical details of the two techniques applied in this study (i. e. 
parametric stochastic frontier analysis and non-parametric data envelopment analysis) 
will be provided in chapter 5 and 6. Here, we present a brief overview of the 
-frequently used parametric and non-parametric techniques. 
8 The following sub-sections draw on some of the many reviews of the parametric and non-parametric 
approaches, especially Berger and Humphrey (1997), Bauer et al . (1998), Coelli et al. (1998), 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), and Murillo-Zamarano (2004). However, the examples of studies 
using various techniques cited herein are from the author's own literature review. I 
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a- Parametric approaches 
The parametric approach to measure the efficiency of firms requires the selection of 
economic concepts (for example, profit function or cost function), a pre-specified 
functional form for the function (for example, translog functional form or Fourier 
flexible functional form) 9, and distributional assumption for the error term of the 
estimated frontier (see Bauer et al., 1998). The methodology is stochastic as the error 
term is assumed to consist of an inefficiency component and random noise. 
Efficiency is measured by separating the inefficiency component from the composite 
error term (see Berger et al., 1993; Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Bauer et al., 1998). 
Three parametric approaches have been used in the empirical literature to calculate 
the efficiency of financial institutions. These approaches are: Stochastic Frontier 
Approach (SFA), Distribution Free Approach (DFA), and Thick Frontier Approach 
(TFA). These parametric approaches differ from each other in determining how best 
to separate random error term from the inefficiency of firms in a given sample. 
I- Stochastic frontier approach (SFA) 
In SFA, a functional form for a cost, profit, or production relationship among inputs, 
outputs, and environmental factors is specified and estimated using econometric 
techniques, usually maximum likelihood estimation procedure (see Kumbhakar and 
Lovell, 2000). The SFA posits a composed error model where the inefficiency term 
is assumed to follow an asymmetric distribution, usually half-normal, while random 
errors are assumed to follow a symmetric distribution, usually the standard normal 
(Berger and Mester 1997; Bauer et al., 1998, p. 93; Coelli et al., 1998, and 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). That is, the error term Y from the estimated frontier 
9 See, for example, Altunbas et al. (2001). 
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is assumed to be composed of two terms, i. e. e=u+v, where y represents 
inefficiency and follows a half-normal distribution or truncated non-nal distribution, 
and v represents random error that is assumed to be normally distributed'o. Both the 
inefficiency term and the random error term are assumed to be orthogonal to inputs, 
outputs, or exogenous variables used in the pre-specified production function (Ferrier 
and Lovell, 1990). Examples of studies that have employed SFA are: Williams and 
Gardner (2003), Altunbas et al. (2001), Carbo, Gardner, and Williams (2002), Hao et 
al (2001), Bauer et al. (1998), Abd-Karim (2001), Berger and DeYoung (1997), and 
Mester (1996). 
11 
- Thick Frontier Approach 
Like SFA, the Thick Frontier Approach (TFA) also specifies a functional form for 
the cost function. The cost function is estimated for the firms in the lowest average 
cost quartile. This estimated frontier is considered as a 'thick frontier', and it is 
assumed that the firms forming this frontier are of greater than average efficiency. A 
cost function is also estimated for the highest average cost quartile and it is assumed 
that the firms forming it are of less than average efficiency. 'The difference between 
10 Greene (1990) suggests that other distributions for inefficiency may be more appropriate than half 
normal. The imposition of different distributional assumption has influenced the estimation of 
efficiencies of financial institutions (see, Yuengert, 1993; Mester, 1996; Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Green (1990) proposes a Gamma distribution for the inefficiency term. Lee (1983) proposed a four- 
parameter Pearson distribution. However, Bauer et al. (1998, p. 94) argue that any distributional 
assumption simply imposed could lead to significant error in estimating individual firm efficiencies. 
For example, half-normal assumption on the inefficiencies imposes that most of the firms are 
clustered near full efficiency, but there is no theoretical reason why inefficiencies could not be more 
evenly distributed of distributed close to symmetrically, like the assumed distribution of the random 
error. Although more flexible distributions 
have been proposed, the two original single parameter 
distributions remain the distributions of choice for the empirical research on efficiency (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell, 2000, P. 9) 
60 
the two estimated cost function are separated into 'market factors', which are 
explained by differences in the available exogenous variables, and an 'inefficiency 
residual', which cannot be explained' (Berger and Humphrey, 1991, p. 121). The 
deviations from predicted performance values within the highest and lowest 
performance quartiles of observations are assumed to be due to random error. This 
approach of measuring inefficiency does not provide exact point estimates for the 
efficiencies of the individuals firms constituting the sample but is intended instead to 
provide an estimate of the general level of overall efficiency (see Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997). Some examples of the studies using the TFA are: Berger and 
Humphrey (1991), Shaffer (1993), Pantalone and Plait (1997), and Yuengert (1993). 
III 
- Distribution Free Approach 
If panel data on the inputs and outputs of firms are available, the Distribution Free 
Approach (DFA) enables one to relax the distributional assumptions of the SFA 
because this approach 'does not impose a specific shape on the distribution of 
efficiency (as does SFA) nor does it impose that the deviations within one group of 
firms are all random error and deviations between groups are all inefficiencies (as 
does TFA). Instead, the DFA assumes that there is a core efficiency or average 
efficiency for each firm which is constant over time, while random error tends to 
average out over time' (Berger and Mester, 1997, p. 95). The main contribution of 
the DFA is the identification of the persistent part of unexplained costs (profits), 
which is considered as an important firm-specific characteristic, from the transitory 
part, which is considered as random noise. This is carried out by comparing many 
observations of observed and predicted costs for each firm in the sample and 
inferring that the average difference is a good indicator of the unobserved 
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inefficiency parameter. More specifically, if the cost function is given by: 
InC=f(w, Y, Z)+Inuj+E, where the cost, C, is a function of prices, w, outputs, Y, and 
environmental variables, Z. ui represents unobservable firm-specific cost 
inefficiency, and Ej denotes random error. To estimate the unobserved cost 
inefficiency for firms in a sample, the DFA estimates separate cross-section 
regressions for the cost function (as panel data are available) for each of period t in 
the sample. Under the assumption that the random errors average to zero over time 
for firms in the sample, a simple average of the t regression residuals approximates 
the unobserved firm-specific cost inefficiency term. Examples of studies that have 
employed the DFA are: Hunter and Timme (1995), Berger and Mester (1997), Hardi 
and Patti (2001), Bauer et al. (1998), and Rime and Stiroh (2003). 
Non-parametric Approaches 
Unlike the parametric approaches, the non-parametric approaches do not require 
specification of functional form of the frontier. Two widely used non-parametric 
approaches are: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
method. 
I- Data envelopment analysis 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a linear programming technique to construct the 
best-practice production frontier and to calculate the efficiency of firms relative to 
the constructed frontier (see Thanassoulis, 2001). Unlike the parametric approaches 
discussed above, the best-practice production frontier within the DEA is not 
determined by some specific functional form but is generated from a piecewise linear 
combination of the input-output correspondence data on firms included in a sample. 
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This piecewise linear combination yields a convex production possibility set that 
envelops all the firms in the sample. The efficiency of each firm in the sample is 
calculated by measuring the distance between the calculated frontier and the input- 
output correspondence of the firm. Firms that form the production frontier are 
considered as (100%) efficient relative to the other firms in the sample. Examples of 
studies that have employed the DEA are: Casu and Molyneux (2003), Bauer et al. 
(1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), Strum and Williams (2004), Gilbert and Wilson 
(1998), and Leightner and Lovell (1998). 
11 
- Free Disposal Hull 
Free Disposal Hull (FDH) technique was proposed by Deprins et al. (1984) as a 
special case of the DEA where the points on lines connecting the DEA vertices are 
not included in the frontier. Instead, in the FDH approach, the production possibility 
set is composed only of the DEA vertices and the free disposal hull points interior to 
these vertices. As Berger and Humphrey (1997, p. 5) note, 'because the FDH frontier 
is either congruent with or interior to the DEA frontier, the FDH will typically 
generate larger estimates of average efficiency than [the] DEA'. 
3.3.2 - Which technique is best? 
As discussed above, the extensions of the traditional neoclassical theory of the firm - 
transactions cost/property rights approach, and the behavioural theory of firm, for 
instance - suggest that firms may not always be able to optimally utilise their 
resource due to individuals within firms pursuing their own objectives rather than 
striving to maximise finns' profits. However, to investigate whether such 
inefficiency exists in reality requires methods that could empirically determine what 
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the optimal utilisation of resource (i. e. the best practice frontier) is and whether firms 
are producing according to the frontier. We have briefly reviewed parametric and 
non-parametric frontier techniques that enable one to determine the efficiency of a 
given sample of homogenous firms, provided that the data on inputs and outputs of 
the firms in the sample is given. Now, given the differences between the various 
frontier-techniques discussed above, which technique is the best? 
Although a lot of research has gone into the measurement of efficiency of firms 
(financial, as well as, non-financial firms) using both parametric and non-parametric 
approaches, to date there is no consensus in the literature regarding the best frontier 
technique with some researchers preferring the parametric (e. g. Berger, 1993, 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000) and others the non-parametric (e. g. Seiford and Thrall, 
1990, Thanassoulis, 2001) approach. On the empirical front, a consensus is difficult 
to achieve because the true (absolute) efficiency of firms is not known with which 
the estimates from various techniques could be compared (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). On the theoretical level, the consensus is difficult to make as both parametric 
and non-parametric techniques have their relative strengths and weaknesses. 
The main disadvantage of the parametric approaches is that these techniques impose 
a particular functional form that presupposes the shape of the best practice frontier. 
Consequently, the measurement of efficiency using parametric techniques could face 
a misspecification problem. Therefore, as contended by the proponents of non- 
parametric approaches, non-parametric approaches are preferable because these 
approaches do not impose any restrictions on the shape of the frontier. In this regard, 
the proponents of the parametric approaches have specified more general functional 
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form., such as the Fourier flexible functional form, which adds Fourier trigonometric 
terms to a translog functional form, to lower the risk of misspecification error (see, 
for example, Berger and Mester, 1997, Altunbas et al., 2001). 
Another criticism against the parametric approaches, particularly against the SFA, is 
that it assumes, rather arbitrarily, a particular probability distribution for the 
composed error term (half-normal, truncated, or, more recently, Gamma distribution) 
(see Greene, 1990; Bauer et al., 1998). 
The key disadvantage of the non-parametric approaches is their deterministic nature. 
That is, the measurement error and statistical noise are assumed to be nonexistent in 
the non-parametric techniques. Therefore, any deviation from the calculated frontier 
would be considered as inefficiency. Parametric techniques, on the other hand, are 
more robust in the sense that they consider random error as a source of deviation 
from the best-practice frontier. 
Given these advantages and disadvantages, Bauer et al. (1998) suggest that it is not 
necessary to have consensus on which is the single best technique to measure 
efficiency. Instead, Bauer et al. (1998) propose a set of consistency conditions that 
the efficiency measures derived from various approaches should meet so as to be 
useful for regulators and other decision makers. Bauer et al. (1998, p. 87) argue that 
'the efficiency estimate derived from the different approaches should be consistent in 
their efficiency levels, ranking, and identification of best and worst firms, consistent 
over time and with competitive conditions in the market, and consistent with 
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standard non-frontier measure of performance'. More specifically, Bauer et al. 
(1998) propose following consistency conditions: 
I- The efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should have 
comparable means, standard deviations, and other distributional properties. 
2- The different approaches should rank the institutions in approximately the 
same order. 
3- The different approaches should identify mostly the same institutions as 
'best-practice' and as 'worst-practice'. 
4- All of the useful approaches should demonstrate reasonable stability over 
time, i. e. tend to consistently identify the same institutions as relatively 
efficient or inefficient in different years, rather than varying markedly from 
one year to the next. 
5- The efficiency scores generated by the different approaches should be 
reasonably consistent with competitive conditions in the market. 
6- The measured efficiencies from all of the useful approaches should be 
reasonably consistent with standard non-frontier performance measures, such 
as return on assets or the cost/revenue ratio. 
The first three conditions might be considered as measuring the degree to which the 
different techniques are consistent with each other, while the last three conditions 
might be considered as measuring the degree to which the efficiency scores 
generated by different approaches are consistent with reality or are believable. 
This study employs two of the most widely used techniques to measure the efficiency 
of banks in India and Pakistan during the 1990s, namely data envelopment analysis 
and stochastic frontier analysis. In chapter 5, we employ the non-parametric DEA to 
measure technical efficiency and to decompose technical efficiency into pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency. This measurement will be carried out using 
66 
annual frontiers for each year in the sample. We then employ parametric stochastic 
frontier analysis to check the robustness of our results. In addition, we use the DEA 
to construct the Malmquist total factor productivity indices for the banking industry 
in both the countries". In chapter 6 we augment the analysis of chapter 5 in two 
ways. First, following Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), we employ the DEA to measure 
the pure technical efficiency of banks relative to a single grand-frontier constructed 
using pooled input-output data for 1992-1998. Second, we highlight how various 
components of the economic and structural reforms in India and Pakistan (see 
Chapter 4) may explain inter-temporal variations, if any, in the efficiency of banks. 
Towards this end, besides various internal bank-specific factors highlighted by the 
existing empirical literature, we regress the efficiency scores of banks on external 
macroeconomic factors to examine the impact of four elements of the economic and 
structural reforms on the efficiency of banks during the post-ESRs period. 
3.3.3 - Bank efficiency and inputs-output specification 
As evident from the above discussion, to measure the efficiency using frontier 
techniques, one first needs to specify inputs and outputs of finns under consideration. 
Contemporary literature on banking views banks as providers of four key services 
(see Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p. 14-16): (1) offering access to a payment system, 
(2) transforming assets, (3) managing risk, and (4) processing information and 
monitoring borrowers. For empirical purposes, it is difficult to define precisely what 
inputs banks use and what outputs they produce (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992). 
This difficulty arises due to the dual nature of some of the services (resources) that 
banks provide (use). For example, bank deposits can be regarded as banks' inputs as 
11 We will discuss the construction of the Malmquist total factor productivity index using the DEA in 
chapter 
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they are the main ingredients for loan production. On the other hand, high value 
added deposits products, like integrated saving and checking accounts, can be 
regarded as services (outputs) that banks produce. Broadly speaking, the existing 
frontier analysis based empirical studies utilise two approaches to specify banks' 
inputs and outputs, namely the 'production approach' and the 'intermediation 
approach'. 
Within the production approach, banks are viewed as the providers of loan and 
deposit accounts (see Isik and Hassan, 2003). To provide these outputs, banks use 
capital and labour. The outputs are measured by the numbers of deposits and loans, 
while inputs are defined as operating expenses. The main weakness of this approach 
is that it does not take into account the interest expenses that banks incur. Another 
difficulty with this approach is that it is usually hard to obtain data for the number of 
transactions (i. e. number of loans and deposits accounts) for a given period of time. 
This approach, however, is useful in evaluating the efficiencies of different branches 
of financial institutions because branches usually process customer documents for 
the institution as a whole and branch managers typically have little influence over 
bank funding and investment decisions that influence their interest expense. (Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). Examples of studies that use this approach are: Sherman and 
Gold (1985), Oral and Yolalan (1990), and Berger and DeYoung (1997). 
The intermediation approach considers banks as intermediators of financial 
resources from savers to borrowers (see Sealy and Lindley, 1977). That is, banks use 
capital and labour to transform deposits into loans and other earning assets. Within 
this approach, outputs are measured as the value of loans and other eaming assets 
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(e. g. investments), while deposits and other liability funds, along with labour and 
capital, are considered as banks' inputs. Total costs in this approach, due to inclusion 
of deposits, include both operating expenses as well as interest expenses. 
Three variants of the intermediation approach are: (1) the asset approach, (2) the 
value-added approach, and (3) the user cost approach (see Berger and Humphrey, 
1992). The assets approach considers banks as financial intermediaries between 
liability holders (e. g. depositors) and those who receive funds in the form of banks' 
earning assets (e. g. loans and investments). So, outputs are defined as assets for 
which banks have advantage over other financial institutions, while deposits and 
other liabilities are considered as banks' inputs. According to the value-added 
approach, most items on the assets and liability sides of the balance sheets could be 
regarded as both inputs and outputs according to whether they create or add value to 
the operations of banks. Items that create value are usually loans, investments, and 
time and savings deposits. Other items on the balance sheets are considered as 
intermediate products or inputs (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992). The user-cost 
approach specifies inputs and outputs depending on each item's net contribution to 
banks' revenues. If the financial returns on an asset exceed the opportunity cost of 
funds or if the financial cost of a liability is less then opportunity cost of funds, than 
the item is considered as an output. As Berger and Humphrey (1997) notes, neither 
of these approaches fully capture the dual role of banking firms in providing 
transaction/documents processing services and being financial intermediaries that 
transfer funds from savers to investors. 
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3.3.4 - Correlates of bank efficiency 
As Berger and Mester (1997) point out, once the efficiency of banks is measured 
using frontier techniques, it is imperative to determine potential correlates of the 
measured efficiency, i. e. bank, market, and regulatory characteristics that are at least 
partially exogenous and may explain some of the variations in the efficiency over 
time and space. This is particularly relevant to our study as we endeavour to 
examine the impact of changes brought about by the economic and structural 
reforms, particularly the financial liberalisation programme, on the efficiency of 
banks in India and Pakistan during the 1990s. 
In the context of banks in developed countries, substantial research has gone into the 
empirical investigation of factors that may explain the variations in the efficiency 
(see, for example, Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; Altunbas et al., 2001; 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Akhigbe and McNulty, 
2003; Girardone et al., 2004). Broadly speaking, the internal bank-specific variables 
include, inter alia, size of banks, ownership/organisation structure, asset/liability 
structure, age, and cost/profitability ratios. External factors that have been found to 
be significantly related to the banks' efficiency include the level of competition in 
the banking industry, growth in demand for financial services provided by banks, and 
inter-regional and intra-regional variations in governments' regulations. 
The existing empirical studies use the following approaches to asses the impact of 
various environmental factors - including the financial liberalisation - on bank 
efficiency (see, for example, Leightner and Lovell, 1998; Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Coelli et al. 1998, chapter 7; Casu and Molyneux, 2003): 
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(1) Single-stage analysis: This approach can be further subdivided into two 
groups. First, there are studies that use the non-parametric DEA to calculate 
efficiency over a period before and after the implementation of a particular 
policy (e. g. the financial liberalisation). Any improvement (deterioration) in 
the measured efficiency is then attributed to the success (failure) of the 
policy. As evident from our review of the empirical studies on banks in 
developing countries, most of the empirical studies on the impact of financial 
liberalisation on the efficiency of banks in developing countfies fall into this 
category (see, for example, Gilbert and Wilson, 1998, Leightner and Lovell, 
1998). Second, in the case of parametric approaches, costs or profits are 
regressed on environmental variables, along with the specified inputs and 
Outputs. 
(2) Two-stage analysis: This approach involves estimating efficiency scores of 
banks using parametric and non-parametric techniques in the first stage. In 
the second stage, the calculated efficiency scores are considered as data and 
are regressed on various bank-specific variables - e. g. operating expenses, 
size - as well as the proxies for market and regulatory factors such as the 
financial liberalisation. Studies following this approach include Casu and 
Molyneux (2003), Berger and Mester (1997), Hao et al. (2001). Berger and 
Mester (1997) note that the factors used in the second stage could be 
endogenous; therefore, they call them the correlates of bank efficiency rather 
than the determinants of bank efficiency (see also Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000, p. 264). As outlined in chapter 6, to rectify the problem of 
endogeneity, we will employ generalised method of moments. The empirical 
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studies usually employ the two-stage analysis because of following 
advantages of this approach (see Coelli et al., 1998, p. 17 1): 
It can accommodate more than one potential correlate; 
It can accommodate both continuous and categorical variables; 
It does not make prior assumptions regarding the direction of the 
influence of the categorical variables; 
It enables us to test hypotheses regarding the relationship between the 
variations in the efficiency and the potential correlates; and 
It is easy to calculate. 
In chapter 6 of the present study, we will employ two-stage analysis to examine the 
impact of the financial liberalisation on the variations in bank efficiency. In the first 
stage, we will employ the DEA to measure the efficiency of banks. In the second 
stage, we will employ Ordinary Least Squares and Generalised Method of Moments 
to examine factors that may explain inter-temporal and intra-temporal variations in 
the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. The Generalised Method of Moments 
will be particularly useful to rectify the endogenity problem mentioned above (see 
Chapter 6). 
3.4 - Frontier techniques and bank efficiency in developing 
countries: Empirical evidence 
This section reviews the empirical studies that seek to exarrune the efficiency and 
productivity of banks in developing countries, especially those which implemented 
the financial liberalisation programme. However, first a brief discussion of some 
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studies on the efficiency of banks in developed countries, especially those that seek 
to examine the impact of financial deregulation or other regulatory changes, is in 
order (for detailed review of empirical studies on developed countries, see Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997). 
3.4.1 - Bank efficiency in developed countries using frontier techniques 
It is argued that the deregulation of the US banking industry, which started in the 
early 1980s, endeavoured to free the banking industry from excessive government 
regulations introduced after the Great Depression (see Mukherjee et al., 2001, 
DeYoung et al., 2004). Various studies have tried to examine the impact of this 
deregulation on the efficiency and productivity of banks in the US using both 
parametric and non-parametric approaches (see Hunter and Timme, 1991, Bauer et 
al. 1993, Wheelock and Wilson, 1999, and Mukherjee et al. 2001). By estimating an 
alternative profit function for banks in the US, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) 
endeavour to separate statistically the internal, bank-initiated adjustments to 
deregulation from the external, contemporaneous changes in banks' business 
environment. Their results suggest that between 1977-1980 and 1981-1984, large 
banks (those with assets over $500 million) adjusted deposits and loan input prices 
and their use of labour and capital inputs to minimise the negative impacts on profits 
from the deregulation-induced rise in their funding costs, i. e. due to deregulation of 
interest rates. In contrast, Humphrey and Pulley (1997) find, smaller banks (with 
assets between $100 and $500 million) apparently initiated few adjustments in 
response to deregulation and instead relied on an improved business environment to 
stabilise profitability. Humphrey (1993) and Hunter and Timme (1991) estimate cost 
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functions to measure technical change in the US commercial banking industry and 
find little or no technological change during 1977-88. 
Wheelock and Wilson (1999) employ non-parametric technique to calculate 
Malmquist total factor productivity index for US banks during 1984-1993. Wheelock 
and Wilson (1999) find that during 1984-1993, banks of all sizes experienced decline 
in technical efficiency. However, during the same period, banks witnessed 
technological progress. They suggest that though productivity also declined over the 
sample period, the extent was less than the decline in efficiency. Wheelock and 
Wilson conclude that only a few firms might be able to adapt to the changes in 
economic environment, such as those brought about by the deregulation in the 
banking sector. The relatively large technological gains of larger-sized banks since 
1984 suggest that on average they have been favoured more by the changed 
environment than small banks. However, they add, many banks of all sizes lagged 
behind the few leaders in catching up and utilising the benefits of technological 
progress. 
Mukherjee et al. (2001) examine the productivity growth for 201 large US 
commercial banks during 1984-1990. They employ the DEA to construct Malmquist 
productivity index (discussed in chapter 5) and isolate the contributions of technical 
change, technical efficiency change, and scale change to productivity growth. Their 
results suggest an overall productivity growth at the rate of around 4.5% per year on 
average. However, they find that productivity declined by 7.61% between 1984 and 
1985 and by 0.33% between 1988 and 1989. Mukherjee et al. (2001) also employ 
second stage analysis in which they use feasible Generalised Least Squares method 
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to regress productivity growth on various bank-specific and market specific 
variables. They find that larger asset size and specialisation of product mix is 
associated with higher productivity growth while higher equity to assets is associated 
with lower productivity growth 12 
Casu and Molyneux (2003) examine whether there has been an improvement in and 
convergence of productive efficiency across five European banking markets - 
namely, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom - since the creation 
of the Single Internal Market during the early 1990s. Their analysis is based on the 
two-stage procedure outlined above. In the first stage, Casu and Molyneux (2003) 
employ the DEA to calculate technical efficiency. Following the intermediation 
approach, Casu and Molyneux specify two outputs - namely, loans and other eaming 
assets - and two inputs - namely, total costs and total deposits. Their DEA results 
show relatively low average efficiency levels, and show a slight improvement in the 
average efficiency scores over the period of analysis for almost all banking systems 
in the sample, with the exception of Italy. However, the results show that the 
efficiency gap among countries grew even wider over the period 1993-1997. In the 
second stage, using efficiency measures derived from the DEA calculations, the 
determinants of European bank efficiency are evaluated using the Tobit regression 
model approach. Following Simar (1992), in order to minimise the bias arising from 
the inherent dependency problem of the efficiency scores calculated through the 
DEA, Casu and Molyneux also substitute the conventional estimators of the Tobit 
regression coefficient estimates with the bootstrap estimators to calculate the 
standard errors of these estimates. Their bootstrap regression results indicate that 
12 Other influential empirical studies on the US banking industry include Elyasiani and Mehdian 
(1995), Mester (1996), Berger and Mester (1997), and Bauer et al. (1998). 
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geographic location influences bank efficiency, while little evidence was found to 
suggest that the average capital ratio and the return on average equity explain 
variations in bank efficiency levels. They find that these results contrast with the 
positive relationship between both returns and capital ratios and efficiency levels 
found in some of the non-bootstrapped estimates. Casu and Molyneux conclude that 
this contrasting result suggests that inference on the determinants of bank efficiency 
drawn from non-bootstrapped regression analysis may be biased. 
On the recommendation of the Campbell Committee, the deregulation of the 
Australian banking industry started in the mid 1980s (see Wright, 2002). One of the 
most important features of this deregulation was the entry of foreign banks into the 
Australian banking industry, which was previously dominated by four large 
Australian banks. Strum and Williams (2004) evaluate the efficiency and 
productivity of the Australian banking industry during the post-deregulation period. 
Their primary focus is to examine the impact of the entry of foreign banks on the 
efficiency and productivity of the Australian banking industry. Strum and Williams 
(2004) employ the non-parametric DEA and Malmquist Indices to examine the 
efficiency and productivity of both foreign and domestic banks and the dynamics of 
efficiency changes in Australia during 1988-1994. Stochastic Frontier Analysis is 
then used as a robustness check on the results obtained from the DEA. To specify 
inputs and outputs of banks, Strum and Williams utilise the intermediation approach, 
viewing banks as financial intermediaries employing inputs such as labour, capital 
and deposits to produce outputs such as loans and off-balance sheet items. Strum and 
Williams find that scale inefficiency dominates technical inefficiency in the 
Australian banking industry. They argue that the four largest Australian banks used 
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size as a barrier to entry via mergers before the entry of the foreign banks and 
increased spending upon branch networks during the post-deregulation period. Their 
DEA results suggest that foreign banks experienced superior scale efficiency, which 
resulted in increased efficiency, on average, compared to the big four Australian 
banks or the other domestic banks. They argue that these results tend to support the 
'limited form of the global advantage hypothesis' proposed by Berger et al. (2000). 
According to this hypothesis, foreign banks from a particular set of nations are more 
efficient than domestic banks because they are able to master the disadvantages 
presented by the liability of foreignness (see Ataullah and Le, 2004). This nation- 
specific advantage could be sourced from factors such as home market structure and 
regulation. Avkiran (2000) also examines the productivity of ten domestic Australian 
banks from 1986 to 1995, and finds that total productivity increased during the post 
deregulation period, but this increase was mainly due to technological progress rather 
than technical efficiency improvement. 
Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) examine the impact of the liberalisation of the 
Spanish banking industry on the efficiency and productivity of savings banks during 
1986-1991. The Spanish banking industry prior to 1969, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell 
note, was highly regulated and closed to foreign competition. The pace of 
liberalisation was fostered in the mid-1980s. Two consequences of this deregulation 
are a rapid growth in branching activity and a burst of merger activity. To examine 
the influence of the liberalisation, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1996) employ the DEA 
to measure technical efficiency and to construct Malmquist total factor productivity 
index for Spanish saving banks. Their findings suggest that, though deregulation has 
generated service growth in the Spanish banking industry during the sample period, 
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even higher growth in resource use has led to lack of improvement in the 
productivity of banks, i. e. productivity declined during the sample period. Their 
results suggest that the decline in the productivity of less efficient savings banks was 
lower than that in the best practice banks. This, in turn, led to catching up of the less 
efficient banks over the years. They also find little evidence to suggest a positive 
impact of mergers and acquisition on banks' productivity. 
Norway initiated bank deregulation in the mid-1980s (see Ongena et al., 2003 for a 
brief overview of bank deregulation in Norway and subsequent crises). Like in 
developing countries, prior to the deregulation, the Norwegian authorities limited 
both the quantity and rates at which Norwegian banks could lend. In addition, banks 
faced restrictive reserve requirements, and regulations required banks to invest in 
government bonds, and direct controls on lending by state-owned banks facilitated 
the rationing of credit at artificially low loan rates. In 1984, authorities relaxed 
reserve requirements, allowed subordinated debt to be counted as bank capital, and 
opened Norway to competition from both foreign and newly established Norwegian 
banks. Berg et al. (1992) examine productivity growth during the deregulation of the 
Norwegian banking industry during 1984-1989 by employing the DEA, the period 
after the deregulation but prior to the 1990s Norwegian banking crisis. Their DEA 
results suggest productivity regress at the average bank prior to the deregulation, but 
rapid growth when deregulation took place. In addition, they suggest that 
deregulation led to less dispersion of productivity levels within the industry. 
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3.4.2 - Bank efficiency in emerging, transition, and developing economies 
Using the non-parametric DEA, Zaim (1995) evaluates the technical efficiency of 
banks in Turkey for the years 1981 and 1990, where the year 1981 represents the pre- 
financial liberalisation period and the year 1990 represents the post-financial 
liberalisation period. Zaim (1995) specifies four outputs, i. e. total balance of demand 
deposits, total balance of time deposits, total balance of short-term loans, and total 
balance of long-term loans, and four inputs, i. e. total number of employees, total 
interest expenses, depreciation expenditures, and expenditures on materials. Zaim 
finds that on average the efficiency of Turkish banks improved by 10% after the 
implementation of financial liberalisation. The main source of technical inefficiency 
in the Turkish banking industry, according to Zaim's findings, was low pure 
technical efficiency. 
Yildirim (2002) also employs the DEA to measure the technical efficiency of 
Turkish banks between 1988 and 1999, a period characterized by increasing 
macroeconomic instability in the country. She postulates that banks in Turkey 
produce three outputs, i. e. total loans, interest income and non-interest income, by 
employing four inputs, i. e. total demand deposits, total time deposits, total interest 
expense and total non-interest expense (total interest expense contains interest on 
deposits, interest on non-deposit funds and other interest expenses). Yildirim (2002) 
finds that over the sample period, the two components of technical efficiency, i. e. 
pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency, show high inter-temporal and intra- 
temporal variations. In addition, she finds little evidence to suggest a sustained 
efficiency gain. The trend in the perforinance levels over the period suggests that 
unstable macroeconomic conditions had a profound influence on the efficiency 
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measures. In contrast to Zaim's findings, the lack of improvement in technical 
efficiency is found to be due mainly to high scale inefficiency, which, in turn, is due 
to decreasing returns to scale. Yildirim's results suggest that, during the sample 
period, public sector banks outperfon-ned private sector banks. In addition, Yildirim 
examines the relationship between size and bank efficiency. Yildirim proposes that 
size may proxy banks' flexibility in the financial market and their ability to diversify 
credit risk. A positive relationship between size and pure technical efficiency and 
scale efficiency is found. 
Isik and Hassan (2003) also employ the DEA to examine the impact of the financial 
liberalisation on the total factor productivity of Turkish banks during 1981-1990 (see 
also, Isik and Hassan, 2002). They calculate Malmquist total factor productivity 
index that allows decomposing total factor productivity change into its two 
components, technical change and efficiency change. Isik and Hassan specify four 
outputs, i. e. short-term loans, long-term loans, risk-adjusted off-balance sheet item 
(e. g. letters of guarantee, bank acceptance, letters of credit), and other earning assets, 
and three inputs, i. e. labour, capital, and loanable funds. Their results indicate that 
the efficiency of banks improved after the implementation of the financial 
liberalisation: average input waste in banking has declined strikingly from about 50% 
in 1981 to about 24% in 1990. The results also suggest that the source of total 
technical inefficiency in the initial phase of liberalization was mostly scale-related 
for foreign banks as they were new and too small initially to optimally exploit scale 
economies. However, Isik and Hassan argue that, over the years, as foreign banks 
became larger by expanding their business into the domestic market, their scale has 
become almost fully optimal in terms of cost saving. With respect to 1981, Isik and 
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Hassan (2003) find that Turkish banks registered neither productivity growth (except 
in 1982,1989 and 1990) nor technological progress (except in 1982). However, they 
note, negative productivity growth has become increasingly less negative over time 
and turned to a positive growth after 1988. In addition, their results indicate that the 
source of the productivity growth was an efficiency increase rather than progress in 
technology. As the reforms began to show their impact, the performance difference 
between the best- and worst-practice banks narrowed, i. e., inefficient banks began to 
catch-up with efficient banks. Despite the financial reforms and banks' heavy 
investment in technology, lack of technological progress is attributed to the long- 
term nature of banks' investment (Isik and Hassan, 2003, p. 1477-1478). 
Greece fostered its liberalization programme during the late 1980s and early 1990s to 
prepare the domestic financial system for new challenges brought about by the EMU 
membership. Tsionas et al. (2003) employ the DEA to measure technical and 
allocative efficiency and total factor productivity change for Greek banks during 
1993-1998. Following the intermediation approach, they postulate that banks 
produce loans, investments, and liquid assets (outputs) by using labour, physical 
capital, and deposits (inputs). Tsionas et al. (2003) suggest that the majority of the 
Greek banks operate close to the best market practices, while allocative inefficiency 
costs seem to be more important than technical inefficiency costs. Using a Malmquist 
productivity index approach, they find a positive but not substantial technical 
efficiency change over the sample period (approximately. 2.3% on average). Their 
results also indicate that most of the increase in technical efficiency comes mainly 
from medium-sized banks. Also, Tsionas et al. (2003) find, total factor productivity 
changes are mainly attributed to the technical change improvement of larger banks. 
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Gilbert and Wilson (1998) evaluate the impact of the financial liberalisation on the 
productivity of banks in the context of the Korean banking industry by constructing a 
Malmquist total factor productivity index. They postulate that banks produce demand 
deposits, loans in domestic currency, and loans in foreign currency, by employing 
labour, capital, and purchased funds. Gilbert and Wilson find some evidence that 
banks in Korea witnessed improvement in total factor productivity after the initiation 
of the financial liberalisation programme. This improvement in total factor 
productivity was due to improvement in both technology and efficiency. Criticising 
the excessive government regulations and restrictions prior to the financial 
liberalisation, they conclude that '[w]hatever positive effects government control of 
the financial system may have had on growth of the Korean economy in the 1960s 
and 1970s must be weighed against the negative effects on the productivity of 
Korean banks' (p. 153). 
Leightner and Lovell (1998) examine the impact of the financial liberalisation in 
Thailand on the productivity of Thai banks by constructing the Malmquist total 
factor productivity index during 1989-1994. Their sample includes both foreign and 
domestic banks. Recognising the fact that governments in developing countries 
actively influence banks' objectives, Leightner and Lovell (1998) specify two input- 
output models to measure changes in total factor productivity. First, they assume that 
banks seek to maximise their profits arising from their financial activities. To capture 
this objective, Leightner and Lovell postulate that banks produce interest and non- 
interest income using personnel expenses, premises and equipment expenses, and 
provisions for possible loan loss. Second, Leightner and Lovell assume that central 
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banks in developing countries (the Bank of Thailand in case of Thailand) regulate 
banks' behaviour in order to facilitate economic growth by providing financial 
resources to domestic enterprises. Toward this end, Leightner and Lovell postulate, 
banks produce two outputs, i. e. credit granted and investments in securities, by 
employing three inputs, i. e. personnel expenses, premises and equipment expenses, 
and provisions for possible loan loss. They suggest that large Thai banks were more 
successful than small Thai and foreign banks. In addition, their findings suggest that 
three banks classes, i. e. Thai large, Thai medium, and foreign small, performed well 
in the pursuit of profit maximising objective. Only two bank classes, i. e. Thai large 
and Thai medium, performed well in the pursuit of resource providing objective of 
the Bank of Thailand. Overall, Leightner and Lovell suggest that if their results were 
evaluated outside the context of the 1997 Asian Crises, which some blame on 
financial liberalisation, one would conclude that the financial liberalisation was a 
huge success. They argue that four factors contributed to the positive impact of the 
financial liberalisation on the productivity of banks (see Leightner and Lovell, 1998, 
p. 128). First, Thailand liberalised its financial system at a time when the economy 
was booming, which made the adaptation process for banks rather easy. Second, the 
financial system was oligopolistic at the onset of the liberalisation, which gave Thai 
banks a window of opportunity to adapt before increased competition reduced their 
profits. Third, many Thai banks had the international expertise needed to capitallse 
on the simultaneous liberalisation of foreign exchange markets. Fourth, many of the 
foreign banks brought with them the necessary international expertise. 
Using Stochastic Cost Frontier approach, Abd-Karim (2001) examines the efficiency 
of banks in four Asian economies, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
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Thailand, during 1989-1996. Banks' outputs in his study include commercial and 
industrial loans, other loans, time deposits, and demand deposits, while inputs are the 
sum of expenses on wages and salaries, land, buildings, and interest on deposits. His 
results indicate that there were considerable differences in average bank efficiency 
across the four countries during the sample period, with Thai banks being the least 
inefficient, followed by the Malaysian banks, the Indonesian banks, and finally the 
Philippines banks. Abd Karim's findings also suggest that cost inefficiency in the 
four countries increased over the years preceding the Asian crises in 1997, 
suggesting that the problem of bank failures may have had contributed to the crises. 
In addition, the results suggest that privately owned banks are more cost efficient 
than state-owned banks, hence supporting the argument in favour of the financial 
liberalisation that includes privatisation. 
Chen (2002) employs the DEA to measure the technical efficiency of banks in 
Taiwan during 1988-1997. Chen's results show that the efficiency of banks improved 
over the sample period. Chen attributes these improvements to the changes in the 
economic environment brought about by the deregulation and privatisation policy 
adopted during the period. 
Using stochastic cost frontier methodology and data for 1994 and 1995, Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998) examine the technical efficiency of state and private banks in 
Croatia, which initiated liberalisation in the early 1990s. Their results suggest that 
new banks in Croatia are neither as efficient as old banks nor do they operate at the 
efficient scale. However, they argue, that the observation that new private banks are 
not yet as efficient as older banks does not mean that their entry has had no effect on 
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competition in the Croatian banking industry. They propose that the relatively 
satisfactory efficiency performance of old banks may be the result of measures taken 
by them to survive the anticipated competitive threat posed by both new banks and 
restructuring and privatizing old banks. They also suggest that Croatia has not 
benefited from another possible competitive factor, i. e., the entry of foreign banks, in 
large part because of the war situation prevailing through the signing of the Dayton 
Accords in 1995. 
Following entry into the European Community in 1986, Portugal initiated the 
financial liberalisation that included the entry of foreign banks, the granting of new 
banking licenses, and privatisation of existing banks. Canhoto and Dermine (2003) 
seek to determine the impact of this liberalisation policy on the efficiency of banks 
during 1990-1995. To this end, Canhoto and Dermine use the DEA to measure 
technical efficiency, i. e. scale and pure technical, and to construct the Malmquist 
total factor productivity index. Their output vector includes loans, deposits, inter- 
bank assets/liabilities, and number of branches. The input vector includes the number 
of employees and physical capital. Capital is approximated by the book value of 
fixed assets. Their results suggest around 59% improvement in the efficiency of 
banks over the years 1990-1995. The new banks, which were allowed to operate in 
the liberalised era, dominate the old ones in terms of efficiency with an average 
efficiency score of 77% compared to 62%. Moreover, the Malmquist productivity 
index indicates that the new banks consolidate their relative efficiency advantage 
over time. 
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Hungary started the financial liberalisation after decades of dominance of the 
National Bank of Hungary and the National Saving Bank (Hasan and Marton, 2003). 
Like other transition economies, the key elements of this liberalisation were 
privatisation and entry of new domestic and foreign banks. Hasan and Marton (2003) 
employ Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate cost and profit efficiency of 
banks in Hungary in order to explore the role of foreign banks as competitors and 
partners of domestic banks in shaping the new environment of Hungarian banking 
market during 1993-1998. They use Translog functional form for the cost and profit 
function. Their primary finding is that a liberal privatisation policy and easy terms 
and conditions may have caused some immediate loss of maximum possible benefits; 
however, the competition and associations from more skilled and experienced 
foreign banking institutions have resulted in a positive influence on the efficiency of 
the banking sector. Their results suggest that banks with foreign involvement were 
significantly less inefficient than their domestic counterparts, and among the foreign- 
involved institutions, a higher share of foreign ownership was associated with lower 
inefficiency. 
In addition to measuring the efficiency of banks, Hasan and Marton (2003) also 
apply second stage analysis to determine the correlates of banks' efficiency by 
regressing the measured efficiency scores on a number of bank-specific and 
regulatory variables using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method (see Hasan and 
Marton, 2003, p. 2262). Their results suggest that banks involved in acquisition in 
the new banking environment benefited from such experience and are associated 
with lower inefficiency. Among other bank-specific variables, concentration in liquid 
assets is found to have a positive relationship with profit inefficiency, but a negative 
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relationship with cost inefficiency. In addition, equity ratio showed consistent 
positive correlation with inefficiency suggesting that risk-averse banks with 
relatively lower earning assets outstanding were less likely to be associated with 
increased efficiency. Logarithm of banks' assets, a proxy for banks' size, showed 
inverse relationship with the inefficiency of banks. They argue that this negative 
relationship reflects that bigger banks were relatively more efficient during the 
sample period. Following DeYoung and Nolle (1998), they propose that the positive 
relationship between size and efficiency reflects larger banks' capability to attract 
and retain better managers who are able to optimally utilise banks' resources. 
Weill (2003) seeks to analyse the impact of an increasing share of foreign owned 
banks on the performance of the banking industry in Czech Republic and Poland. 
Towards this end, Weill conducts a comparative analysis of the performance of 
foreign-owned and domestic-owned banks by employing the stochastic frontier 
approach to compute cost efficiency scores. Weill's main finding is that on average 
foreign-owned banks are more efficient than domestic-owned banks. However, Weill 
(2003) suggests, this advantage does not result from differences in the scale of 
operations or the structure of activities. 
3.4.3 - Bank efficiency in India and Pakistan 
Sathye (2003) measures the productive efficiency of banks in India for the year 
1997-98. The measurement of efficiency is done using data envelopment analysis. 
The calculation of bank efficiency is based on two input-output models. In the first 
model, outputs are non-interest income and net interest income and the inputs are 
interest expenses and non-interest expenses. In the second model, net loans and non- 
interest income are outputs, while deposits and staff number are used as inputs. 
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Based on the ownership structure, the Indian banking industry is divided into three 
groups: publicly owned, privately owned and foreign owned. Sathye finds the 
efficiency of private sector commercial banks as a group is lower than that of public 
sector banks and foreign banks in India. Sathye then recommends that the existing 
policy of reducing non-performing assets and rationalization of staff and branches 
may be continued to obtain efficiency gains and make the Indian banks 
internationally competitive which is a declared objective of the financial 
liberalisation programme of the Government of India. Given that Sathye's study only 
examines the efficiency for one year, his conclusion regarding the liberalisation 
programme is not well supported. 
Saha and Ravisankar (2000) employ the DEA to examine the efficiency of 25 public 
sector banks in India during 1992-1995. They exclude both private domestic and 
foreign banks. They conclude that, with a few exceptions, public sector banks 
improved their efficiency during 1992-1995. They also find that the public sector 
banks that successfully tapped capital markets during the recent privatisation drive 
attained consistently high efficiency scores. 
Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) attempt to examine the impact of the financial 
liberalisation on the efficiency of banks in India during 1986-1991 using the two-step 
procedure. In the first step, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) employ the DEA to measure 
the pure technical efficiency of banks, and in the second step, they employ SFA to 
determine factors that may explain variations in the measured efficiency. Instead of 
measuring annual frontiers, they pool data for all the years in the sample, i. e. from 
1986 to 1991, to construct a single grand frontier against which the efficiency of each 
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bank in the sample is then measured for each of the sample years. To measure the 
efficiency of banks using the DEA, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) postulate that banks 
produce three outputs, i. e. advances, investments, and deposits, using two inputs, i. e. 
interest expenses and non-interest expenses. Their sample includes an un-balanced 
panel of more than seventy banks, including public sector banks, foreign banks, and 
domestic private banks. They find that public sector banks achieved the highest 
average efficiency, and the smallest average variation in efficiency, during the 
sample period. Overall average performance, they suggest, improved marginally 
after 1987: Public sector banks showed a significant decline in average efficiency, 
private Indian banks showed almost no change, and foreign-owned banks showed a 
remarkable increase in their efficiency during the sample period. In addition, foreign- 
owned banks exhibited below average performance through 1990, and improved 
dramatically to above average performance in the last year of the sample period, 
when they were nearly as efficient as the public sector banks. 
After measuring efficiency using the DEA, Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) use SFA to 
examine factors explaining variations in the measured efficiency. They find that 
relative to the base year 1986, and controlling for ownership form and the 
environmental variables, performance declined significantly between 1988 and 1991: 
over the entire period the Baltagi-Griffin performance index declined at an average 
annual rate of 2.23%. They conclude that this declining trend presumably reflects a 
cautious adjustment of banks to rapid policy changes in a relatively unstable political 
environment. They also examine the impact of branching restriction policy and find 
no evidence to suggest that geographic restrictions on branch network expansion had 
any perceptible impact on the performance of publicly-owned banks, but find 
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negative impact on the performance of private banks. Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) 
also find that the capital adequacy variable has a statistically insignificant impact on 
the performance of public sector banks, but for foreign-owned banks and private 
Indian banks it has a statistically significant adverse effect on perfonnance. This 
suggests that the conservative behaviour of the latter two groups accounts for their 
lower efficiency scores, implying a risk-return trade-off in the industry. It should be 
noted that the time period used in their study might not be able to capture the impacts 
on the liberalisation that started in 1991-92. 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) investigate the impact of financial liberalisation by 
calculating growth in the total factor productivity (TFP) of 23 public sector banks 
and 27 private domestic banks during 1985-1996 (their study excludes foreign 
banks). To date, this is the only study on the efficiency of Indian banks that uses a 
time period long enough to shed some light on the impact of the financial 
liberalisation. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) measure TFP growth by estimating a 
translog cost function, and decompose TFP growth into a technological change, a 
scale, and a miscellaneous component. To estimate the cost function, they specify 
banks inputs and outputs according to the value-added approach. The banks' outputs 
vector includes quantities (Indian Rupee value in 1980-81 prices) of fixed deposits, 
savings deposits, current deposits, investments, and loans and advances. Apart from 
these, they also include the number of branches, disaggregated into rural branches, 
urban and semi-urban branches, and metropolitan branches as additional outputs. 
Labour and capital are used as two variables inputs, while equity is assumed as a 
quasi-fixed input. In addition, in Kumbhakar and Sarkar's study, prices of inputs are 
determined as follows: The price of labour is obtained by dividing total expenses on 
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labour by total number of employees, and the price of capital is obtained dividing the 
difference between total operating cost and total expenses on labour by total fixed 
assets. 
Kumbhakar and Sarkar's results indicate the presence of significant distortion in 
input prices due to regulation, which resulted in over-employment of labour relative 
to capital throughout the entire study period. The extent of distortion is observed to 
have declined over the years, but the rate of decline is very slow. TFP growth is 
found to be moderate over the entire study period, with a slowdown around 1990. A 
reversal of the downward trend is observed in the years following deregulation, but 
no significant improvement in TFP growth compared with the pre-deregulation 
period is observed in the post-deregulation period. Kumbhakar and Sarkar suggest 
that public sector banks in India have become too dominant to feel the impact of 
changes in the economic environment brought about by financial liberalisation. In 
the case of private banks, Kumbhakar and Sarkar find significant over-employment 
of labour relative to capital in the pre-deregulation years. The extent of distortion is 
found to have been progressively reduced in the post-deregulation period and 
completely eliminated by 1996, the terminal year of their study period. The TFP 
growth of private sector banks is found to be slightly higher than that of public sector 
banks for the entire study period. 
Finally, to date, only one study has examined the efficiency of banks in Pakistan (see 
Hardy and De Patti, 2001). Hardy and De Patti (2001) employ parametric 
Distribution Free Approach to examine the impact of the financial liberalisation on 
revenue and cost efficiency of 33 banks. Their sample includes seven state-owned 
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banks, two of which were privatised in 1991-92, twenty two foreign banks, and four 
wholly private domestic banks, for which data begin in 1993. They exclude 
specialised credit institutions, as these institutions are subjected different regulations. 
Like in this study, Hardy and De Patti (2001) corrected a number of typographical 
errors; data were obtained from various issues of the Money and Banking Statistics 
published by the State Bank of Pakistan. In order to evaluate the impact of financial 
liberalisation that started in 1991-92, Hardy and De Patti divide the whole sample 
period, i. e. 1981 to 1998, into two sub-periods: the first sub-period (1981 to 1992) 
represents the period before and during the liberalisation, and the second sub-period 
(1993 to 1998) denotes post-liberalisation period. After dividing the data into two 
sub-periods, Hardy and De Patti specify costs, revenue, and profit functions for each 
bank, where revenues are defined as total interest and fee receipts, total variable costs 
are the sum of interest costs and fees, and other wage and non-wage operating 
expenses, and profits are defined as the difference between theses revenue and the 
total costs. All bank-specific variables, except prices, are divided by total assets in 
order to normalise for difference in size between institutions. The translog functional 
form is used for estimation. The outputs specified for the cost, profit and revenue 
function are total earning assets, which comprise loans and advances, holding of 
government securities and bills purchased and discounted, cash balances with other 
banks, and investments. The unit price of banks' output is defined as total income 
from interest receipts and fees, divided by earning assets. The unit price of borrowed 
funds is defined as total interest expenses and fees divided by payable liabilities, 
namely deposits and amount due to other banks, which are specified as banks' inputs. 
Hardy and De Patti find that financial liberalisation has led to an increase in both 
revenue and costs of banks during the post-liberalisation period. They conclude that 
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benefits of the liberalisation were passed to the consumers of bank outputs (such as 
borrowers and those needing transaction services, who received more and better 
products) and those supplying banks inputs (such as depositors). They also find no 
evidence of improvement in profit efficiency, which, they suggest, was held down by 
a combination of rising deposits rates and intensified competition. 
3.5 - Summary and conclusion 
The paucity in the scale and scope of the empirical studies on the efficiency of banks 
in developing countries is obvious from our review (see also Table 3.2). To date, 
very few studies have sought to measure the variations in the efficiency of banks in 
developing countries. One possible reason for this could be the lack of reliable data 
on the inputs and outputs of banks. It is also evident that most of the empirical 
studies use single-stage procedure to examine the impact of the implementation of 
the financial liberalisation programme. Furthermore, the impact of other components 
of the economic and structural reforms on the efficiency of banks has not been 
investigated. In the following chapters, we review the main components of economic 
and structural reforms in India and Pakistan, and attempt to examine the impact of 
these components, particularly that of the financial liberalisation, on the efficiency of 
commercial banks during the 1990s using non-frontier based ratio analysis and 
frontier based data envelopment analysis and stochastic frontier analysis. 
93 
r_ u "C 2 7D 
Im 
ce 
u 
4- m r_ 
>b m 
CZ 
> r . ý; r_ CZ 
u u 
N 
r_ 
ce 
u 
-0 "0 11 >ý 
422 :E - ýa 'A 
4- 
li: m m , 
>ý u "0 -CD "0 u CA ý, u n ý- ý. ' . 
-- > u u 1) 
ý4. d 
= rA 2, ý - r 4ý 
cn 
C 
r_ (A 
In. = t; : " ce 14 ue tE ýc 
i 
CD 
u >ý (z: e- M u ' ;, -:, ,> .-', ' cj 
M. 
*- 
u 
ý. U r_ ý: u 
u 
rw c 
- 
4-, U 
r- . - , Zr -0 r- 
u v5 - -"Z 
= 
A u 3 >ý - = 1 ) I: 1 -rj M U u . - 
4- 1-. E u U , . A 
cl Z u Er- c u 
E - tý t u - 9, E 
55 
r «Z U > . - 
= 
Z cn U 4- u D . - ýý ic - Q) Q) C) r- U U0 - U U ý Z 
4ý 
CZ -- 
E 
C 
ýý !Z U r . 
4i 
L4 - Li U 16- eDi) 
-0 E ce r_ -a m u 
g) v2 1) CD 
CD 
ce u 
cJ 
Z E - ý: 
i-- CD 
U 
> ýz rt9 ýI: j E 0 W ýý .. E- = c) 4- (A cn 
ri2 
(A 
. mm c02 
.2 
0 rn C 
rn rA 
Z -CJ u 
- Q) U 4ý 
2 u u ýý Ij r- 0 4-5 4- 
C) 
1 Z CD 
CD 42 
CA 421 CD Q) 
u u ce "a 
u 0 CD. 
(2 r u >, tý u3 « mi mg e mm . E ;ý ý. U M u . 1. ) N. C) 
c 
.-Z 
Z Z 
ýý 
E >< M u C> liý c> ,d rA 
r_ 
hld -Z Z Z 
M' 
ýi 1 1 1 1 
t 11 1 11 1 1 
- , E = u 0 lb u E ce ýi .- cu & .. 0 2 f E < 1 E < Ilý 
Q) 
12-4 , zw 
0 rw C A 0 
ce 
ý. 
< w r. 0 ce ýý W r. CD 
cn 
ýý w 1) CD -zi t. - Q) . Z Z Z Z - r. 0 (Z 
cu - 
1 r. C ý, r. ý, 0 1 m M M 
u 
(> 
ýc Cý, C Cý, N E ý2 Z c ýc = --4 = --4 
ý- 
00 .4 -2 c>ý 00 E -e 
äw »m = : ... ý e, C> 
Z Z e 
rn Z 
eZ e 
N 
Vý 
cl, 
4. > u -- 4. -1 ýA u c-i -a 
bý Q) rz r. , (Z CD U ý: u 
.E l"i 4- 
u ý: u 
ce +ý m r rA (D 0 1-. (A _ ce . - 16- 
CD- 
r_ 
ý. 
= r- 
r- 
ce 
-u Z: Z 7ý CA Q) 
M 
4ý -0 CD 
> 
r. 
4. 
CD 
u 
(A 
C) ý: ýc , f3 ýý (Z U u 
> 
ý= U 
0 CD. X r 
. - 
cn CD 
- 4Z 
4- 
r 
CD 'lýý -2 2 -CJ = 4ý E 4ý 
CD 
.- CZ. 
Ij . - 4- = c: 
cl r- 
D U 
u 
M 
, 
" 
U 
m 
r 
m -Z; u :i M. u 1-. ý- cDý u "Ci Q) = (A . L 
+- 
wý 
1. ) m ý: 
. M cn (D M r- 
2 
Aý 
u 4- 0 u U U 
r r-ý - rA u 
u 
(A 
u > C) 
Z 
ce CL ,= M 
ý. CD. 
U u - u 
p E - -ý m u u ý. 
(1) CD. r- r_ r_ u 
m u e 
7 CD 
4Z4 
1-. 
EL 
E C * - 
r_ 
.- - 
U 
" . 
- = u r) u-c r) 
-m r. 
(D ce u Z . - r ce ce r. Z E= 
- E >, m . - iý 
Zi . - 
ri 
E 
C 
E 
ce 
ý. 
,- = . 
u 
v- 
 -5 = ý, 1) g) u > , 
1.. cu " 
Z 
-a .- U Z-- t>Z U (D sý UM 422 ;.. Z'. 
(D 
Z 
U 
,- u ýA U ý: 3 & ý2 - u u 
r. 
ý) Q2 U - tQ '(7 C) 
Z 
E 0E ý 
" ' ' > , 
Z . m 
ý: = CD. 
X 
r- 
m 
Q) 
CD 2-, C L c - 0 CD 42 u u r- 
CD C) -CJ 
, 6., - 5 
U 
m .- = 
u0 
-cj -cj 42 
ý. 4, 
N 
;: j rA $ý 
-c C. >% r. >ý (A 
i 
1 ce u C, 2 
CD 
IDJ) 
r- 2 
C 
C, 2 - U -c Z ce m m CD. U m 
VD 
CD 
ý . 
- 
pý 
ce 
0 (Z) cJ u 
J 
5 
(Z 
ý C 
CA -a 121 
u 
-0 
u 
0 
U 
u 
- 
-0 
CL u 
CD 
0 
(/3 
> 
U (D U X " 
:i - m , = c. - c2. X 
LG 
:J 
r. C> xt 
ce 
00 
U 00 > 00 
e Z %ý P4 r3 ' rA C> Z Z 
e Z ' "' 
u r_ bij 0 
liz 
u 4.. - 
- 
ci u 
r- CD 10 
r 
u 
6. 
4- cl Z zi cn 4- (A -, (A e 
cu 
CD Z U c E 
. - 
1-1 > 
cn 
42 
(A U 
ýn 4. 
er : ' 4- U U _ CD ö > 
CD M CD- 
5 U r - (A Ch 
0 
CL = 12 
*Z - M (A r- U ý6- u CZ >, E 
6- m 
o u M ý 
l u 
,ý CD CD '4-- 
--4 
-0 
u 
CA CU 
u 
Z 
-0 
Z 
u 
u 0 
* 
- = 0 
E 
>ý 
- 
ü 
CD 
u m M 
c 
M -, ý 
0 
-0 
4ý u 
.u - (i. ) 
> r_ -ci .Z m ri E--ý 
ý- (A 2 
Z (D 
'-, ý- 
0 
4. M 
u> 
2 
t= 
C 
Z3 
r . 
cý 
ýý 
u r_ 
.-:, 
u 
.- 
u 
ý 
ýj 
"zc 
= 
cd 
U 
- 
CI 
> 
E 
C) 
4zý CD 
IL x 
U 
'Z 
M 
.- - ;.. M 
+- 
u -- (D uu u 
c r- 
i- 
E 1) - Z. - >ý 
C) 
r- . - U e - CD 
Z 
M U u j >, -2 
2. 
J: ) X bj) U -- t4:: CU . - .- u 
r- (Z ýZ ce r- U 
cd 
_C ý, c ý C) 
42 
u 
Z: r- r- 72 . - CD 
:Z -- 
r- 
- 
ý. 
u 6. 
ý 
u 
rz 
U 
=Z -C m r 2 - e r CD u -a 
ýý 
r 
CD 
CD. Li >, r- = . - . - , ý 
- j CD CD > 
Z, (Z) ez m u ý, - m -0 Jm 22. Eý5 
> 75 > 2 ý- - - .1 u n. u CD 
> 
- ýc c) 
9) r_ r_ (D Gn r. 
-C u cn 
-0 (A 4. CD 
> 
I 
rn 
.- ý ýdý A . 
Q) (D CA .- 
E 
iý 
ce 
= . - - M 
. 
CD 
u 
E- Q) 
C 
CD a u 
> 
> 
CD C) 
u 
> 
0 
cn CD 
Z Z 
C) 
1 u CA (A Z CA (A rA n > 
u 
X CD 
CD 
= U 
0 czý 
X CD 
c 
CD 
-a 
b 
CD 
- 
X 
u -cj u (4--Z m "C 
>ý 
ý) -cj u 4ý m r- E Q) --, 
"U -Z 
Z 4- A (D CD 
- 
r- 4ý ýn 0 
A 
m 
rA 
le 
-> r_ u 
cn 
Q) (D u 
r 
c Q) 
rA 
Q) C u C iý 62 1) 
> - cli (3 
c 
CA .-> 
cr 
(D 
1--. 
CA CD 
u 
u 
ý. 
0 
u =0 
V u M 4) CD. cn u 
Z :Jý 41 Z 
e - ez -a 0 ýý, Z a = 0 Q) 
> 
u -- 
1E rz . - E 4- *Z = r- 
- - M (A 
221 VD r_ 
> ý- 
ce 
Z CD. C : E- 
ce 
Q-, 
cli 
ý , Cz 21 
C) 
Z - rA = ý 
Z 
' , _ . . . - 
,e =M C> Im U 00 
m 
(: ý . - ce 
e u2 ýý, 
ý 
ce (A 2 
"2 
'-, kn 00 
C) 
(7ý a . ce m O, \ 
t7,4 ý 
rn u -0 - r4 E- M - 
1.. 
r- 
CIN 
42 
Mw 
E 
(A C) 
u to t U 0 0 9' 0 m E 
$.. 
0 ý 0 
r- 
. - 
c ýc *1 u ,- , "'J u C4 
u -5 
"1. u CIO 0 c U E a r cl 0 (D 0 
0 
c4m, . 
. - .C 
ol 
- 
0 0 rA 0 0 (A 0 0 .- U j -U C) V) 4) cis r . 
> liý 
0 
E 
U. 
0 r. M 
J= 
= - = 4ý C) (A m 
cn 
ol 4ý 4- r. 
4) 
rA 
0 0 
0. C) :z 
C) 
tu ;.., 0 0 
-C C, 3 
z 
cli 
u 
m $.. -E " 2 4. ) r- 0 ýc M 
(U 
ýn 
0 
Z4 cl 
6A 
0 C13 
>,, 
-Cý = (D ýý Ct 
(L) Q . 
1Z m Q ýj 
i U r. r- 
cl (U Cýý 
u 
C < > 
73 
CZ = Cý3 'o " 0 
r- 
0 
r_ = 
CA 
C, 4 
ý. ý (U 
s ) 
1ý r- m , U 
u 0 -0 ýc C) r 
(U 
C4 
4Z >-, = :z 
(D 
- m r. rA - 
.- U 
4- 
0 
+ , 
" C) 0 tj) > 0 0 ., - 
. C) - m u C's 
C 0 , 4, .. r. r- " 7ý ,S 
0 -E 0 C, 4ý 
m 
_0 
u 
-Z r M = 
o. 
E 
r 
4, 
= cl >_1 0 0 m u 
ý 
> $-. cl > > >1 U r_ Zj ýc -, u -C Ts > E r. 
:3 4ý 
= = r- 4., .- 4ý -0 > 
r. o 
U 
C) C) lzý I- 
cn 
O 4 
> 
w cl CL L U 
cl 
cl r- 14 0 1: $ 
u 
r_ 
- m t' Cý.. r- CIO 
Q 
&.. 
U 
ct3 
. - 0 0 
ýZ:; 
cn 
(U 0 4. ) 
Mý ., +ý 
U 
E 
CIS 
H 
cl 
E 0 
Cd 
rA 
cn 
r- 
Z rA 
0 
ý 
-- :3 
0 E) x r. C, 3 0 > Cr 
t1o -0 rA 0 
0 a 
0 
7: 1 
u 
u r 
q. cl m m 
CIS vs u =3 0 0 u 
Cý. -J: ý 
71 
- :3 0 
r. cn $.. 
ý 
'o uj >-% 
0 
cl, X 
w M C (U 1--4 ýý 
0 Cl. 
U uo ý, - .1 in. M 
z ýz 
4- 
cl r- C71% 
rA 
4. ) 4, 
a 
00 cl 
= 
C)o 
C'i u 
Qn m a 
ct 
cN 
A lcý 1 CIS - C) C CN C'4 
00 --4 m r- r. m (0 , 
E-4 
It %) ý 
1-1 Qlý 
ON 
0, 
.t ts Q) q: ) 
cc 
u u 42 U U U r- (A 1) 
5 m ce " ý. U 
u E ce -0 
U u .2 
u -0 
'ä4 
= r- " > 
CD. CD Z 0 cn E 0 r_ u L 7- C -0 er , e -ru 
u 
. 
2: 
Z 
- . 
21 
- Z Z u 
. - m u 
0 E -a r- _ CD 
u c2. ý, CD. C> -a u , 
4- 2: U 
.Z 
(A r_ - .- u -a 
= 6. 
(A 
(A 
u 
uE 
m 
E 
u 
c ?, 
it) 
- 
U= 4ý 
c 1, - 
U 
u 
(A -0 
r_ 
= . 
'2 
-,. 
4 r- CA le - c 
.= 
r0 -2 , c) 
4- CD rA ý- uM g= 
u 
!Z r- 
C, 2 
« CA 
4- 
., 
C-, jz U 
.5 CD -c Z: u E (D 4- ý.. CA " -- r (Z 
U 
cl- 
r- 
u 
u -- 
ZE 
4- .: Z u 4ý 
= 
. - 
U 
= 
V. 
.- r u Z: = 4-  
U 
-s cD t2 *Z r- Z '2 r- -- l' -2 u - m0 r- m t>, 0 . >, 
u tZ 4. 
le 
ý > 
cý « u- r- 
- , .-U C u u .- m N 
r. . Li r. um 
; 
EI = 
v) 
, 
E- j 
(2 
4- 
u r. !Z 
u 
- 5 -0 
Q 
- l 
r- m r. -- cý ýE u (2, " 
1. ) 
*- 
uU 
ý tý--4 ýý c) _C (A Q) -- ( , C) CD 
M 
N 
- 
C 2. -0 Zn .C r- m - 
c ý. 
= 
, - 
>ý 0 4- 
U .-u ' E- 
c 
ce 
ýý 
E 
ci 
- 
4ý r_ -, 
ý: U 
u u cn Gn (A -0 
= 
ce 
CA 
cn 
u 
= E 
A Q) 
-ý4 wý 
r 
U 
i 
4. 
cn 
l) 
r_ 
m 
0 
6- 
C 
ce 
u 
E 
m 
ý, 
rA 
- U 
ý 
UD 
-2 
u m 
(A 
. 
r_ 
ý. 
U 
r- m r- 
u - cn U (A 
u 
E 
r= A 
cu 
- u c - E u5 CD ý 
CA 
>, 
Z: 
C) ý. 4-4 Zi ý, z. « CZ 0 Q) 4. U (Z CD m 
2 ýa ý -0 r- U ý: 
ce -i- ý.. 
Cd u 0 
-c Z r- m u -0 ý2 ý, 9) 
Z E öjý (? r r- 
1) 
" 
u 
ce 
A u > týO r ýý 
ce bi) U Z E 22 Z 4. m 1 
rz 
9) 
u2 
4- U CD :j 
ý 
; - 
. - > 
u m 
N 4 
-ý c) 4 - cn iý 
u (A 412 
- 
r. 
ce 
cn 
r- Gn 
Z 
m 
. 
C) U 
= 
r- 
(A -a 
4- ,= = 
ý. M m r_ CD e 
C 
.- 
, 
C) Z: 
-m 
r- -M r. 2 
4- 
0 
-0 
x 
r_ ýa 
(D 
- 
4 
r. ce 
. 
tý e. - 1-. I 
- 
=- 
e. 
u 
E- ll 
CD cn (A m 
U 
Z 
u t c m 
, 
a U 
JC 
"0 42 43 ., 2 
u u . - CD 
C) ce > 0 u 
jc:, ) 
-ci 
X 
tz 
e 4. zi (A -0 cn 
.-0 CD. 
r_ 
42 
Z 
u 
4- 
(D 0u- "Ci 
t 1) -M >, M> 
cn U 
. ý_o rj2 
(A 
u cl u 
ý: ;.. 
u 
-a 
c 
(D GA 
ýn 4ý C) ý. CD 
zi 
Z 
>-% 0 U CA 
CD. 
U Q) r :: -0 "0 
1. ) 
U Zi M u c31 , Q) , 
Co' 
(12 
< 
4- 
= , E< 
r- cd u C 2 
-2. u 
u 
* 
M u 
Z 
ý; 
:b ýc - 
vi m 
C Cd CL - cli - Cd 
iý r - 
c, 2 
r Z Z 
ce vi 
_ CD 
u cý Cý r_ 
m 
cý 
cý U) = 
cý 
-. d 
C- CD 0 Z: ce cý 
--4 -0 ý - m 
r_ rA .- 
CD 00 
vi 
»u 
Ge 
le -Z rn eN e CZ »e Z >u -2 (Z 
cýI 
clý 
-0 >-, cl 
=u -C 
$.. 
,4mM 4- 4-0 4- 
2 >-% 0 t., ý4 -0 
1 
j- 
to =aC: L, tý k;:! 
R bl, rl Q4 0 4ý 
2 C's oZ -S 
U) 
cn 
0 
CIS 
u 
U 4ý 
C) 
u 
I 
r- 
03 
C's 
CN 
Chapter 4- The Economic and Structural Reforms and the 
Evolution of the Banking Industry in India and Pakistan 
4.1 - Introduction 
As highlighted in chapter 1, India and Pakistan launched a programme of Economic 
and Structural Reforms (ESRs) in the early 1990s in areas including industry, trade, 
exchange rates, foreign investment, tax policy, government expenditures, and the 
financial sector (see Sachs et al., 1999; Panagariya, 2004; Zaidi, 1999; Husain, 
1999). The key objective of the ESRs was to reduce pervasive state-directed resource 
allocation and to make the economy more market friendly. 
This chapter reviews the key elements of the ESRs in India and Pakistan. In the 
context of the present study, emphasis will be placed on the financial liberalisation 
programme. This review highlights the changes brought about by the ESRs in the 
economic environment in which commercial banks in India and Pakistan operate. In 
addition, we examine trends in the banking industry in both the countries, before and 
after the implementation of the ESRs. Our aim is to examine whether the ESRs, 
particularly the financial liberalisation programme, resulted in any change in the 
banking industry in terms of deposits mobilisation, credit provision, asset 
diversification, profitability, and efficiency. It should be noted that unlike in the 
following chapters that employ frontier techniques (DEA and SFA) to evaluate bank 
efficiency, the analysis in this chapter is based on traditional financial ratios. 
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 discuss the key 
elements of the ESRs in India and Pakistan, respectively, and examine trends in 
deposits mobilisation, credit provision, competition and profitability, and financial 
ratios-based efficiency of banks. Section 4.4 surnmarises and concludes. 
4.2 - The ESRs and the banking industry in India during the 1990s 
4.2.1 - Key elements of the ESRs and macroeconomic performance during the 
1990S 
After its independence in 1947, India pursued a policy of state-controlled resource 
allocation until the early 1980s when a liberalisation programme was initiated. The 
scope of the early 1980s' liberalisation programme, however, was limited because of 
the dominance of the leftist ideology in India that emphasised an equitable allocation 
of resources by the state. Therefore, it is argued that the liberalisation of the early 
1980s was introduced quietly and without much content (usually referred to as 
'liberalisation by stealth') (see Panagariya, 2004). In contrast, the ESRs initiated in 
the early 1990s, when India was facing a severe fiscal and balance of payment crisis, 
were a combination of short-term stabilisation and long-term structural adjustments 
that sought to gradually reduce government's role in mobilising and directing 
economic resources in the economy. 
Key elements of the ESRs included controlling fiscal deficits and inflation, 
improving the external payments position, liberalising import rules and cutting 
import duties, encouraging exports and foreign investment, removing controls on 
private investment, and reforming the financial sector by lowering excessive 
government regulations and restrictions (Srinivasan, 2000). 
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Table 4.1 shows key macroeconomic indicators of India from 1980 to 2001, 
reflecting the economic performance in areas targeted by the ESRs'. In 1991 fiscal 
deficits of the central and local government reached 10% of GDP, the rate of 
inflation was nearly 14%, and real GDP grew at the rate of less than 1%. The current 
account deficit reached 3.2% of GDP in 1990, compared with 1.79% and 2.34% in 
the first and second half of the 1980s, respectively. The foreign currency reserves fell 
to US$ 1.5 billion in 1990 and, thus, for the first time in its modem history India was 
faced with the prospect of defaulting on its external commitments. 
Table 4.1 suggests that the GDP growth rates were much higher during the 1980s 
than in the 1990s. It is argued that high, albeit volatile, average GDP growth rates 
during the 1980s (i. e. prior to the ESRs) were achieved through an unsustainable 
fiscal expansion financed by external and internal borrowings (Joshi and Little, 
1994). There was a jump in the GDP growth rate during 1977-79, a massive decline 
in 1979-80, a jump again in 1980-82, a moderate growth during 1982-88 except 
1983-84, a climb up again in 1988-91, and a crisis in 1991-92 (see Panagariya, 
2004). On the other hand, growth rates during the 1990s were more robust and far 
less volatile. From 1992 to 1993 GDP growth rates improved significantly, and again 
during 1994-1996 GDP grew impressively at the rate of more than 7%. From 1997 
until 2001, the GDP growth rate ranged between 3.95% and 6.5%. 
During the 1980s fiscal deficits were large and growing. Fiscal deficits as a 
percentage of GDP in the first and second half of the 1980s were around 6%. This, 
however, deteriorated to 7.9% during the late 1980s (see Table 4.1). At the same 
1 In this chapter, unless stated otherwise, the statistics are calculated by the author. For details on the 
sources of data see Appendix 4.1. 
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time, government expenditure increased significantly from 24.5% of GDP in 1981- 
1982 to 30.5% in 1986-1987, and 36.6% in 1990-1991 (see Bajpai and Sachs, 1999). 
It could be argued that these figures understate the extent of the fiscal deficits 
because during this period the interest rates at which the Government of India 
appropriated a large share of the loanable funds of the commercial banking industry, 
through the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (around 38.5%) and the Cash Reserve Ratio 
(around 15%), were administratively set below what would have been the market 
clearing level (see Srinivasan, 2000, pp32-36)2 . Although high government 
expenditure maintained high and volatile growth rates, the growing fiscal deficits and 
government expenditure were identified as one of the root causes of the 1991 crisis. 
Therefore, reducing fiscal deficits was considered as the primary objective of the 
ESRs in the early 1990s. 
Nevertheless, as Table 4.1 shows, tackling high fiscal deficits was a rather 
disappointing aspect of India's ESRs (see, Ahluwalia, 1999a). In the post-ESRs 
period fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP declined to less than 6% in 1991 and 
1992, increased again to 7% in 1993 and decreased thereafter, ranging between 4.7% 
and 5.5% (see Table 4.1). However, this ratio remained well above the target of 3% 
set by the Indian Ministry of Finance in 1993. It is argued that the lack of 
improvement on the fiscal front was due to high central and state government 
2 This argument will become the basis of our hypothesis regarding the possibility of a negative 
relationship between bank efficiency and fiscal deficits in chapter 6. 
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expenditures, rising interest rates that made debt servicing more expensive, and the 
lack of improvement in tax structure (see Bajpai and Sachs, pp 81-118)3. 
Table 4.1 - Macroeconomic Performance Indicators of India (1980 - 2001) 
GDP 
Growth' 
Fiscal 
DeficitS2 
3 Inflation C/A Balance 
5 
4 Reserves 
Exports 
Growth 6 
Imports 
Growth 7 
18 Fl) GD19 
19801410 5.58 -6.06 9.16 -1.79 5346.3 3.98 7.04 53.6 20.80 
19851911 6.21 -7.93 7.96 -2.34 5605.52 6.63 6.85 155.9 23.26 
1990 5.81 -7.64 10.55 -3.20 1521 9.10 3.69 236.7 24.06 
1991 0.91 -5.49 13.82 -0.61 3626.6 10.80 -12.21 73.5 21.93 
1992 5.27 -5.33 8.85 -1.59 5757.1 6.92 19.18 276.5 23.78 
1993 4.87 -7.04 9.48 -0.56 10199 14.41 11-13 550.4 21.25 
1994 7.59 -5.60 9.55 -1.17 19698 7.96 17.55 973.3 23.38 
1995 7.68 -5.04 8.94 -1.76 17922 32.93 14.48 2143.6 26.53 
1996 7.23 -4.89 7.40 -1.30 20170 7.05 10.12 2426.1 22.13 
1997 4.45 -4.87 6.53 -1.44 24688 6.23 11.78 3577.3 22.93 
1998 6.50 -5.27 7.37 -1.05 27341 12.53 -2.51 2634.7 21.36 
1999 6.10 -5.50 4.47 -1.14 32667 16.68 12.73 2168.6 23.59 
2000 3.95 -5.21 4.09 -0.64 37902 20.86 10.62 2315.1 22.90 
2001 1 5.40 -4.74 3.50 0.27 45870 9.01 4.86 3403 22.50 
1 Real in %. 2 Overall budget balance of the central government, including grants as % of GDP. 
3 
Consumer Price Index in %. 4 Current Account Balance as % of GDP . 5 Net Internationa l Reserves, 
excluding gold, in current million US$. 
6 
and 
7 in %. 8 Net inflows of FDI i n current million U S$. 9 Gross 
Domestic Investments as % of GDP. 10 and 11 Annua l Average. 
Source: World Development Indicators 2003 
Opening the economy to foreign trade and foreign investment was considered as an 
important step to reap potential benefits from a greater integration with the world 
economy (Sachs et al., 1999). Reforms in trade policy included: dismantling 
quantitative restrictions, reducing tariffs, and introducing a flexible exchange rate 
regime. These policies led to some improvements in the external payment position 
(see Table 4.1). The current account deficit decreased substantially in the post-ESRs 
3 Another factor contributing to the presence of high fiscal deficits is the presence of various explicit 
and implicit subsidies of government (estimated to be around 14.4% of GDP in 1994-1995) (see 
Srinivasan, 2000, p. 40). 
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period. For example, in 1990 the current account deficit was 3.2% of GDP, while 
between 1992 and 2001 it ranged between 0.56% and 1.76%, which was well below 
the ratio in 1990 and during the pre-ESRs period. Foreign direct investment inflows 
improved considerably during the post-ESRs period. 
Foreign currency reserves increased from US$ 1.5 billion in 1990 to US$ 5.7 billion 
in 1992, which was equal to the average level of the 1980s. From 1993 to 2001 the 
reserves increased steadily and reached US$ 45.8 billion in 2001. Exports grew 
significantly after the reforms though there was some slowdown, which is partly 
attributed to slower growth in world trade (Ahluwalia, 1999a). Imports during the 
post-ESRs period also grew at much higher growth rates than during the pre-ESRs 
period. The import-weighted customs duty rates of the whole economy, decreased 
from 87% in 1990 to 30% in 1999 (Ahluwalia, 1999a). 
Another key element of the ESRs was a gradual removal of controls on private 
investment in order to create a more competitive industrial environment. The 
'Statement of Industrial Policy' in 1991, usually known as the New Industrial Policy, 
sought to remove the complex licensing policy of the 1980s. By reducing the number 
of industries reserved for the public sector, and by initiating a policy of automatic 
approval for foreign direct investment (FDI) up to 51 percent, the New Policy ended 
the public sector's monopoly in many industries that prevailed in the pre-ESRs 
period (see Panagariya, 2004, p. 22). Investment by both the private corporate sector 
and households increased after the New Industrial Policy was implemented. For 
example, investment by the private corporate sector as a percentage of GDP 
increased from 3.5% in the 1980s to around 6% between 1992 and 1994 and 8% 
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between 1995 and 1997. The increase in private investment was, however, offset by 
a decline in public sector investment (Ahluwalia, 1999a), and, therefore, the ratios of 
gross domestic investment over GDP in the post-reforms period were not much 
different from those in the 1980s. During the late 1980s, average annual inflow was 
around 155 million dollars. FDI inflows to the country increased rapidly in the 
1990s after an abrupt drop in 1991. By 2001 the FDI inflows were US$ 3.4 billion, 
compared with US$ 53 million and US$ 155 million in the first and second half of 
the 1980s, respectively (see Table 4.1). 
4.2.2 - Reforms in the financial sector 
The objective of the financial liberalisation programme, a key element of the ESRs, 
was to enhance the efficiency of financial institutions, particularly that of 
commercial banks, and capital markets to mobilise and allocate scarce financial 
resources (Hanson and Kathuria, 1999, Sen and Vaidya, 1998). Towards this end, in 
August 1991, the Government of India appointed a high level Committee (the 
Narasimharn Committee) to look into all aspects of the financial system, and make 
comprehensive recommendations for reforms. The Committee made a number of 
recommendations for reforms in the banking industry and in the capital market 
(Ahluwalia, 1999b). With the acceptance of the government, the financial 
4 
liberalisation programme was set in motion in 1991-1992 
Z Lin, is a rich source of information about the 4 The website of the Reserve Bank of India, www. rbi. or 
financial sector reforms, especially the reforms in the commercial banking industry, in India. 
Documents that are extensively used for this review are Trend and Progress of Banking in India 
(various issues) 
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In the banking industry, as discussed below in more detail, measures were introduced 
to promote flexibility and competition. Interest rates were liberalised, allowing banks 
to vary rates charged to borrowers according to their costs of funds and the 
creditworthiness of their borrowers (RBI, various issues, Ahluwalia, 1999b). 
Competition was promoted within the banking industry and between banks and non- 
bank financial institutions (NBFIs), development finance institutions (DFIs), and 
capital markets (Ahluwalia, 1999b). According to an official from the Reserve Bank 
of India, the competition from other institutions and markets spurred by the financial 
liberalisation compelled commercial banks to gradually adopt modem technology to 
maintain their market share (Talwar, 2001). In the following chapter, using a 
Malmquist total factor productivity index, we will examine this claim. 
Regarding the stock markets, as Sen and Vaidya (1998) state, 4compared with other 
developing countries, India has had fairly well-developed stock markets ... In 1993 
India ranked 22 in the world in terms of market capitalisation, 24 in ten-ns of value 
traded and 2 in terms of listed domestic securities' (p. 79). The financial 
liberalisation programme endeavoured to enhance the role of capital markets in 
mobilising and channelling financial resources. Before 1991 India's capital market 
did not have a statutory regulatory framework (Hanson and Kathuria, 1999). The 
Securities and Exchange Board of India was given statutory powers in 1992. It laid 
down a structure of regulations governing participants in the capital market, 
including rules for insider trading, takeovers and management of mutual funds, 
regulation of new issues and information requirements for listed shares. The focus of 
the new regulations was to better govern the stock exchanges and ensure investor 
protection through transparency and full disclosures. A new exchange, the National 
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Stock Exchange, was created in 1992. Another important policy in the reforms was 
the opening of the capital market to foreign institutional investors, and allowing 
Indian companies to raise capital abroad by issuing equity in the form of global 
depository receipts. As a result of these measures, market capitalisation as a ratio of 
GDP increased from around 5% in the 1980s to above 50% by the mid 1990s (see 
Sen and Vaidya, 1998). 
4.2.3 - Reforms in the commercial banking industry 
Refon-ns in the Indian commercial banking industry were initiated in 1992 with the 
acceptance of the key recommendations of the Narasimham Committee. The reforms 
aimed at increasing the profitability and efficiency of banks, especially that of public 
sector banks (PSBs), and improving their safety and soundness through improvement 
in prudential norms and standards, reducing the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and 
statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), liberalising branching policy, interest rate 
deregulation, increasing competition in the banking sector, eliminating quantitative 
restrictions on credit allocation by banks, and strengthening supervision. 
The financial liberalisation programme gradually changed the economic environment 
faced by the commercial banking industry. The interest rate liberalisation, which 
gradually deregulated deposit rates and lending rates, was aimed at giving banks 
opportunity to offer borrowers more attractive interest rates (Ahluwalia, 1999b). At 
the same time, the elimination of quantitative restrictions on credit allocation (e. g. 
state-directed credit allocation to priority sectors) gave banks more operational 
-freedom to determine their asset portfolio and to strengthen their methods of 
assessing the working capital requirements of borrowers. This, however, was allowed 
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within the prudential guidelines and exposure norms prescribed by the Reserve Bank 
of India. Prior to the liberalisation, to finance growing fiscal deficits, the Government 
of India kept the interest rates on government securities below the market-clearing 
rate. The liberalisation allowed the interest rate on government securities to be 
determined by the market on the basis of periodic auctions (see RBI, various issues). 
To allow banks to have more control on their asset portfolios, the financial 
liberalisation programme lowered the existing high reserve requirements and 
mandatory requirements for investment by banks in low-interest government 
securities. Towards this end, average CRR fell from 15% in the 1990-1991 to around 
5% by the end of the 1990s, and SLR was gradually reduced from above to 35% in 
the early 1990s to around 25% in the late 1990s (see RBI, various issues). 
Prior to the liberalisation, the entry of foreign banks (FBs) and domestic private 
banks (DBs) was restricted. To increase the level of competition in the commercial 
banking industry, new private sector banks were given licenses and FBs were 
allowed to expand much more liberally than in the past. Banks were also exposed to 
increased competition from the non-bank sector, including NBFIs, DFIs and the 
capital market (RBI, various issues; Ahluwalia, 1999b; Hanson and Kathuria, 1999). 
In addition, the liberalisation programme allowed PSBs to raise capital from 
domestic equity markets in order to allow gradual privatisation of these banks. 
The focus of the statutory regulation of commercial banks in India until the early 
1990s was mainly on licensing, administration of minimum capital requirements, 
pricing of services including administration of interest rates on deposits and credit, 
and reserves and liquid asset requirements (see Venkitaramanan, 1999). The 
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regulatory and supervisory frameworks for banks in India also underwent significant 
changes after the liberalisation. Prior to 1993, the supervision and regulation of 
commercial banks was handled by the Department of Banking Operations and 
Development (DBOD). In December 1993 the Department of Supervision was 
carved out of the DBOD with the objective of segregating the supervisory role from 
the regulatory functions of RBI. The aim was to align supervisory and regulatory 
standards with international best practices by keeping in view the socio-economic 
conditions of the country, the business practices, the payment systems prevalent in 
the country and the predominantly agrarian nature of the economy. Prudential norms 
and standards relating to capital adequacy, income recognition, asset classification 
and provisioning were upgraded and brought into a closer alignment with the Basle 
Committee's recommendations. External supervision of banks was strengthened to 
monitor and evaluate banks' performance on the basis of the new prudential 
standards (RBI, 2000). 
The major instrument of supervision of the financial sector is inspection. Areas 
relating to internal control, credit management, overseas branch operations, 
profitability, compliance with prudential regulations, developmental aspects, proper 
valuation of as sets/li abilities, portfolio investment, and the bank's role in social 
lending are covered in the course of the inspection (RBI, 2000). 
The entire supervisory mechanism was realigned in 1994 under the directions of a 
newly constituted Board for Financial Supervision (BFS), which functioned under 
the aegis of the Reserve Bank of India. Off-site and on-site surveillance and new 
institutions for supervision and monitoring were introduced. The Off-site Monitoring 
and Surveillance System (OSMOS) was introduced in 1995 as an additional tool for 
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supervision of commercial banks to supplement the on-site examinationS5 . All 
commercial banks were introduced to concurrent audit in 1993 by using external 
auditors and required to set up audit committees to follow up on the reports of the 
statutory auditors and inspection by the RBI. It is argued that higher prudential 
standards forced banks to seek quality borrowers in order to improve their asset 
quality (Talwar, 1999) and strengthening external supervision made the financial 
condition of banks more transparent (Ahluwalia, 1999b). 
In the 1990s, the Indian commercial banking industry was also exposed to major 
changes brought about by other elements of the overall economic reforms initiated in 
1991 such as controlling fiscal deficits and government expenditure, removing 
controls on private investment and encouraging foreign direct investment. For 
example, fiscal reforms enabled government to reduce its reliance on funds 
mobilised by the commercial banking industry, while the liberalisation of investment 
provided more opportunities to extend loans and advances (more on this in chapter 
6). In the following sections the trends and performance of the Indian commercial 
banking industry in the 1990s are evaluated on the basis of deposit mobilisation and 
5 On-site inspection of banks is based on the CAMELS model (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings appraisal, Liquidity and Systems & controls). A rating system for domestic 
and FBs based on the international CAMELS model combining financial management and systems 
and control elements was introduced for the inspection cycle commencing from July 1998. Off-site 
monitoring system for surveillance over banks was put in place in RBI in March 1996. This requires 
quarterly reporting on assets, liabilities and off balance-sheet exposures, operating results for the 
quarter, asset quality and large credit exposures in respect of domestic operations by all banks in India 
(RBI, 2000). 
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credit provision, asset diversification, competition, profitability, and ratio-based 
efficiency. 
a- Deposit mobilisation and credit provision 
There were some achievements in the 1990s in terms of deposit mobilisation and 
credit provided to the economy by the Indian commercial banking industry. Figure 
4.1 shows that time deposits as a percentage of GDP increased steadily in the 1990s. 
From 29% in 1990 this ratio briefly decreased to 26% and 27% during the time of 
crisis, i. e. 1991 and 1992, but increased after 1992. By 1998, this ratio increased to 
34.2%. Meanwhile demand deposits as a percentage of GDP stayed almost 
unchanged at around 6.7% after a decrease to 5.6% in 1992. A similar trend can be 
seen in banks' credit provision. Figure 4.1 also shows that shortly after the initiation 
of the liberalisation, credit provided by the commercial banking industry as a ratio of 
GDP decreased from 51% in 1990 to 44% in 1995. However, from 1995 to 1998 this 
ratio increased gradually and reached 47% in 1998. 
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Figure 4.2 shows that the growth rates of deposits mobilised by the commercial 
banking industry were impressive during 1991 and 1998. The average growth rate of 
the whole industry was around 14.4%, which was close to the average rates of PSBs 
and FBs but lower than the average rate of DBs at 18.4%. In the 1990s the growth 
rates of deposit mobilised by PSBs were rather stable, ranging between 11.2% and 
18%. Meanwhile the growth rates of deposits mobilised by the FBs were fluctuating, 
-16% in 1991 and ranging between 7% and 37% between 1992 and 
1998. DBs had 
the highest growth rates of deposit mobilisation in most years. Except in 1991, where 
the growth rate in this sector was -52%, between 1992 and 1998, the growth rates 
ranged between 21.6% and 37.1 
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Figure 4.3 shows that in terms of share of total deposits, concentration in the banking 
industry declined gradually during the 1990s. The share of PSBs declined while that 
of private banks, foreign and domestic, increased over the years. This may suggest 
that PSBs were finding it difficult to maintain their dominance that prevailed during 
the penod pnor to the initiation of the financial liberalisation. 
Chart 4.5 - Share of Credits in the Banking 
Industry in India (1990-1998) 
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As mentioned above, the interest rate liberalisation gave banks more flexibility to 
offer borrowers more attractive interest rates. At the same time the competition for 
lending within the commercial banking industry and from the non-bank industry, 
including NBFCs, DFIs and the capital market, intensified. Meanwhile, other 
elements of the reform such as opening the economy to trade and foreign investment 
and removing controls on private investment might have had some positive impacts 
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on demand for funding. Under these circumstances credit provided by the banking 
industry increased at the average rate of 11.9% in the 1990s. 
Figure 4.4 shows that the growth rates of credit provided by the three groups 
exhibited similar trends. Credit provided by PSBs and FBs increased at the average 
rate of 10% and 16%, respectively. DBs had the highest growth rate of credit in most 
years with the annual average growth rate of 38.6%. As in the case of total deposits, 
Figure 4.5 shows that in terms of share of total credit, concentration in the banking 
industry declined gradually during the 1990s. The share of PSBs decreased while that 
of private banks, foreign and domestic, increased over the years. 
This improvement in deposit mobilisation and credit provision by the commercial 
banking industry could be attributed to several elements of the 1991 reforms. Before 
1991 the Reserve Bank of India controlled the rates payable on deposits and also the 
rates that could be charged for bank loans (Ahluwalia, 1999b). As the interest rate 
deregulation gave banks flexibility to offer borrowers and depositors more attractive 
interest rates, banks could mobilise more funds and generate more loans. The 
availability of funds was also improved due to reduction in CRR and SLR. 
b- Asset diversification 
This section evaluates asset diversification in the Indian commercial banking 
industry during the 1990s. In India, as credit and investment are the two major 
sources of income for banks on the asset side of their balance sheet, the level of 
diversification depends largely on the choice between these two assets, which in turn 
depends on their relative risk and return. Investments primarily include government 
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securities. According to Sarkar (1999) with the deregulation of lending interest rates 
and gradual reduction in CRR and SLR, one would expect Indian banks to alter their 
asset portfolios in favour of credit. Nevertheless Figure 4.6 shows that this did not 
occur in the Indian commercial banking industry. The share of credit in total assets of 
the industry fluctuated without any clear trend. Meanwhile the share of investment 
increased from 23.7% in 1990 to 34.2% in 1998. This increasing share of investment 
in total assets was due to an increase in the proportion of investment in government 
securities (Sarkar, 1999). 
Figures 4.6 to 4.9 show that the trends of asset diversification in PSBs, DBs and FBs 
resembled that of the whole industry, especially in PSBs. For DBs and FBs the gap 
between shares of credit and investment in total assets was much wider in the mid 
1990s and became smaller toward the end of the decade. 
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Although the share of investment in total assets was lower than that of credit prior to 
1992, the increasing trend of the former made the gap between the two ratios very 
trivial. Sarkar (1999) argues that this increasing trend of investment in the Indian 
commercial banking industry bears some consistency with the 'credit crunch 
hypothesis', in which reforms characterised by relatively large increases in riskless 
interest rates are more likely to see a substitution away from riskier loans and a flight 
to government securities. He also suggests that the stickiness of government 
securities investment and the inability of banks to diversify to changes in regulatory 
and market conditions was due to the absence of an active secondary market for such 
securities. Bhaumik and Mukhopadhyay (1997), however, advocate a 'demand side' 
explanation for the increase in the share of investments in banks' portfolios. They 
argue that this could be due to the lack of adequate demand for bank credit in the 
economy. This demand side explanation, as we shall see in chapter 6, could have 
implications for the efficiency of banks as higher demand for banks' output (e. g. 
loans) could lead to higher resource utilisation by allowing banks to enhance their 
outputs (e. g. credit) with given amount of inputs (see, for example, Berger and 
Mester, 1997). 
c- Competition 
One of the key objectives of the financial sector reforms was to promote competition 
through allowing the entry of new DBs and FBs, encouraging new products and 
technology, and providing more operational freedom to banks (see Ahluwalia, 
1999a, b). In this increasingly deregulated environment there were some signs of 
increasing competition within the commercial banking industry. With the entry of 
new DBs and FBs the number of banks in the industry increased rather significantly. 
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In 1990 there were 28 PSBs, 24 DBs and 21 FBs. In 1998 there were 27 PSBs, 34 
DBs and 41 FBs (see RBI, vafious issues). 
To measure the level of competition in the commercial banking industry more 
accurately, the Herfindahl index of relative concentration is used. This index is 
constructed using the market share of each bank in four different aspects: deposits, 
credit, total assets and total income. A declining index shows a declining trend of 
6 
concentration or increase in competition . Figure 4.10 shows the trends of the 
Herfindhal index of concentration in the Indian commercial banking industry. 
Figure 4.10 shows similar declining trends in concentration, i. e. increasing in 
competition, in providing credit and in generating assets. Although the competition 
pressure in generating income declined between 1991 and 1992, it increased 
thereafter. There was an increasing trend in competition in mobilising deposits 
although such increase was more gradual than in providing credit, and generating 
assets and income. 
6 For more information about this index see Appendix 4.2 
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Increase in competition could also be seen from the declining share of PSBs in the 
industry. The shares of PSBs in deposits, credit, total assets and total income of the 
industry decreased from 90% before the reforms were initiated to around 80% in 
7 1998 . Meanwhile the shares of FBs in the commercial banking industry increased, 
especially in the total income of the industry 8. Such an increase in the share of FBs in 
the banking industry's activities is said to promote a healthy competition leading to 
the adoption of a better technology and expertise in offering specialised banking 
products such as derivatives, advisory services and trade finance (Talwar, 2001). 
d- Proritability 
With the initiation of the liberalisation, profitability was considered as an important 
indicator to gauge the performance of banks, especially that of PSBs (Sarkar, 1999). 
Figure 4.11 shows no clear trend in the income growth of the commercial banking 
industry in the 1990s. 
Figure 4.11 - GrovAh of Income of the 
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Sectorally, DBs had the highest growth rates in most years with the annual average 
rate of 29.7%. Income of FBs grew at 21.9% per year. Although PSBs had the lowest 
annual average growth rates of income at 14.9%, they retained the highest but 
See also Appendix 4.3 
8 See also Appendix 4.4 
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declining share in income of the industry (see Figure 4.12). From 90% at the start of 
the 1990s, the share of PSBs gradually declined to 79% by the end of the decade. 
The share of DBs increased quite sharply from 3% to 11 % while FBs maintained its 
share of around 9%. 
e- Ratio-based efficiency 
Increase in the level of competition discussed above was expected to enhance the 
efficiency of the banking industry. In this section six non-frontier-based measures of 
efficiency are presented, including: total income over total assets; net return on 
assets, defined as the difference between total income and total expenses divided by 
total assets; interest margin, defined as the difference between interest earned and 
interest paid divided by total assets; total expenses over total income; staff expenses 
over total assets and non-performing loans (NPLs) over total advances. 
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Banking Industry (1990-1998) - Staff 
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The first two ratios measure the efficiency of banks in generating earnings and profit. 
The interest margin is an indicator of operating efficiency, or core earning capacity 
of banks (Sarkar, 1999). The ratio of total expenses over total income measures 
banks' ability to economise costs while the ratio of staff expenses over total assets 
measures manpower expenses. An increase in the first three ratios and decreases in 
the last three ratios is considered as an improvement in efficiency. Also, all the 
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indicators show a sudden improvement in the performance of foreign banks in the 
year 1992. This could be attributed to relaxation of restrictions on the operations of 
foreign banks in 1991-1992 after years of government restrictions on this groups 
such as branch opening restrictions. 
There was no clear trend in banks' efficiency during the 1990s. The annual average 
of all ratio-based measures of efficiency between 1990 and 1995 are similar to those 
between 1996 and 1998. Sectorally, FBs were much more efficient than both PSBs 
and DBs. The annual average ratios of total income over total assets, net return on 
assets and the interest margin of FBs were almost two times higher than those of 
PSBs and DBs. The measures of cost efficiency showed no significant difference 
among three sectors. By all ratio-based measures DBs were marginally more 
efficient than PSBs. 
Table 4.2 - Efficiency in the Banking Industry in India (1990-1998) 
Total Income a Net Return Interest 
Total Assets on Assets b Marginc 
1990-1998 1990-1995 1996-1998 1990-1998 1990-1995 1996-1998 1990-1998 1990-1995 1996-1998 
Total 0.131 0.139 0.115 0.032 0.037 0.022 0.040 0.044 0.034 
PSBs 0.108 0.109 0.107 0.021 0.024 0.014 0.030 0.030 0.030 
DBs 0.108 0.105 0.115 0.024 0.027 0.020 0.033 0.036 0.030 
FBs 0.182 0.214 0.121 0.052 0.063 0.030 0.060 0.070 0.040 
Total Expenses/ Staff Expenses/ 
Total Income d Total Assets 
1990-1998 1990-1995 1996-1998 1990-1998 1990-1995 1996-1998 
Total 0.869 0.882 0.843 0.020 0.024 0.011 
PSBs 0.912 0.934 0.870 0.023 0.024 0.021 
DBs 0.867 0.891 0.822 0.021 0.025 0.013 
FBs 0.823 0.809 0.850 0.017 0.022 0.009 
FBs= Foreign Banks; DBs=Dornestic Private Banks; PSBs=Pub1ic Sector Banks 
a= Total income includes both interest and non-interest income; b= Net return on assets in net profit 
divivded by total assets; c= Interest margin is the difference between total interest income and interest 
expense as a percentage of assets; d= total expenses divided by total income 
All values are simple averages for the specified group 
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Non-perfom-ýing assets of PSBs was identified as a big problem in the Indian banking 
industry. This, according to Hanson and Kathuria (1999), is consistent with 
experience of PSBs in other developing countries as these banks find it difficult to 
lend without generating large NPLs. High levels of NPLs indicate low asset quality 
and earnings, thus decreases in NPLs indicate improvement in banks' performance. 
Table 4.3 shows the trends in NPLs of PSBs in the post-ESRs9. From 1993 to 1995 
NPLs as a percentage of total advances decreased from 24.3% to 18.5%. The number 
of banks with the ratio of NPLs over total advances of more than 20% decreased 
from 16 to 10 in the same period. Nevertheless the volume of gross NPLs increased 
from around Rs. 410 billion to Rs. 435.8 billion. According to Sarkar (1999) the 
problem of NPLs of PSBs was so serious that it was not clear whether the reforms 
ushered in a higher level of asset quality in the banking industry. Factors responsible 
for the persistence of the NPLs problem include inadequate credit appraisal skills, 
on-site and off-site monitoring and supervision and inadequate loan recovery by 
PSBs. While the recovery of advances improved, such improvement was marginal 
despite several institutional arrangements such as debt recovery tribunals and 
specialised task forces (Sarkar, 1999). 
Table 4.3 - Non-Perfortning Loans of Indian PSBs (1993-1997) 
1993-4 1994-5 1995-6 1997-8a 
Percentage of NPLs to total advances 24.3 20 18.5 15.89 
No. of Banks with NPLs more than 20% 16 10 10 6 
Volume of NPLs (Rs bn) 410.4 384.2 416.6 442.8 
Source: Sarkar (1999); a= From RBI's Trends and Progress in the Indian banking industry 
9 As Sarakar (1999) mentioned except some aggregated data on NPLs of the PSBs, data on NPLs of 
the whole industry and of other sector are not available and there is very little published disaggregated 
information on the nature of NPLs, the sectors in which NPLs are concentrated, the list of defaulters 
and the recovery performance of NPLs. 
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4.3 - The ESRs and the banking industry in Pakistan during the 
1990S 
4.3.1 - Key elements of the ESRs and macroeconomic performance during the 
1990S 
Like India, Pakistan followed a policy of state-directed resource allocations after the 
independence in 1947. However, private participation in the financial and real sectors 
was encouraged until the early 1970s. The policy of state-determined resource 
allocation intensified during the 1970s when major industries and financial 
institutions were nationalised (see Zaidi, 1999). Like in India, a liberalisation was 
started in the 1980s with the preparation of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1983-1988). 
However, the scope of the liberalisation programme of the 1980s was limited (see 
Zaidi, 1999; Husain, 1999). The ESRs of the early 1990s, sponsored by the IMF and 
the World Bank, were relatively more extensive in nature. Like the ESRs in India, 
key elements of the ESRs in Pakistan were: controlling fiscal deficits, tariff reforms, 
promoting exports and foreign investment, promoting private investment, reforms in 
the industrial sector and the financial liberalisation. 
Table 4.4 shows key macroeconomic indicators of Pakistan from 1980 to 2001 
reflecting the economic performance in key areas targeted by the ESRs. The figures 
suggest that the overall performance of the economy after the implementation of the 
ESRs was not considerably better than in the pre-ESRs period. While the annual 
average growth rates of GDP in the first and second half of the 1980s were 7.3% and 
6.4%, respectively, the average rate between 1990 and 2001 was 3.89%. This lack of 
improvement in the GDP growth rate could be partially attributed to high political 
instability in Pakistan during the 1990s (see Zaidi, 1998). 
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Tackling high fiscal deficits, a key objective of the ESRs, was a disappointing aspect 
of the ESRs in Pakistan. When the ESRs were initiated, the target was set to lower 
fiscal deficits to 4% of GDP. In addition, the ESRs endeavoured to reduce reliance 
on domestic and foreign borrowings (Zaidi, 1999). Towards this end, taxes were 
increased and public expenditures were curtailed. For example, between 1994 and 
1997 additional taxes of Rs. 140 billion were levied in the fonn of sales tax and other 
indirect taxes. Despite these measures, however, the ratio of fiscal deficits over GDP 
during 1990-2001 was always much higher than the target 4% in all years. 
Table 4.4 - Macroeconomic Performance Indicators of Pakistan (1980 - 2001) 
GDP Fiscal C/A Exports Imports 
Growth' DerCit2 Inflation 3 Balance' Reserves' Growth 6 Growth 7 FD18 GD19 
19801410 7.30 -5.84 8.65 -2.56 1038.768 10.53 0.20 64.1 18.7176 
19851911 6.43 -7.70 6.11 -2.78 586.702 10.78 2.67 152.72 18.6306 
1990 4.46 -5.40 6.45 -3.38 295.91 1.13 -3.50 245.3 18.935 
1991 5.06 -7.58 13.06 -3-01 526.52 33.47 -7.40 258.4 19.026 
1992 7.71 -7.92 10.06 -1.84 850-19 13.82 30.84 336.5 20.251 
1993 1.76 -8.93 8.70 -6.46 1196.8 1.32 14.84 348.6 20.835 
1994 3.71 -7.27 12.92 -3.18 2929.4 3.11 -10.79 421 19.568 
1995 4.99 -6.63 13.85 -3.97 1732.8 -3.08 3.97 722.6 18.57 
1996 4.85 -7.99 8.37 -7.25 548.29 1.99 13.59 922 19.028 
1997 1.01 -7.82 13.38 -5.71 1194.8 -6.54 -3.79 716.3 17.957 
1998 2.55 -6.42 7.53 -2.73 1028 -5.73 -5.62 506 17.75 
1999 3.66 -6.88 5.86 -3.63 1511.4 -2.85 -5.40 532 15.565 
2000 4.24 -5.47 2.75 -1.97 1513.3 16.02 -2.25 308 16.014 
2001 2.74 -4.71 5.66 -1.90 3640 11.84 1.53 383 15.935 
1 Real in %. 2 Overall budget balance of the central government, including grants as % of GDP . 
3 Consumer 
Price Inde x %. 
4 Current Acco unt Balance as % of GDP .5 Net International Reserves , excluding gold, in 
current mi llion US$. 
6 
and 
7 %. 8 Net inflow s of FD I in current million US$. 9 Gross Domestic Investments 
as % of GDP. 10 and 11 Annual Average. 
Source: World Developing Indicators 2003 
Another key area of the ESRs was to open the economy to foreign trade and 
investment. The Government of Pakistan claimed that it was committed to making 
extensive changes in the trade regime, including liberalisation of the foreign 
exchange regime, reduction in the level of protection by reducing tariff rates and 
125 
gradual removal of most tariff exemptions and concessions, and enhancing export 
incentives. For example, the list of restricted import items was reduced from 125% in 
1992 to around 45% in 1999. Meanwhile a 55% income tax rebate on export earnings 
was changed into a 75% rebate for export of high value added products and a 50% 
rebate for all other products. 
During the post-ESRs, there was little or no improvement in the external payment 
position. The current account deficits between 1990 and 2001 were much higher than 
in the 1980s. The annual average current account deficit as a percentage of GDP in 
the 1990s was 3.7%, compared with 2.56% and 2.78% in the first and second half of 
the 1980s, respectively. This increased to 6.4% and 7.2% in 1993 and 1996, 
respectively. Foreign reserves, however, increased from US$ 295 million in 1990 to 
US$ 3,640 million in 2001. The annual average foreign reserves during 1990 and 
2001 were US$ 1,414 million, compared with US$ 1,038 million and US$ 586 
million in the first and second half of the 1980s, respectively. 
The export perfonnance was disappointing despite export incentives provided by the 
government. During 1990 and 2001 the annual average growth rate of exports was 
5.3%, which was much lower than the growth rate of 10% in the 1980s. This was due 
to the fact that high rates of export growth in some years were offset by low and even 
negative growth rates in other years (see Table 4.4). The annual average growth rate 
of imports between 1990 and 2001 was similar to that of the second half of the 1980s 
at 2%. Between 1997 and 2000 the import growth rates were even negative. Even 
though import growth was not high after the ESRs were initiated, the trade reforms 
were criticised for being responsible for the de-industrialisation of the economy 
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because a large number of imported goods that were previously produced locally 
(Zaidi, 1999; Husain, 1999). 
Like the ESRs in India, encouraging FDI was another important element of the ESRs 
in Pakistan. A number of measures to attract FDI were implemented, such as 
removing the requirement for government approval of FDI, allowing 100% 
ownership with few exceptions, allowing foreign finns to engage in export trading 
activities, removing controls in technology transfer, and offering various fiscal and 
monetary incentives (Zaidi, 1999). Until 1996 the annual FDI inflows to Pakistan 
increased quite steadily, reaching the highest level of US$ 922 million, compared 
with US$ 64 million and US$ 152 million in the first and second half of the 1980s, 
respectively. From 1997 to 2001 FDI inflows declined sharply probably due to an 
intensified competition for FDI among developing countries, and due to the nuclear 
experiment of 1998 that resulted in severe economic restrictions by various 
international institutions like the World Bank and the ME 
The ESRs also emphasised the enhancement of growth by encouraging domestic 
private investors in both financial and non-financial sectors. Not only was 
sanctioning of private investment discontinued, but also a number of other regulatory 
restrictions were removed. Areas of investment previously reserved for the public 
sector were opened to the private sector and the government also provided incentives 
to the private sector (World Bank, 1993). Along with this, reforms in the industrial 
policy were implemented, including: limiting the list of specific industries, de- 
regulating business decisions, phasing out industrial location policies and provision 
of infrastructural services, and divesting the shares of public sector companies to the 
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pnvate sector. After the reforms were launched investment by the private sector 
increased substantially. The share of the private sector in gross fixed capital 
formation increased from 39.3% in the first half of the 1980s to 46.5% in the second 
half of the 1980s and to 51.7% in 1995 (Zaidi, 1999; Husain, 1999). The growth rate 
of investment of the whole economy, however, was not higher than that of the 1980s, 
which was around 18%. 
4.3.2 - Reforms in the financial sector 
The financial liberalisation programme was initiated in 1990-1992, and was 
augmented by a series of policy measures in 1997. The key objectives of the 
liberalisation programme were: institutional strengthening, restructuring of banks and 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs), improving the regulatory framework, 
promoting competition, switching over to market-based and relatively more efficient 
monetary and credit mechanisms and tackling the problem of non-performing loans. 
Regarding institutional strengthening, the reforms gave the regulator of the financial 
sector, the State Bank of Pakistan, higher autonomy in formulating and implementing 
monetary policy by a number of amendments in the Banking Law, and consolidated 
its role as regulator of banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs). A process 
of internal restructuring in the State Bank of Pakistan was also initiated in order to 
address core financial issues such as strengthening on-site and off-site surveillance, 
creating government securities, monitoring NBFIs, dealing with non-performing 
loans and enhancing the capacity of the State Bank (SBP, 2000). 
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As the government ownership of commercial banks was identified as a source of 
inefficiency in the banking industry a number of policies were undertaken to 
encourage the participation of the private sector (SBP, 2000). A major break from the 
past was the decision to allow new private sector commercial banks to function in 
1990 (Zaidi, 1999). Subsequently in 1991 ten new DBs were permitted to commence 
their operations. The government was also empowered to sell all or any part of the 
share capital of PSBs. 
Various measures were taken to promote market-based and relatively more efficient 
monetary and credit mechanisms. The debt management reforms were initiated to 
reduce the segmentation in government debt market, rationalise the cost of raising 
long-term government debt, and establish a market-based rate of return structure for 
government securities. Consequently, debt auctioning was set up in 1991, FBs and 
corporations were allowed to invest in Treasury Bills and Federal Investment Bonds 
(FIBs) in the same year and open market operations become a major instrument of 
market-based monetary management in 1995. 
In 1995 the system of credit ceilings and credit-deposit ratios was abolished to 
encourage banks to extend credit to the private sector through market-based 
mechanisms. Maximum caps on lending rates were reduced and maximum caps on 
lending rates for exports related modes of financing were removed in 1995. Floors on 
minimum lending rates for projects and trade related financing were also lifted in 
1997 and accordingly banks and NBFIs were able to set their lending rates in relation 
to the demand-supply condition in the market. 
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Another important policy to promote market-based and relatively more efficient 
credit mechanisms was to phase out concessional credit. Before the financial sector 
reforms, credit was allocated in a detailed manner through an annual credit plan. 
Through their structural adjustment loans, international financial institutions brought 
considerable pressure to bear upon the Pakistani planners to phase out concessional 
credit (Zaidi, 1999). In 1991, concessionary financing schemes were pared down 
with the termination of cotton financing. In order to eliminate the subsidy element 
and the attendant financial market distortion, the lending rates on special financing 
schemes including locally manufactured machinery and export finance were 
gradually raised (SBP, 2000). To ensure that financial institutions were not burdened 
with subsidised credit, all new schemes involving concessional finance were capped. 
In 1994 rates for concessional loans were raised from 11 % to 12% and to 14% during 
the second half of the 1990s (SBP, 2000). 
As the rapidly deteriorating governance and credit discipline, especially in PSBs, 
aggravated structural problems and led to a worsening level of non-performing loans 
(NPLs), the financial liberalisation focused on prudential measures, including capital 
adequacy, adequate provisioning, and effective loan recovery mechanisms and legal 
procedure (SBP, 2000). In 1992 prudential regulation was amended with compliance 
mandatory. Information from early warning systems, off-site and on-site inspection 
was integrated and focused on risk analysis. At the same time, a system was put in 
place whereby performance of each bank and NBFI was evaluated under the 
CAMELS system 10 - As 
NPLs were a major problem in the financial sector, the State 
10 The acronym "CAMEL" refers to the five components of a bank's condition that are assessed: 
Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity. A sixth component, a bank's 
Sensitivity to market risk, was added in 1997; hence the acronym was changed to CAMELS. 
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Bank of Pakistan promised to strengthen loan recovery process. In November 1993, 
the State Bank of Pakistan asked banks to set quarterly recovery targets, submit 
progress reports and form strategies to improve the future recovery process. At the 
same time, minimum conditions for borrowers were also established to ensure that 
defaulters were not provided with fresh loans. All financial institutions were 
instructed not to accommodate defaulters unless rescheduling or restructuring of 
outstanding liabilities was completed to the satisfaction of lending institutions. In 
1993 a list of loan defaulters were published, banks and DFIs were asked to provide 
details of bad debts and loans written off, and to consult the Credit Information 
Bureau of the State Bank of Pakistan prior to financial accommodation of RS 0.5 
million or above. Steps were also taken to institutionalise the credit rating process of 
banks and NBFIs. In 1998 the State Bank of Pakistan's prudential regulation for loan 
classification was rationalised, thereby requiring banks to make qualitative 
evaluation of their credit portfolios for risk assessment on the basis of adequacy of 
security, cash flows and credit worthiness of borrowers (SBP, 2000). 
4.3.3 - Reforms in the commercial banking industry 
The financial liberalisation programme discussed above brought about major changes 
to the operation of the commercial banking industry in Pakistan. A key policy was 
that new private sector commercial banks were allowed to operate. Before 1988 the 
banking sector consisted of only two sectors, the domestic public sector, which had 
five main nationalised commercial banks PSBs and the foreign sector, which had 24 
banks. In 1991 the government issued licences to ten new DBs and denationalised 
two smallest PSBs (Muslim Commercial Bank and Allied Bank Limited). The 
reforms also enabled banks to operate and function with a higher level of 
freedom. 
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Banks were allowed to close their branches entirely on commercial considerations. 
The interest rate rationalisation and the promotion of market-based and efficient 
credit mechanisms aimed at allowing banks to be able to set their lending rates in 
relation to the demand-supply condition in the market. Furthermore, concessional 
credit was also phased out and all new schemes involving concessional finance were 
capped to ensure that banks are not burdened with subsidised credit. Prudential 
practices in the banking industry were focused. The loan recovery process was 
strengthened and various measures were applied to tackle the problem of NPLs. 
In the post-reforms period, besides financial sector reforms, the Pakistani 
commercial banking industry was also exposed to major changes brought about by 
other elements of the overall economic reforms initiated in 1988 such as controlling 
fiscal deficits and government expenditure, removing controls on private investment 
and encouraging foreign direct investment. In the following sections the trends and 
performance of the Pakistani commercial banking industry in the 1990s is evaluated 
on the basis of deposit mobilisation and credit provision, asset diversification, 
competition, profitability, and ratio-based efficiency. 
a- Deposits mobilisation and credit provision 
The financial liberalisation programme, especially the interest rate rationalisation and 
the promotion of a flexible and market-based credit mechanism, was designed to 
increase the deposits mobilisation and credit provision by the banking industry. 
Although there was no interest rate deregulation for deposits, there were several 
measures to enhance deposit mobilisation. Resident Pakistanis were allowed to open 
foreign currency deposit accounts and banks paid higher interest rates on these 
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deposits than LIBOR. According to a report by the World Bank, foreign currency 
deposits increased from US$ 1.6 billion in 1988 to US$ 3.7 billion in 1992 and US$ 
8.5 billion in 1996 (World Bank, 1993). Several policies were also launched to 
increase credit provided to the economy. The system of credit ceilings and credit- 
deposit ratios was abolished to encourage banks to extend credit to the private sector 
through market-based mechanisms. In 1991 foreign companies were allowed to 
borrow for their capital expenditure from banks and other financial institutions. 
Despite such polices Figure 4.14 shows no significant improvements in the post- 
reforms period in terms of deposit mobilisation and credit provision by the Pakistani 
commercial banking industry. After an increase between 1990 and 1993, both 
demand deposits and time deposits decreased sharply in 1994 and decreased 
gradually thereafter. Over the post-reforms period, demand deposits as a percentage 
of GDP decreased by half from 16.9% in 1990 to around 8.9% in 1998. Time 
deposits also decreased from 18.8% of GDP to 13.3% in the same period. Saving 
deposits however increased steadily from 14.5% to 17.6% of GDP between 1990 and 
1998. Figure 4.18 also shows that in the post-reforms period credit provided by the 
commercial banking industry stayed almost the same at around 50% of GDP. 
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Figure 4.19 shows the growth rates of deposits mobilised by the commercial banking 
industry during 1991 and 1998. The annual average growth rate of the whole 
industry was around 15%. Sectorally, FBs had the highest annual average rate of 
25.7%, while the average rates of DBs and PSBs were 21% and 8%, respectively. In 
the 1990s changes in the growth rates of deposit mobilised by PSBs and DBs were 
not as much as changes in the growth rates of deposit mobilisation of FBs. From 
56% in 1992, the deposit mobilisation growth rates of FBs declined sharply to 14% 
in 1997 and below zero in 1998. Despite this declining trend Figure 4.20 shows that 
the share of FBs in deposit mobilisation increased rapidly from 4.7% in 1990 to 
17.3% in 1998. The share of DBs also increased rapidly from 18% in 1992 to 29.7% 
in 1998. Meanwhile the share of PSBs decreased sharply from 92.5% in 1990 to 
52.8% in 1998. 
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Figure 4.21 shows no clear trend in the credit provided by the banking industry. The 
annual average growth rate of credit provided by the banking industry was 14.3% in 
the 1990s. Credit provided by DBs and FBs increased at the same average rate of 
23% while that of PSBs grew only by 7.4%. Figure 4.22 shows that like deposit 
in total credit provided to the economy decreased mobilisation, the share of PSBs II 
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sharply by half from 91% in 1990 to 52% in 1998. Meanwhile, the share of FBs 
doubled from 8.6% in 1990 to 17.7% in 1998 and of DBs increased froml. 8.6% in 
1992 to 30% in 1998. 
FBs= Foreign Banks; DBs= Domestic Priavet Banks; PSBs= Public Sector Banks 
b- Asset diversirication 
As discussed earlier, the choice of credit and investment, the two major sources of 
income for banks on the asset side of the balance sheet, determines the asset 
diversification of banks. Figure 4.23 shows that the share of credit was always higher 
than the share of investment in total assets, which indicates a preference for credit 
over investment in the Pakistani banking industry. Despite increasing from 36.4% in 
1990 to 47.5% in 1998, the share of credit in total assets of the whole banking 
industry fluctuated and showed no clear trend in the 1990s. Sharp increases were 
witnessed between 1994 and 1995 when the share of credit increased from 30.7% to 
36.6% and between 1996 and 1997 when the share of credit increased from 32.1% to 
47.5%. With the removal of maximum cap on lending interest rates, one would 
expect banks to alter their asset diversification in favour of credit because banks 
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could set the rates according to the demand-supply condition in the market rather 
than being under constraint by the rates set by the State Bank. However, like in India, 
there was no such trend in Pakistan probably because banks became more cautious in 
providing credit under the implementation of prudential measures to strengthen the 
loan recovery process and to tackle the problem of NPLs. 
Similar to credit, there were fluctuations in the share of investment in total assets in 
the 1990s. After increasing from 18.2% in 1990 to 23.4% in 1991 and 25% in 1992 
the share of investment in total assets decreased gradually to 21.6% in 1996. Increase 
of investment in the early 1990s could be because the implementation of the debt 
management reforms, which established a market-based rate of return structure for 
government securities, an auction system of public debt and a secondary market for 
government securities, thus encouraged banks to hold government securities. Also a 
new type of government paper, the Federal Investment Bonds, was introduced in 
view of ample demand for a market-based long-term government paper by banks 
(SBP, 2000). The share of investment in total assets jumped from 21.6% in 1996 to 
30.1 % in 1997 and 28.9% in 1998 because of a better rate of return on government 
securities attracted large investment, especially from DBs (SBP, 2000). 
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Rgure 4.23 - Diversification in the 
Banking Industry in Pakistan (1990-1998) 
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Figures 4.24,4.25 and 4.26 show that the trends of asset diversification in PSBs, DBs 
and FBs resembled that of the whole industry. The only exception was that in the late 
1990s DBs increased their holding of government securities and thus the shares of 
investment in total assets of DBs were much higher than those of PSBs and FBs. In 
1998 for example the share of investment in total assets of DBs was 34.2% compared 
with 26.6% and 26.9% of PSBs and FBs, respectively. 
c- Competition 
One of the key objectives of the financial liberalisation programme was to enhance 
the efficiency of the banking industry by promoting a competitive environment. 
Allowing new private sector commercial banks to function was commended as a 
major break from the past (Zaidi, 1999), which made the number of 
banks in the 
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industry increase significantly in the 1990S. In 1990 there were 5 PSBs and 15 FBs. 
In 2000 there were 4 PSBs, 21 DBs and 17 FBs. According to Khan (1999) the 
competition among banks and other financial intermediaries resulted in improved 
service quality and higher yields. 
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Figure 4.27 shows the Herfindahl index of concentration in the Pakistani commercial 
banking industry. It shows similar declining trends in concentration, i. e. increasing 
trends in the level of competition, in mobilising deposits, providing credit, total 
assets and total income. Competition in generating income was however lower than 
in all other aspects. 
An increasing level of competition could also be seen from the declining share of 
PSBs in the industry. The shares of PSBs in deposits mobilised, credit provided and 
total assets of the industry decreased from above 90% in 1990 to less than 70% in 
1998. The shares of PSBs in total income of the industry decreased even more 
significantly from above 90% in 1990 to around 60% in 1998". Several elements of 
the financial liberalisation could be responsible for this declining share of PSBs in 
" See also Appendix 4.5 
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the industry, including the amendment of Act 1974 that allowed the entry of new 
private banks and empowered the government to sell all or any part of the share 
capital of PSBs, measures taken by SBP to require PSBs to rationalise their size; and 
growing competition from the private sector. 
d- Profitability 
Figure 4.28 shows the fluctuations in growth rates of income in the Pakistani 
commercial banking industry in the 1990s. Although the annual average growth rate 
of income of the whole industry in the 1990s was 18% there were years when the 
growth rates of income of the industry were either well above or below this rate. For 
example, the growth rate of income decreased from 19% in 1995 to 10% in 1996, 
increased sharply to 30% in 1997 and abruptly became negative in 1998. The growth 
rates of income of PSBs were much lower than those of DBs and FBs in all years 
except 1997. Accordingly, the annual average rate of PSBs was much lower than that 
of DBs and FBs, 9% compared with 28%. Despite high growth rates, the growth 
rates of income of DBs and FBs showed a decreasing trend. The growth rates of 
income of DBs decreased dramatically from 48% in 1993 to around 10% in 1998. 
The growth rates of income of FBs decreased even more severely from 50% in 1991 
to around 3% in 1998. 
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Having the lowest growth rates of income, PSBs retained the highest but declining 
share in income of the industry (see Figure 4.29). From 90% at the start of the 1990s, 
the share of PSBs decreased significantly by half by the end of the decade. The share 
of DBs almost doubled from 17.6% to 32.5% while the share of FBs increased from 
10% to 22.6% in the same period. 
e- Efficiency 
This section evaluates the efficiency of the Pakistani commercial banking industry 
using six different measures: total income over total assets; net return on assets; 
interest margin; total expenses over total income; staff expenses over total assets and 
non-performing loans (NPLs) over gross advances 12 . Overall there was very little 
improvement in the efficiency of the commercial banking industry in the 1990s. 
There was an increasing trend in the ratio of total income over total assets and the 
interest margin (see Figures 4.30 and 4.32). Nevertheless the net return on assets, 
which is defined as the difference between total income and total expenses divided 
by total assets, were decreasing (see Figure 4.3 1) which could be due to increasing 
trends in expenses (see Figures 4.33 and 4.34) and NPLs (see Figure 4.35). Also 
Khan (1999) suggests that intense competition among banks and other financial 
institutions squeezed spreads and lowered margins. 
12Compare this with Section 4.2.2 on the efficiency of banks in India. 
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income over total assets of FBs and PSBs were twice as much as that of DBs. In the 
1990s the annual average net return on assets of FBs and PSBs was around twice that 
of DBs. Between 1990 and 1994 this ratio of FBs and PSBs was three times higher 
than that of DBs. In terms of cost efficiency, PSBs were much less efficient than DBs 
and FBs. The annual average ratio of total expenses over total income of PSBs in the 
1990s was I compared with 0.8 for DBs and FBs. The annual average ratio of staff 
expenses over total income of PSBs in the 1990s was ten times higher than that of 
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DBs and six times higher than that of FBs. This was mainly due to high staff 
expenses in the early 1990s of PSBs. 
Table 4.5 - Efficiency in the Banking Industry in Pakistan (1990-1998) 
Total Income/ Net Return Interest 
Total Assets on Assets b Margin' 
1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 
Total 0.120 0.126 0.111 0.037 0.056 0.014 0.041 0.042 0.039 
PSBs 0.114 0.126 0.098 0.031 0.061 -0.006 0.036 0.031 0.041 
DBs 0.092 0.069 0.109 0.018 0.020 0.017 0.039 0.036 0.041 
FBs 0.125 0.132 0.116 0.039 0.058 0.016 0.043 0.047 0.038 
Total Expenses/ Staff Expenses/ 
Total Income Total AssetSd 
1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 1990-1998 1990-1994 1995-1998 
Total 0.842 0.741 0.968 0.030 0.043 0.015 
PSBs 1.019 0.871 1.203 0.103 0.170 0.019 
DBs 0.803 0.742 0.848 0.010 0.008 0.012 
FBs 0.843 0.699 1.023 0.016 0.014 0.018 
PSBs= Public Sector Banks; DBs=Domestic Private Banks; FBs= Foreign Banks 
a= Total income includes both interest and non-interest income; b= Net return on assets in net profit 
divivded by total assets; c= Interest margin is the difference between total interest income and interest 
expense as a percentage of assets; d= total expenses divided by total income 
All values are simple averages for the specified group; Number of banks: PSBs=4, DBs= 17, FBs= 18 (see 
Appendix 5.2 for more details 
Figures 4.35 and 4.36 show that despite the implementation of the reforms NPLs 
were still a big problem in the Pakistani commercial banking industry in the 1990s. 
NPLs of the whole industry as a share of gross advances had an increasing trend. 
This, according to the State Bank of Pakistan, was partly because strict disclosure 
requirements forced banks to disclose the true classification of their loans, many of 
which had been undeclared NPLs. 
The problem of NPLs was particularly serious in PSBs. The ratios of NPLs over 
gross advances of PSBs were much higher than those of DBs and FBs 
in all years. 
The annual average NPLs over gross advances of PSBs was 23.1% compared with 
only 8% and 5.9% of DBs and FBs, respectively. 
The share of NPLs in gross 
advances of FBs declined 
from 1990 to 1994, increased from 1994 to 1995 and 
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remained stable in the later part of the 1990s. The share of NPLs in gross advances of 
DBs declined from 1994 to 1995 and increased especially after 1998, which was due 
to aggressive lending by these banks (SBP, 2000). Meanwhile, the share of NPLs in 
gross advances of PSBs was increasing, which according to SBP (2000) was due to 
substantial loans provided on political grounds especially during the early and mid 
1990s that resulted in NPLs after a time lag. 
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Figure 4.36 shows that PSBs had the largest share in total NPLs of the banking 
industry, which was much greater than their share in deposits, credit, total assets or 
total income' 3. Although this share declined slightly in the later part of 1990s, from 
95% in 1990 to 91% in 1998, according to SBP (2000) this was more due to an 
increase in NPLs of DBs and FBs rather than to any improvement in NPLs of PSBs. 
The analysis of five measures of efficiency reveals that with lower earnings and 
profit and higher expenses PSBs were less efficient than DBs and FBs. This could be 
due to several reasons, including growing competition from the private sector, 
political intervention, overstaffing and over-branching (SBP, 2000). High and 
fast 
growing NPLs also contributed to the inefficiency of PSBs. 
13 See also Appendix 4.5. 
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4.4 - Summary and conclusion 
In both India and Pakistan a programme of economic and structural reforms was 
initiated in the early 1990s. The reforms in India were triggered by an economic 
crisis that included high fiscal deficits and a severe balance of payment crisis. 
However, in the case of Pakistan there were no crises. The reforms in both countries 
included similar elements, including controlling fiscal deficits, liberalising imports, 
encouraging exports and foreign investment, removing controls on private 
investment, and reforming the financial sector. However, the performance of the two 
countries in the 1990s after the reforms were initiated was not very similar (see, for 
example, Figure 4.37 and Figure 4.38). 
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India seems to be more successful with its ESRs compared to Pakistan. The Indian 
economy saw higher economic growth rates, lower fiscal deficits, increasing 
international reserves, higher growth in exports, imports and foreign investment, and 
increase in investment, especially by the private sector. Meanwhile the overall 
performance of the Pakistan economy was disappointing and even worse than the 
pre-reforms period. The economy was growing at lower rates than before with higher 
current account deficits, and lower growth rates of exports and imports. There was, 
however, some progress in the form of increase in foreign investment in the first half 
of 1990s and in investment by the private sector. 
For both countries, tackling high fiscal deficits was the key objective of the 
economic reforms and both countries failed to achieve their targets. Even though the 
fiscal deficits in India in the 1990s were significantly lower than the pre-reforms 
period, they remained well above the target of 3% of GDP. Meanwhile Pakistan still 
had very high fiscal deficits compared with the pre-reforms period and much higher 
than the target of 4% of GDP set by the reforms. 
As a key element of the 1990s reforms in both India and Pakistan, the financial 
liberalisation programme included efforts to increase competition, allowing banks to 
operate with more freedom, and strengthening supervision and prudential measures. 
The financial liberalisation programme brought about major changes to both the 
Indian and Pakistani commercial banking industries. In India new domestic private 
sector banks were given licenses and foreign banks were allowed to expand much 
more liberally than in the past. In Pakistan the major break from the past was the 
decision to allow domestic private sector commercial banks to function. In both 
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countries banks were allowed to operate with higher flexibility through such policies 
as liberalising interest rates, liberalising branch policies, and establishing a market- 
based rate of return structure for govemment securities. 
In India deposit rates and lending rates were gradually deregulated during the post- 
ESRs period. Quantitative restrictions on credit allocation by banks were eliminated 
and mandatory requirements for investment by banks in low-interest government 
securities were sharply lowered. Similarly, the system of credit ceilings and credit- 
deposit ratios was abolished in Pakistan. Banks were encouraged to extend credit to 
the private sector through market-based mechanisms and concessional credit was 
phased out. In order to establish a strong and stable financial sector, the reforms in 
both countries emphasised prudential measures, including implementing prudential 
norms and standards on capital adequacy and asset classification and provisioning, 
strengthening supervision, especially on-site and off-site surveillance, and evaluating 
banks' performance based on the new prudential standards. Such higher prudential 
standards aimed at forcing banks to seek quality borrowers in order to improve their 
asset quality and tackle the problem of non-performing loans. A loan recovery 
mechanism and legal procedure was implemented, requiring banks to set quarterly 
recovery targets, submit progress reports and form strategies to improve the future 
recovery process. Some other measures were also established such as minimum 
conditions for borrowers to ensure that defaulters were not provided fresh loans and a 
list of loan defaulters. 
The analysis of non-frontier-based ratios shows that under the sirmlar financial 
liberalisation, the performance of the commercial banking industry in India and 
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Pakistan was not the same. In India there were some achievements in terms of 
deposits mobilised and credit provided by the banking industry (see Figure 4.1,4.2. 
and 4.3). In Pakistan there were no significant achievements (see Figure 4.18,4.19ý 
and 4.20). Both demand deposits and time deposits as a percentage of GDP 
decreased in Pakistan. In terms of core earning assets, India witnessed an increasing 
trend in the share of investment, which was mainly due to increases in the share of 
government securities. Although the share of investment in total assets initially was 
lower than that of credit, the increasing trend of the former made the gap between the 
two ratios very trivial. In Pakistan the share of investment in total assets was always 
lower than the share of credit, although there was some increase of investment in the 
early 1990s due to the implementation of the debt management reforms. Both 
countries witnessed an increase in the level of competition in the banking industry. In 
both countries the number of banks in the industry increased significantly in the 
1990s and the Herfindahl index of concentration bears similar declining trends. In 
India the increase in competition for deposits was more gradual than for credit, 
assets, and income. In Pakistan the increase in competition for income was more 
gradual than for deposits, credit and assets. The analysis of ratio-based efficiency of 
both countries, however, showed no clear trends. 
Sectorally, although public sector banks still retained the highest share in the industry 
both countries saw a decline in the share of these banks, which occurred to a higher 
extent in Pakistan. In India the shares of public sector banks in deposits, credit, total 
assets and total income of the industry decreased from 90% before the reforms were 
initiated to around 80% in 1998. In Pakistan the shares of public sector banks 
decreased from above 90% in 1990 to less than 70% of deposits, credit and total 
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assets of the industry and 60% of total income in 1998. In both the countries public 
sector banks had the lowest growth rates of deposit, credit and income. In India, both 
domestic private banks and foreign banks had high growth rates of deposits, credit 
and income, and domestic private banks' shares in the industry increased while those 
of foreign banks remained quite stable. In Pakistan, foreign banks had the highest 
growth rates of deposits, credit and income and its shares in the industry increased 
rapidly. Domestic private banks also had high growth rates of deposits, credit and 
income and its shares in the industry also increased but more gradually than foreign 
banks. Relating to the efficiency, in both the countries foreign banks were the most 
efficient while public sector banks were the least. The gap in efficiency between 
foreign banks and public sector banks and domestic private banks in India was larger 
than in Pakistan. In Pakistan, the gap was marginal. In both countries the problem of 
non-performing loans remained serious in the post-ESRs, particularly for public 
sector banks. In the following chapter, we employ frontier techniques to analyse 
whether these conclusions regarding the efficiency of banks are robust. 
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Chapter 5: The Technical Efficiency and Total Factor 
Productivity of Banks in India and Pakistan during 1990- 
19981 
5.1 - Introduction 
The preceding chapter reviewed the economic and structural reforms (ESRs) in India 
and Pakistan during the 1990s. Within the context of this study, emphasis was placed 
on the implementation of the financial liberalisation programme that transformed the 
banking industry in both the countries during the post-ESRs era. This chapter 
describes and employs non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure 
the technical efficiency and total factor productivity change of banks in India and 
Pakistan during 1990-1998 2. Our aim is to examine whether the efficiency and 
productivity of banks improved after the implementation of the financial liberalisation 
programme in 1991-1992. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents some technical 
details of the DEA. Section 5.3 measures technical efficiency for the banking industry 
in India and Pakistan during 1990-1998. Following Bauer et al. (1998) and Resti 
(1997), we also check the consistency of our results. In addition, stochastic frontier 
1 An extended version of section 5.3 of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the Applied 
Economics. Also, a paper based on section 5.4 of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the 
Service Industries Journal. 
2 As mentioned earlier, due to price distortions in the banking industry caused by excessive government 
restrictions on interest rates and wages, we will not calculate allocative efficiency. Another reason for 
not calculating allocative efficiencies is the unavailability of data on number of employees. 
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analysis (SFA) is employed to check the robustness of our DEA results. Section 5.4 
measures changes in total factor productivity during 1992-1998. We also decompose 
total factor productivity change into technological change and efficiency change. 
Section 5.5 concludes. 
5.2 - Methodology and Data 
Chapter 3 highlighted various parametric and non-parametric techniques that have 
been employed in the empirical literature to measure the frontier-based efficiency of 
banks. This section provides some technical details of the DEA, the technique used in 
this chapter. We will also discuss the construction of the Malmquist total factor 
productivity index, and its decomposition into technological change and efficiency 
change 
3. 
5.2.1 - Technical efficiency measurement using Data Envelopment Analysis 
Based on Farrell's (1957) work, Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) introduced a 
basic DEA model to calculate the technical efficiency of decision-making units 
(DWs) (i. e. firms, branches, subsidiaries, and so forth). Before outlining the 
mathematical formulation, a graphical example would be useful to illustrate the 
underlying concept of the DEA (see Ali and Seiford, 1993). 
Consider an industry comprising six firms that use two inputs (xl and x2) to produce a 
single output Y. Assuming constant returns to scale, Figure 5.1 plots the input-output 
correspondence (ordered-pairs in the R2 plane) for the six firms, where xl/Y and x2/Y 
3 For a comprehensive review of theory and applications of DEA, see Thanassoulis (2001) and Coelli et 
al. (1998). The notations used in this chapter are primarily from Coell' et al. (1998). 
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represent inputs per units of Y. Fl refers to the input-output correspondence set of fin-n 
1, F2 refers to the input-output correspondence set of firm 2, and so forth. As 
discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3.1), the measurement of the efficiency of a firm 
requires comparing that firm's actual input-output correspondence set with a best- 
practice production frontier. As highlighted earlier, Farrell (1957) suggested that the 
best practice production frontier for a given industry can be obtained by a theoretical 
production function specified by engineers and/or by an empirical determination based 
on actual data on resource usage and output generation by firms operating in that 
industry 4. 
With the DEA, for a given sample of firrns, the best-practice frontier is obtained 
through a piece-wise linear combination of input-output correspondence sets that 
envelops the input-output correspondences of all firms in the sample. The assumptions 
underlying such a piece-wise linear combination are (see Thanassoulis, 2001, p. 10): 
(1) Interpolation between feasible input-output correspondences (i. e. actually observed 
correspondences) leads to new input-output correspondences that are feasible in 
principle, and (2) Inefficient production is possible (i. e. some firms may not produce 
on the interpolated linear combination). In Figure 5.1, for example, the best practice 
frontier (i. e. an empirically determined isoquant) is formed by interpolating between 
the observed input-output correspondence sets of finn 1 and finn 5 in such a way that 
no firm lies to the left of the linear combination. The efficiency of each firm not on the 
calculated frontier is then measured as a distance from the frontier (the firms 
constituting the frontier are considered 100% efficient). For example, the efficiency of 
firm 2 is given by the ratio OF2 "1OF2. 
4 As outlined in chapter 3, parametric or non-parametric techniques can be used in this regard. 
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Fii! ure 5.1 - Piecewise-linear combination and technical efficiencv 
x2fY 
xIfy 
Adoptedfrom C: mllist al. (1998 p. 143) 
This measure of efficiency is usually known as Farrell's 'radial efficiency' (i. e. 
possible proportional contraction in both inputs while maintaining the existing input 
mix). It is argued that there is a problem with this measure of efficiency due to the 
sections of the calculated production frontier that run parallel to axes because, for 
example, for firms 2 and 6 Farrell's measure of radial technical efficiency is given by 
OF2"1OF2 and OF6"IOF6, respectively. However, as evident from the figure, it is 
pertinent to question the inclusion of point F6" in the best-practice frontier because 
any firm at point F6" can reduce its usage of input x2 (i. e. from F6" to F5) and still 
produce the same output. This is referred to as 'slacks' in the empirical literature. 
Unlike Farrell's definition of efficiency, which only considers radial movement, 
Koopmans' (1951) definition of efficiency considers both radial efficiency and all 
associated slacks (see, for example, Lovell, 1994; Aly and Seifod, 1993; Coelli et al. 
1998). According to Koopmans' definition, a firm is efficient if it is not possible to 
raise (lower) anyone of its outputs (inputs) without lowering (increasing) at least 
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another one of its outputs (inputs) and/or without increasing (lowering) at least one of 
its inputs (outputs). 
This chapter focuses on radial efficiency only and ignores any slack because, 
following Ferrier and Lovell (1990), it is assumed that any slacks in the Indian and 
Pakistani banking industry could be due to allocative inefficiency (see also Coelli et 
al., 1998, p. 176). As highlighted earlier, allocative efficiency is not considered 
because of the non-availability of price data and a possibility of distortions in prices 
due to state-determined interest rates and wages. Also, the general evidence from 
developed and developing countries suggests that compared to technical efficiencies, 
allocative efficiencies in the banking industry are negligible (see Berger and 
Humphrey, 1997; Isik and Hassan, 2003; Sathye, 2001). Furthermore, Bhattacharyya 
et al. (1997) find that slacks in the Indian banking industry are insignificant compared 
to the radial inefficiencies. Therefore, given this previous empirical evidence, we 
concentrate on Farrell's radial efficiency measure. 
Mathematicalformulation of a simple DEA with Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) 
In their original paper, Chames, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) introduced a basic DEA 
model by assuming that the production frontier exhibits constant returns to scale. 
Banker, Chames, and Cooper (1984) allowed for the possibility of variable returns to 
scale (VRS). We first consider simple CRS DEA. Following Coelli et al. 's (1998) 
notations, assume we have N firms (or DXWs) each producing M number of outputs 
using K number of inputs. For the 
ith firm, the inputs and outputs are represented by 
column vectors xi and yi, respectively. The KXN input matrix, X, and the MxN output 
matrix, Y, represent the data for all the N firms. In ratio form, the efficiency of a firm 
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would be the maximum of the ratio uýylv'xi, where u is an MxI vector of output 
weights and v is a Kx1 vector of input weights. The optimal weights are obtained by 
solving the mathematical programming problem with an objective function and 
specified constraints: 
max,,,, (u'yi / v'xi) 
subject to 
U-yi / V'xi < 1,2,..., N 
(5.1) 
U, V 
The above problem requires finding values of the optimal weights in such a way that 
the efficiency measure for the ith firm is maximised given that the efficiency measure 
for each firm in the sample is equal to or less than 1. The difficulty with the above 
ratio form is that it has an infinite number of solutions because if (u*, v) is a solution, 
the (ru*, rv*) is another solution (where r is any constant). To avoid this, the above 
ratio form can be formulated in the following linear programming problem: 
max, u, v 
(dyi) 
subject to 
V, xi =I 
,U% yj - V'X J-<0; 
2,..., N 
(5.2) 
, U, V 
Where the change of notation from u and v to ýt and v stresses that this is a different 
linear programming problem (see Coelli et al., 1998, p. 141). Using the duality in 
linear programming5, the dual of the above maximisation problem can be written in 
the following envelopment form that provides the technical efficiency of the i"' firm: 
5 See Chiang (1984) for a simple exposition of linear programming techniques and duality theorem. Cý 
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min O, A 0 
subject to 
-Yi +YA>o 
ox 
i -XA ý! 0 
A>O 
(5.3) 
where 0 is a scalar and A is a Nx1 vector of constants. The value of 0 obtained is the 
efficiency score for the ith firm. The above linear mathematical problem is solved N 
number of times to get the efficiency score for each firm in the sample. A value of I 
represents a 100% efficient firm, i. e. firm producing on the best practice production 
frontier. 
DEA with Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) 
The above DEA model with CRS assumption does not take into account the 
information on the scale economies as it assumes that all the firms operate at the 
optimal scale, i. e. at the CRS. However, factors like imperfect competition and 
constraints on finance may cause firms to diverge from producing at the optimal scale 
(see Coelli et al., 1998, p. 150). Banker et al. (1984) extended the above DEA model 
by relaxing the CRS assumption and allowing for VRS. The DEA with the VRS 
assumption allows decomposing the overall technical efficiency into its two 
exhaustive components, namely pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency. The 
DEA model in 5.3 above can be modified to account for the possibility of VRS, by 
adding a convexity constraint NI'.; 4 as follows: 
155 
min62 0 
subject to 
- Yi + YA >0 
Oxi - XA >0 
Nl'A =I 
A>O 
(5.4) 
where NI is a NxI vector of ones. 'This approach forms a convex hull of intersecting 
planes which envelop the data points more tightly than the CRS conical hull and thus 
provides technical efficiency scores which are greater than or equal to those obtained 
using the CRS model ... [T]he convexity constraint (N1'.; 4=1) essentially ensures that 
an inefficient firm is only "benchmarked" against firms of a similar size. That is, the 
projected point (for that firm) on the DEA frontier will be [a] convex combination of 
observed firms. This convexity restriction is not imposed in the CRS case. Hence, in a 
CRS DEA, a firm may be benchmarked against firms which are substantially larger 
(smaller) than it. In this instance the X-weights will sum to a value greater than (less 
than) one'. (Coelli et al., 1998, p. 150). 
Input and output orientation 
Efficiency can be defined in terms of input-orientation or output-orientation. The 
input-oriented efficiency examines by how much can input quantities be 
proportionally reduced without changing given output quantities. On the other hand, 
output-ofiented efficiency examines by how much can output quantities be 
proportionally expanded without altering input quantities used. Under the CRS 
assumption, output-oriented and input-oriented measures are equal. However, when 
production frontier exhibits variables returns to scale, input-oriented measures are 
different from the output-oriented measures (see Thanassoulis, 2001, chap. 4). 
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Nevertheless, 'the output- and input-oriented models will estimate exactly the same 
frontiers and therefore, by definition, identify the same set of firms as being efficient. 
It is only the efficiency measures associated with inefficient firms that may differ 
between the two models' (Coelli et al., 1998, p159). Following recent studies on the 
efficiency of banks in developing countries (e. g. Bhattacharyya et al. 1997, Leightner 
and Lovell, 1998; Gilbert and Wilson, 1998; Yildirim, 2002), this chapter measures 
output-oriented efficiency for banks in India and Pakistan because as interest rates and 
wages in the banking industry are determined by governments, banks have relatively 
less control over their inputs (e. g. interest expenses and operating expenses). 
Measuring Scale efficiency using CRS and VRS DEA model 
The extension of CRS DEA model to take into account the possibility of VRS 
technology could be used to calculate the scale efficiency of firms. This is achieved by 
running both CRS and VRS DEA models, and then decomposing technical efficiency 
obtained from the CRS DEA into pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency as 
follows: 
TECRS= TEVRS x SE (5.5) 
Figure 5.2 represents the CRS and VRS frontiers for finns producing one output, Y, 
using one input, X. Under the CRS, the input-oriented technical inefficiency of the 
firm producing at point P is the distance PP, while under the VRS assumption the 
technical inefficiency would be the distance PP,. The difference between these two 
represents the scale efficiency of the firm. 
TECRS= APJAP 
TEVRS= APv/AP 
SE = APJAP, 
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This measurement of scale efficiency can be extended in order to examine whether a 
firm operates in the area of increasing or decreasing returns to scale. To accomplish 
this, the DEA model in 5.4 is altered by substituting NI'X=l with Nl'X<-l (see Fdre, 
Grosskopf and Lovell, 1994; Lovell, 1993). 
Fip-ure 5.2 - Pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency 
Y 
x 
The measurement of efficiency using both the CRS and VRS assumptions is pertinent 
in the context of the banking industry in India and Pakistan where governments 
restricted the scale of operation of private sector banks (especially foreign banks) and 
directed public sector banks to extend their branch network to rural and suburban 
areas. These restrictions could hinder banks' ability to exploit scale economies. The 
implementation of the financial liberalisation may enable banks to improve their scale 
efficiency. However, as both the countries adopted a gradual approach towards the 
liberalisation, and as our study only considers the period until 1998, the improvement 
in scale efficiency may not be very significant. For example, public sector banks in 
both the countries were only able to start closing some of their branches after 1995- 
1996. Also, due to strong labour unions, both public sector and private sector banks in 
India found it difficult to convince government to allow them to reduce their number 
of employees (see Ahluwalia, 1999a). Therefore, although we do examine variations 
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Soluxce: Ailopted from Coelli et: aJL (1998) 
in the scale efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan, like Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), 
our main emphasis would be pure technical efficiency obtained by assuming a VRS 
production frontier. Following the existing empirical studies, we refer to the pure 
technical efficiencies as managerial efficiencies (see, for example, Bhattacharyya et 
al., 1997). That is, how efficient the managers are to utilise their existing resources. 
5.2.2 - Malmquist total factor productivitY change index 
The total factor productivity (TFP) of a firm is defined as the quantity of its output per 
unit of input. In a single-output and single-input case, the productivity is simply the 
ratio of the firm's output to input quantities (see Coelli et al., 1998). However, in a 
multiple outputs inputs situation, indices of outputs and inputs are used to measure the 
productivity of the firm. 
The measures of efficiency discussed above do not take into account shifts in the 
calculated production frontier relative to which the efficiency of each unit is assessed. 
In this section, we discuss the Malmquist total factor productivity change index that 
enables us to measure changes in productivity over time or space, and to decompose 
this change into change in efficiency and shifts in the production frontier due to either 
technological progress or technological regress in the industry in question. 
An index number is a real number that measures inter-temporal and/or intra-temporal 
change in a variable, such as price level (see, for example, Anderson et al., 1996, 
chap. 17). In terms of measuring productivity changes, index numbers are used in 
measuring changes in the level of output produced and the level of input used in the 
production process over two time periods or across two firms. In the empirical 
159 
literature, two techniques have been used to measure changes in TFP: an econometric 
approach and an index number approach (see Coelli et al. 1998). In this paper, the 
index number approach is adopted for two reasons. Firstly, in contrast to the 
econometric approach, it does not impose a pre-specified functional form on the 
production frontier. Secondly, as a recent study by Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) has 
already employed the econometric approach to measure TFP change in Indian banks, 
it is pertinent to ascertain whether their conclusions would still hold using the index 
number approach. 
The index number approach incorporates the following three alternatives: the Fischer 
Index, the Tornqvist Index, and the Malmquist Index (see Coelli et al., 1998). 
However, the Malmquist approach has a number of advantages compared to the other 
two methods (see, Grifell-Tatje and Lovell, 1996). First, unlike the Tomqvist and 
Fischer indices, the Malmquist Index does not require a behavioural assumption, such 
as cost minimisation or profit maximisation. Second, in contrast to the Tomqvist and 
Fischer indices, the Malmquist index can also be calculated without any information 
on the prices of inputs and outputs. Finally, provided that panel data are available, the 
Malmquist Index provides a decomposition of productivity change into technical 
change and efficiency change, and thereby offers an insight into the potential sources 
of change in TFP. This is important because efficiency change reveals whether a firm 
is moving closer to or further away from the best practice frontier in a particular 
industry, and technological change shows whether the best practice frontier (or 
technology) to which a firm is being compared is either improving, static or 
deteriorating. This is particularly relevant to developing countries, like India and 
Pakistan, where the banking industry is expected to enhance its technological level by 
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adopting new financial products (e. g. credit cards) and financial technology (e. g. 
Automated Teller Machines) already in use in developed countries. The 
decomposition of total factor productivity into efficiency change and technical change 
will, therefore, allow us to determine whether the productivity of commercial banks in 
India and Pakistan is improving either because of a more efficient utilisation of 
resources or because of more investment in new technology (or a combination of 
both). 
The Malmquist TFP index is defined using distance functions, which enable us to 
describe a multi-input, multi-output production technology without the need to specify 
a behavioural objective (such as cost-minimisation or profit maximisation) (see 
Shephard, 1970; Coelli et al. 1998, p. 62-64). One may specify input distance function 
or output distance function. An input distance function characterises the production 
technology by looking at a minimal proportional contraction of input vector, given an 
output vector. An output distance function considers a maximal proportional 
expansion of output vector, given an input vector. 
We utilise the concept of output distance function. Let us assume that the production 
P'(x) can be defined by: 
P'(X) =I (X, Y) :y can be produced from xj 
The output distance function for a given output vector, y, an input vector, x, for period 
t technology is defined as: 
D, t (X, y) = minlg: (y / 9, x) cz Pl (x)1 (5.6) 
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where P(x) is the production possibility set. The distance here represents the smallest 
factor, o5, by which output needs to be deflated so as to be feasible with the given 
input vector, x, under period t technology. The distance function takes a value equal to 
or less than unity if the output vector, y, is an element of the feasible production set, 
P(x). Using this definition of distance function, the Malmquist TFP index measures 
the TFP change between two data points by calculating the ratio of the distance of 
each point relative to a common technology. Following Fare et al. (1994), the output- 
oriented Malmquist TFP change index, MI between two time period s (the base or 
initial period) and t is defined as: 
D'(y x, ) D'(y x 
ý/2 
M, (Y x Yt, Xt 0 X- 0 t) (5.7) D'(yx, ) D'(yx, ) 
001 
where Do (y, , x, ) represents the distance from the period t observation to the period s 
(the base period) technology, while D'(y,, x, ) represents the distance from the period 0 
s observation to the period s technology. A value of M, greater than 1 will indicate a 
TFP growth from period s to period t while a value less than 1 indicates a TFP decline 
relative to the base periods. The above equation is the geometric mean of TFP 
indices, the first evaluated with respect to period s technology and the second with 
respect to period t technology. This geometric mean could be written as: 
m 
D'(y x, ) D, '(y x, ) x- 
DO (y x, ) (5.8) (Ys, x yl, Xt) 0 D'(y., x, ) D'(yt, x, ) Dt(y., x, ) 0100 
where the ratio outside the square brackets measures the change in the output oriented 
measure of Farrell's technical efficiency between periods s and t. That is, the efficient 
change is equivalent to the ratio of the Farrell technical efficiency in period t to the 
Farrell technical efficiency in the periods. The remaining part of the above equation is 
the geometric mean of the shift in technology between the two periods. Therefore, the 
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decomposition of TFP change in the above equation into its two components, i. e. 
efficiency change and technical change, is: 
Efficiency change 
N, x, ) (5.9) 
and 
Ds 
" 
(YS 
-v 
Technical chnage 
Do_(y,, x, ) 
x 
DO (y, x, ) [DO(y,, 
x, ) DO(y,, x, )_ 
(5.10) 
Following Fdre et al (1994), and numerous studies following them, we employ the 
DEA to measure the distance functions required to calculate various components of 
TFP change during two time periods. Fdre et al (1994) assume constant returns to 
scale technology in the analysis. Following the notations used above to explain the 
DEA, the linear programming (LP) problems for the distance functions are (see Coelli 
et al., 1998, p. 227): 
[Do (y, x, )] -' = max 0,, z 
subject to 
- OYt + yt/i > 0, (5.11) 
xit -x tZ ýý 
,Z ýý 0 
[D'(y x )]-' =max 0Sýs0,, ý 
subject to 
- oyi, + YZ ýý 0, 
Xis -xsZ>0, 
,Z>0 
(5.12) 
163 
[Do (ys 
I x, )]-' = max 0,, z 
subject to 
- oyi, + ytlz 
Xis -x tZ>0, 
,Z>0 
[Do (y, x, )] -' = max 0,,, 
subject to 
- oyit + YSz ýý 
xit -x sZ ýý 0, 
,Z>0 
(5.13) 
(5.14) 
Like the basic DEA model, the measurement of TFP change can be carried out by 
relaxing the CRS assumption. This enables one to decompose the technical efficiency 
change into its two components, namely 'pure technical efficiency change' and 'scale 
efficiency change' between the time period s and t. This requires the solution of two 
additional Us that involves repeating Us 5.11 and 5.12 with the convexity restriction 
I'A = 1. 
5.2.3 - Input output specification 
As is apparent from the above discussion, the calculation of efficiency and TFP 
change using the DEA requires data on inputs and outputs of finns in question. As 
highlighted in chapter 3, there is no consensus on a precise specification of inputs and 
outputs of banking firms. Therefore, as measurement of efficiency is usually sensitive 
to the way inputs and outputs are specified (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997; 
Molyneux et al., 2001; Sathye, 2001), our analysis is based on two alternative input- 
output models, which have been used by the recent empirical studies on the efficiency 
of banks in developing countries (see, for example, Leightner and Lovell, 1998). In 
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Model A (loan-based model), we postulate that banks incur operating and interest 
expenses to produce loans and advances, and investments. In Model B (Income-based 
model), banks incur operating and interest expenses to produce interest and non- 
interest income 6. 
Following Leightner and Lovell (1998), we argue that these two models represent two 
alternative, and sometimes conflicting, objectives of banks in developing countries. 
On one hand, as governments in developing countries play an explicit role in deciding 
banks' asset portfolio through state-directed credit policies, Model A postulates that 
banks seek to mobilise financial resources to fund borrowers, including those in the 
so-called priority sectors. Model B, on the other hand, could represent the profit 
maximisation objective of banks (see Leightner and Lovell, 1998). The specification 
of these two input-output models also reiterates the key assertion of the behavioural 
theory of the firm that firms' objective is influenced by various economic agents. 
According to Model A, government is a key agent in determining the objective of 
banks in India and Pakistan. 
It should be noted that the outputs in the two models are inter-related as banks' 
income (i. e. an output in Model B) depends largely on loans and advances (including 
priority sector lending), and investments (i. e. outputs in Model A) generated by banks. 
This is especially the case for commercial banks in developing countries where, unlike 
in developed countries, fee income is insignificant, and banks rely on traditional loans 
and government securities for their income generation. However, if governments see 
6 We did not include deposits as an input because, following Leightner and Lovell (1998), we believe 
that deposits are a function of the two inputs that we did include (i. e. interest expenses and operating 
expenses). 
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banks as institutions to promote socially equitable economic growth (like during the 
era of financial repression), then banks are forced to pursue the objective outlined in 
Model A (especially by extending credit to priority sectors like agriculture) even if it 
leads to a failure in pursuing the objective outlined in Model B. 
Another reason for a divergence between the efficiency according to the two models 
could be the presence of high non-performing loans in banks' asset portfolios. Due to 
high non-performing loans, efficiency in generating loans (Model A) may not always 
translate into efficiency in generating income (Model B). These two complementary 
models, therefore, could enable us to investigate, to some extent, the impact of non- 
performing loans on variations in the efficiency of the commercial banking industry in 
India and Pakistan. The impact of non-performing loans could be more appropriately 
analysed by explicitly including such loans in the specified input-output models (see 
Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Drake and Hall, 2003). However, at the time of this 
study, data on non-performing loans were not available for individual banks operating 
in India and Pakistan. 
5.2.4 - Data 
Our analysis covers the period from 1990 to 1998, a period characterised by changes 
brought about by the ESRs, particularly the financial liberalisation programme. We 
assume that the period 1990-1992 represents the pre-liberalisation era. We have 
excluded the period after 1998 because of the lack of availability of data, and because 
of the fact that the nuclear experimentation in both the countries in 1998 disrupted the 
ESRs as severe economic and financial restrictions were imposed on both the 
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countries, especially on Pakistan, by the international community, including 
institutions like the World Bank and the EMF that were the main sponsors of the ESRs. 
In the case of both the countries, the commercial banks included in our sample control 
more than 90% of total assets, deposits, and loans of the commercial banking industry. 
Data for commercial banks in Pakistan are obtained from various issues of the 
7 Banking Statistics of Pakistan published annually by the State Bank of Pakistan . In 
the case of India, data from 1990 to 1998 are obtained from the recently uploaded data 
set on the website of the Reserve Bank of India 8. Banks having zero recorded values 
for one or more outputs or inputs variables in any year are excluded from the sample 
for that year in recognition of the fact that the DEA is sensitive to outliers (see 
Yildirim, 2002, p. 2294). All data are converted into 1992 prices using the GDP 
deflator, which is obtained from World Development Indicators 2003. Appendix 5 
provides descriptive statistics for inputs and outputs, and the number of banks 
included for each year during 1990 to 1998. 
7 In case of Pakistan, data were not available in electronic format. Therefore, converting data into a 
spreadsheet format consumed a considerable amount of time. Also, there were many problems with the 
data provided in the Banking Statistics of Pakistan. For example, in many cases, asset and liability side 
did not match. The author tried his best to consult members of staff at the SBP to rectify problems 
where possible before performing the DEA. 
8 Data could be obtained from Bankscope. However, Bankscope does not provide data on all foreign 
banks present in India and Pakistan. This may question the conclusion of some recent influential studies 
(e. g. Claessens et al., 2001) that seek to examine the effect of foreign banks' entry on the 
domestic 
banking industry using data from Bankscope. 
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5.3 - The technical efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan 
5.3.1 - The technical efficiency of banks using DEA 
This section reports the DEA efficiency for commercial banks in India and Pakistan 
during 1990-1998, calculated for the two alternative input-output models using both 
the CRS and VRS assumptions. The empirical studies on bank efficiency either 
construct annual frontiers using input-output data for each single year in the sample 
(see, for example, Yildirim, 2002) or construct the so-called grand-frontier by pooling 
input-output data for all years in the sample (see, for example, Bhattacharyya et al., 
1997). The analysis in this chapter is based on annual frontiers. The grand-frontier 
technique will be used in chapter 6. 
Our primary objective in this section is to examine whether the technical efficiency of 
banks in India and Pakistan improved after the implementation of the financial 
liberalisation programme in 1991-92, which endeavoured to enhance the level of 
competition and private sector participation in the banking industry and reduce 
government interventions in deciding the price and direction of financial resources 
mobilised by commercial banks (i. e. through state-directed credit policies). Also, we 
seek to examine whether public sector banks are less or more efficient than private 
sector banks. 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 present the average overall technical efficiency (OTE), and its 
two constituents, for the whole banking industry in India and Pakistan, respectively, 
for the period 1990 to 1998. The results show that the banking industry in both the 
countries exhibits very low OTE, and witnessed little improvement at least until 1995. 
In both the countries, especially in Pakistan, the major source of low OTE was low 
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SE, which has not been examined by the existing empidcal studies on the banking 
industry in India and Pakistan. The low level of SE could be attributed to 
governments' restrictions on private banks to extend their operations, and 
governments' direction to public sector banks to extend their branch network to rural 
and sub-urban areas. The limited improvement in OTE until 1995 may suggest that 
banks reacted slowly to the relatively more liberalised and competitive environment 
during the post-ESRs period (see also, Bhattacharyya et al., 1997). In the case of 
India, this finding is consistent with that of Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) who 
analysed the productivity change of Indian domestic banks during 1986-1996. 
The average OTE of the Indian banking industry improved from 68.6% (Model A) 
and 59.8% (Model B) in the pre-liberalisation period (i. e. 1990-1992) to 80.1% 
(Model A) and 68.8% (Model B) in the post-liberalisation period (i. e. 1996-1998). In 
Pakistan, the OTE of the banking industry increased from 39.9% (Model A) and 
48.6% (Model B) in the pre-liberalisation period to 51.2% (Model A) and 64.8% 
(Model B) in the post-liberalisation period. So, in both the countries, the average 
improvement in OTE was around 11%. Following Casu and Molyneux (2003), the 
non-parametric Mann-Whitney test9 is used to test whether there is a difference 
between the efficiency of banks in the pre-liberalisation (i. e. 1990-1992) and post- 
liberalisation period (1996-1998). According to the results of the test for both India 
and Pakistan (for both input-output models), the null hypothesis that the two 
populations (i. e. efficiency of banks in the pre-ESRs and post-ESRs period) are 
statistically same was rejected at 99% confidence level. 
9 See Anderson et al. (2002) 
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Figure 5.3 - Technical efficiency of banks in India during 1990-1998 
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In India, the improvement in the OTE was due to improvement in both PTE and SE 
(see Table 5.1). The average PTE of the Indian banking industry improved from 
86.77% (Model A) and 81.43% (Model B) in the pre-liberalisation period (i. e. 1990- 
1992) to 89.53% (Model A) and 86.40% (Model B) in the post-liberalisation penod 
(i. e. 1996-1998). At the same time, SE in Model A and Model B improved by at least 
10.6% and 6.4%, respectively. The improvement in SE in the Indian banking industry 
was less than in Pakistani industry perhaps because the Indian government was more 
cautious in allowing banks to reduce their staff and to close unprofitable branches. 
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Fijzure 5.4 - Technical efficiency of banks in Pakistan durin 1990-1998 
Overall Technical Efficiency (OTE) 
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In contrast with the Indian banking industry, the improvement in the OTE of the 
banking industry in Pakistan was due mainly to improvement in SE. The SE of banks 
in Pakistan improved considerably after 1995-1996 when the government allowed 
public sector banks to reduce the number of employees and close unprofitable 
branches in rural areas. On the other hand, the Model A PTE of the banking industry 
declined from 83.20% in the pre-liberalisation period to 77.1%, while Model B PTE 
improved marginally from 83-43% to 84-50 in the post-liberalisation period. 
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5.3.2 - The technical efficiency of public, domestic private, and foreign banks 
As discussed earlier, based on the ownership structure, the banking industry in India 
and Pakistan could be divided into three groups: public sector banks, domestic private 
banks, and foreign banks. This section sheds some light on the evolution of the 
efficiency of these three groups. 
As discussed above, the PTE of the banking industry in Pakistan declined according 
to Model A and improved insignificantly according to Model B. This decline in 
Model A and the lack of a significant improvement in Model B was primarily due to a 
decline in the PTE of public sector banks even when the PTE of foreign banks and 
private domestic banks improved during the post-ESRs era. Table 5.4 suggests that 
the PTE of public sector banks in Pakistan declined from 88.23% (Model A) and 
83.8% (Model B) in the pre-liberalisation period to 76.3% (Model A) and 78.87% 
(Model B) in the post-liberalisation period. On the other hand, in the case of the 
Indian banking industry, the PTE of public sector banks improved from 91.90% 
(Model A) and 83.27% (Model B) in the pre-liberalisation to 93.70% (Model A) and 
89.40% (Model B) in the post-liberalisation period (see Table 5.3). It could be argued 
that, unlike in India, the financial liberalisation process in Pakistan failed to encourage 
the managers of public sector banks to enhance their utilisation of operating and 
interest expenses to generate an optimal quantity of earning assets (i. e. loans and 
advances, and investments) and income. This could be due to the fact that although 
both the countries followed a similar financial liberalisation programme to enhance 
the efficiency of large public sector banks, the economic environment in Pakistan was 
marred by high political instability during the 1990s (see Zaidi, 1999). This high 
political instability could have undermined the Pakistani government's commitment to 
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the liberalisation process, and, therefore, failed to encourage public sector banks to 
enhance their resource utilisation. In contrast with the public sector banks, private 
sector banks, especially foreign banks, in both the countries witnessed improvements 
in both PTE and SE for almost all the years. 
Another possible reason for the lack of improvement in the efficiency of Pakistani 
public sector banks could be the high level of non-performing loans that these 
financial institutions inherited at the start of the financial liberalisation programme 
(see chapter 4). The presence of the high level of non-performing loans could have 
hindered large public sector banks' ability to adapt themselves quickly to the changes 
brought about by the ESRs in general, and the financial liberalisation programme in 
particular. 
Following Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003), another reason for the slow improvement 
(or the lack of improvement) in the efficiency of public sector banks relative to their 
private sector counterparts could be that this group had become too dominant 
(controlling around 88% of the assets of the banking industry) to feel any need to 
quickly transform itself in the face of competition from smaller foreign and private 
domestic banks. 
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Pure Technical 
Model A 
Figure 5.6 - Efficiency of banks in Pakistan according to ownership groups 
Overall Technical Efficiencv (OTE) 
Scale Efficiency (SE) 
Model A Model B 
vomestic Frivate tsanKs 
Foreign Banks 
It should be noted, however, that after 1995-1996, public sector banks did exhibit 
more improvement in their efficiency. It could be argued that the liberalisation 
programme took sometime to increase the level of competition by encouraging private 
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Pure Technical Eff 
Model A 
ciency (PTE) 
Model B 
sector banks, especially foreign banks, to adopt new financial technology (e. g. 
computerisation of bank branches and Automated Teller Machines) and the 
introduction of new financial products (e. g. credit cards and car financing schemes). 
This, in turn, put more pressure on public sector banks to enhance their resource 
utilisation. 
As we noted in the previous chapter, non-performing loans (NPLs) are a major 
problem for the banking industry in India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is crucial to 
examine their impact on the evolution of technical efficiency. This could be achieved 
by using NPLs as another input, usually non-discretionary, that banks use (see Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997; Drake and Hall, 2003). However, as bank-level data on NPLs 
are not available for India and Pakistan, we attempt to examine their impact by taking 
a closer look at the difference between the efficiency scores obtained from the two 
models, i. e. the loan-based model and the income-based model. Model A postulates 
that banks produce loans, advances and investments with given resources, while 
Model B postulates that banks produce income with given resources. Consequently, 
the outputs of Model B (income) depend primarily on the outputs of Model A (loans, 
advances and investments). However, if banks are unable to enhance their income- 
based efficiency even when they are able to improve their loan-based efficiency, this 
could be due to the presence of high NPLs in their portfolios. 
In the case of the Indian public sector banks, at the start of the financial liberalisation 
in 1991-1992, the NPLs as a percentage of total advances were around 24% (see 
Bhide et al., 2002). This percentage, however, gradually declined to 16% in 1997- 
1998. The gap between the efficiency scores obtained from two input-output models 
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follows a similar trend: during the early years, public sector banks were much more 
efficient in generating loans, advances and investments than in generating income. 
During the post-liberalisation era, however, this gap gradually declined. In the case of 
the public sector banks in Pakistan, the level of NPLs increased after the 
implementation of the financial liberalisation from around 18% of total advances to 
around 26% (see SBP, 2000). The gap in the efficiency scores of Pakistani public 
sector banks also increased over the years. 
A similar gap between the efficiency scores of private sector banks also exists in the 
two countries. However, as the level of NPLs of private banks is much lower than in 
the public sector banks, the gap between the efficiency scores obtained from the two 
models is also lower. This gap in the efficiency scores from the two models may 
reflect the impact of the presence of high NPLs. That is, over the years, the presence 
of NPLs impeded banks' ability to generate income even when they were relatively 
more efficient in generating earning assets. It could be argued that if the liberalisation 
programme fails to enhance the efficiency of banks to generate income from their 
resources, it could, in the medium- and long-run, impede their ability to intermediate 
between savers and borrowers and to enhance the quality of their services, which, in 
turn, may negatively influence the process of economic growthlo. As we shall see 
10 Another possible explanation for this gap between the efficiency scores obtained from the two 
models could be that banks transferred the benefits of improvement in their efficiency to their 
customers because though banks produced more loans, advances and investments (i. e. intermediated 
more funds) with given inputs, they did not extract more income from this intermediation process. 
However, increasing interest margins in both the countries, coupled with constant criticism in the 
domestic media about the quality of customer services provided by banks, especially by public sector 
banks, may cast some doubt on this interpretation. 
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below in the section on TFP change using the Malmquist index, a similar divergence 
appears in the TFP change obtained from the two input-output models. 
5.3.3 - Efficient frontier banks 
Table 5.5 reports the number of banks forming the annual efficient frontiers with both 
CRS and VRS assumptions. In both the countries, foreign banks were the ones that 
determined the efficient frontier, especially in the case of the income-based model. 
This may suggest that this group places more emphasis on generating assets that could 
contribute towards their earning. Domestic banks, especially public sector banks, were 
influenced by governments' objectives to promote socially equitable economic 
growth. Also, the public sector banks' extensive branch network in rural and suburban 
areas was there to mobilise deposits, which are not included as banks' outputs. These 
rural and suburban branches had little opportunity to generate loans and advances, 
which are the key output in our models. Foreign banks, on the other hand, had their 
branches in large metropolitan areas that provided relatively more opportunities to 
attract borrowers. 
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Table 5.5 - Banks forming the efficient frontiers in each year (by ownership group) 
Panel I- Number of efficient banks per year 
Loan-based model Income-based model 
CRS VRS CRS VRS 
PSBs DPBs FBs PSBs DPBs FBs PSBs DPBs FBs I PSBs DPBs FBs 
INDIA 
1990 0 6 10 5 9 0 0 7 2 1 10 
1991 1 5 9 4 9 o 0 7 2 1 9 
1992 
i 
10 6 11 0 0 8 2 2 11 
1993 0 1 6 7 5 10 i 
i 
0 0 6 2 9 
1994 : 0 0 5 7 3 10 0 0 4 2 7 
1995 0 3 4 9 5 8 0 1 4 3 9 
1996 0 2 6 8 6 10 0 1 6 4 3 10 
IY97 1 0 2 71 7 6 13 o 0 7 3 2 14 
1998 0 3 9 7 7 13 0 7 6 2 15 
PAKISTAN 
1990 0 n. a. 2 2 n. a. 6 0 n. a. 5 2 n. a. 5 
1991 0 n. a. 2 2 n. a. 5 0 n. a. 5 2 n. a. 4 
1992 0 2 2 2 2 5 0 2 4 0 1 4 
0 1993 3 5 2 3 9 0 2 6 1 2 6 
1 1994 3 2 8 12 0 3 51 0 2 5 
1995 1 4 2 7 7 0 1 3 0 3 7 
1996 0 3 1 5 10 1 2 5 1 2 6 
1997 0 6 7 2 7 11 1 2 6 1 3 8 
1998 0 5 4 2 6 8 0 2 1 3 9 
Panel 11 - Proportion of efficient banks per year (in percenta ges) 
Loan-based model Income-based model 
CRS VRS CRS VRS 
PSBs DPBs FBs PSBs DPBs FBs PSBs DPBs FBs PSBs DPBs FBs 
INDIA 
1990 3.6 0.0 21.4 1 35.7 17.9 32.1 1 0.0 0.0 25.0 7.1 3.6 35.7 
1991 3.6 3.6 17.9 32.1 14.3 32.1 i 0.0 0.0 25.0 7.1 3.6 32.1 
1992 3.6 3.6 21.4 35.7 21.4 39.3 U. 0 0.0 28.6 7.1 7.1 39.3 
1993 :1 0.0 3.6 21.4 25.0 17.9 
35.7 0.0 0.0 21.4 7.1 3.6 32.1 
1994 0.0 0.0 17.9 25.0 10.7 35.7 0.0 0.0 14.3 7.1 3.6 25.0 
1995 0.0 10.7 14.3 32.1 17.9 28.6 0.0 3.6 14.3 1 10.7 3.6 32.1 
1996 0.0 7.1 21.4 28.6 21.4 35.7 0.0 3.6 21.4 14.3 10.7 35.7 
1997 0.0 7.1 25.0 25.0 21.4 46.4 0.0 0.0 25.0 10.7 7.1 50.0 
1998 0.0 10.7 32.1 25.0 25.0 46.4 0.0 3.6 25.0 21.4 7.1 53.6 
PAKISTAN 
1990 0.0 n. a. 17.0 7.1 n. a. 21.4 0.0 n. a. 17.9 7.1 n. a. 17.9 
1991 0.0 n. a. 18.0 7.1 n. a. 17.9 0.0 n. a. 17.9 7.1 n. a. 14.3 
1992 1 0.0 7.1 18.0 7.1 7.1 17.9 7.1 14.3 0.0 3.6 14.3 
1993 0.0 10.7 18.0 7.1 10.7 32.1 0.0 7.1 21.4 3.6 7.1 21.4 
1994 1 3.6 10.7 18.0 3.6 28.6 42.9 0.0 10.7 17.9 0.0 7.1 17.9 
1995 1 3.6 14.3 18.0 3.6 25.0 25.0 0.0 3.6 10.7 0.0 10.7 25.0 
i 
1996 1: 0.0 10-7 3.6 17.9 35.7 3.6 7.1 17.9 3.6 7.1 21.4 
1997 0.0 21.4 18.0 7.1 25.0 39.3 1 3.6 7.1 21.4 1 3.6 10.7 28.6 
1998 0.0 17.9 19.0 7.1 21.4 28.6 0.0 3.6 7.1 3.6 10.7 32.1 
I--- lic Sector Banks; DPBs= Domestic Private Banks; FBs= Foreign Banks; n. a. refers to PSBs= Pub a the ye rs 
when DPBs were not allowed to o perate. 
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5.3.4 - DEA efficiency scores and non-frontier based ratios 
As suggested by Bauer et al. (1998), for the frontier-based efficiency scores to be 
useful, the estimated scores should be positively correlated with the traditional non- 
frontier based measures of performance used by regulators, managers, and industry 
consultants: 'Positive rank-order correlations with these measures would give 
assurance that the frontier measures are not simply artificial products of the 
assumptions made regarding the underlying optimisation concept' (Bauer et al. 1998, 
p. 108)" 
Table 5.6 presents the Spearman Rank correlations between the PTE and SE of the 
banking industry in India and Pakistan generated by the DEA and three non-frontier 
based measures of bank performance, namely return on assets (ROA), total operating 
and interest cost per rupee of assets (TC/TA), and total cost per rupee of revenue 
(TC/TR). The first measure is expected to have a positive correlation with the 
frontier-based efficiency scores, while the latter two are expected to have a negative 
correlation. That is, it is assumed that ROA of banks should be positively related to 
their efficiency, while TCTA should be negatively related to the efficiency since 
better production efficiency should lower banks' costs. The results in Table 3 suggest 
that most of the DEA-based efficiency scores are consistent with the three non- 
frontier based performance measures. Only in case of Pakistan, 
11 It could be argued that if the non-frontier based ratios 
determine whether a frontier technique is 
robust or not, then there may be no need to conduct 
frontier based analysis. 
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Table 5.6 - Correlation between frontier and non-frontier based measures 
I India I Pakistan 
Model A 
PTE SE 
ROA 0.0795* 0.040* 
TCITA -0.171 
* 
-0.063** 
TCITR -0.071 ** -0.051 
Model B Model A Model B 
PTE SE PTE SE PTE SE 
0.314** 0.060* -0.020* 0.010 0.011** 0.092* 
-0.087 * -0.049 -0.011 
* 
-0.027** -0.089 -0.037 
-0.301 ** -0-097** -0.091** -0.051* -0.259** -0.077** 
PTE= Pure Technical Efficiency; SE= Scale Efficiency; ROA= Return on Assets; 
TC/TA= Total Costs/Total Assets; TC/TR= Total Costs/Total Revenue 
Spearman Rank Correlation is statistically significant at 5% level 
** Spearman Rank Correlation is statistically significant at 1% level 
ROA is not consistent with the loan-based PTE of banks. That is, there is an 
unexpected negative coffelation between loan-based PTE and ROA of banks. This 
could be due to the increasing NPLs of public sector banks in Pakistan, which 
suggests that even when banks were becoming more efficient in generating loans and 
advances, the profitability of banks (i. e. their ROA) was deteriorating. 
5.3.5 - Resti's (1997) test of robustness 
This section examines the robustness of our results by using Resti's (1997) approach, 
which has been employed by some more recent studies like Casu and Molyneux 
(2003). Following Resti, after solving the VRS DEA problems using all the 
observations composing the sample., all banks presenting an efficiency score equal to 
unity were deleted, and DEA problems were solved once more with the remaining 
sample. The correlation between the efficiency scores obtained on the original sample 
and on the reduced sample is then considered as an indicator of the robustness of the 
results. Table 5.7 suggests that there is a strong significant positive correlation 
between the original efficiency scores and the efficiency scores obtained 
from the 
reduced sample. Only in case of 
Pakistan, there is a weak statistically insignificant 
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positive correlation during the years 1990 and 1991. This could be due to a very small 
sample left after deleting the efficient observation from the original sample. Due to 
the small sample, almost all banks became 100% efficient. 
Table 5.7 - Pearson moment order correlation test 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
India 
ModelA 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.61 0.67 0.63 0.81 0.71 
(4.02) (3.97) (4.81) (4.43) (5.22) (7.03) (6.44) (11.3) (8.61) 
Model B 0.79 0.81 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.69 0.36 0.80 0.83 
(7.81) (7.9) (12.9) (10.3) (12.2) (7.17) (3.42) (11.6) (11.9) 
Pakistan 
Model A 0.20 0.21 0.56 0.795 0.75 0.80 0.72 0.77 0.83 
(1-00) (1.05) (3.21)* (5.09)* (4.20) (4.92)* (3.99)* (5.16)* (5.87)* 
Model B 0.65 0.67 0.81 0.75 0.79 0.84 0.82 0.74 0.79 
(3.19) (3.64) (5.21) (4.21) (4.87) (6.21) (6.01) (4.32) (4.98) 
Figures in parenthesis are t-statistic (where t is distributed with n-2 degrees of 
freedom and n is the number of banks in the sample); 
* suggests that we can reject the null hy pothesis that the correlation coefficient is 0 at I% 
5.3.6 - Comparison with the SFA results 
As highlighted in chapter 3, one major criticism against the DEA is that it does not 
take into account random factors - such as strikes, weather - that may make actual 
output deviate from the best-practice output, and all the deviation is attributed to the 
inefficiency of managers. Therefore, to check the robustness of our DEA scores, in 
this section we follow Battese and Coelli (1992) to measure the technical efficiency of 
12 
banks in India and Pakistan using stochastic frontier analysis . 
Battese and Coelli (1992) proposed a stochastic production function for panel data 
that has firm effects, which follow a truncated normal probability distribution. These 
firm effects are permitted to vary systematically with time. This time-varying measure 
of efficiency is suitable as the frontier may shift over the years. Also, as we have 
12 Some technical details of the stochastic frontier analysis are presented in Appendix 5. 
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measured the efficiency using annual frontier DEA model, it is logical to compare the 
results with time varying SFA results. 
To calculate the technical efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan, we estimate the 
following Translog production function: 
ln(Qi, ) =, 8(, +, 8, ln(Oi, ) +, 8, ln(Ii, ) +, 8, In(Oi, )2 +, 8, In (Ii, 
+, 85 ln(Oi, ) ln(Ii, ) + (V, - U) 
where Ii, represents interest expenses of the ith firm in time t; Oit represents operating 
expenses of the ith firm in time t; Qjt is the output for the ithfirm in time t (for Model A 
the output is the sum of loans, advance, and investments, and for Model B the output 
is the sum of interest income and other income); Vi, are random variables which are 
assumed to be identically and independently normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance a,; and these Vs are assumed to be independent of Ui, s that are non-negative 
random variables which are assumed to account for technical inefficiency in 
production and assumed to be independently and identically distributed and follow a 
truncated normal distribution (see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The efficiency 
results for India and Pakistan are presented in Table 5.8 and 5.9, respectively. 
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The SFA results for India are consistent with the DEA results for the Indian banking 
industry presented above. Like the DEA results, the SFA results suggest that the 
efficiency of the banking industry in India gradually improved over the years. In the 
case of Model A, the efficiency of the Indian banking industry improved from 90.38% 
in the pre-ESRs period to 94.32% in the post-ESRs period. In case of Model B, the 
efficiency improved from 77.73% to 86.95%. Although the magnitude of the SFA 
efficiency is higher than that of DEA efficiency, both the technique suggests similar 
trends over the years. 
Like the DEA results, the SFA results also suggest that public sector banks were more 
efficient than private sector banks in generating loans and advances, and investment 
from their given inputs. The gap between the efficiency of public and private sector 
banks declined during the post-ESRs era. It is also found that in the case of the 
income-based model, foreign banks were much more efficient than public sector 
banks. This may substantiate our conclusion that due to high non-performing loans, 
public sector banks are more efficient in generating earning assets. However, this 
efficiency is not translated into generating income from their earning assets. 
The SFA results for Pakistan are also consistent with the DEA results. We find that 
the efficiency of the banking industry in Pakistan according to the SFA improved 
from 88.72% (Model A) and 90.16% (Model B) during the pre-ESRs era to 91.39% 
(Model A) and 91.37% (Model B) in the post-ESRs period. Again, like DEA results, 
public sector banks are found to be more efficient than private sector banks in 
generating earning assets, but less efficient in generating income. 
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To examine further whether the results from various techniques are consistent with 
each other, Bauer et al. (1998) suggest that even when the estimates of the levels of 
efficiency from the parametric and nonparametric frontier methods are quite different, 
the results from two techniques may still be consistent if they generate the similar 
ranking of banks by the efficiency scores. Towards this end, following Bauer et al. 
(1998), we calculate Spearman rank-order correlation between the efficiency scores of 
individual banks obtained through the DEA and through the SFA. The results are 
presented in Table 5.10. Like Strum and Williams (2004), the results suggest a high 
and significant positive correlation between the DEA and the SFA rankings. 
Therefore, we suggest that the conclusions reached through our DEA results are 
robust even if we used parametric stochastic frontier analysis. 
Table 5.10- Spearman rank-order correlation between 
DEA and SFA 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
India 
Model A 0.62* 0.59* 0.63* 0.66* 0.60* 0.57** 0.64* 0.69* 0.66* 
Model B 0.71* 0.69* 0.65* 0.69* 0.70* 0.65* 0.68* 0.72* 0.73* 
Pakistan 
Model A 0.43** 0.39** 0.52** 0.57** 0.46** 0.40** 0.57** 0.48** 0.50** 
Model B 0.56** 0.52** 0.47** 0.54** 0.49** 0.42** 0.51** 0.48** 0.58** 
Rank correlation significant at 1% or 5% significance level, respectively. 
5.3.7 - Bank size and pure technical efficiency 
The evidence on the relationship between size and PTE of banks in developing and 
emerging economies is mixed. For example, in the context of the Singaporean 
banking sector, Leong and Dollery (2002) find that larger banks, due to complexity of 
their operations, exhibit higher inefficiencies. In contrast, Yildirim (2002) finds a 
positive relationship between size and PTE of Turkish banks. This positive 
relationship is attributed to larger banks' market power and their ability to diversify 
credit risk in an uncertain macroeconomic environment. In the case of developed 
191 
economies, Berger and Humphrey (1997) also find a positive relationship between 
size and efficiency for the US banking industry (see also, Altunbas et al., 2000). 
Figure 5.7 - PTE scores by size quartile for commercial banks 
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To examine the relationship between size and PTE, we divide the banking industry in 
India and Pakistan into four quartiles according to their size, where the size of each 
bank is determined by the total assets of that bank as a percentage of the total assets of 
the whole commercial banking industry. We will examine this relationship again in 
the following chapter using regression analysis. Figure 5.6 presents the evolution of 
PTE of different size groups. The figure suggests that in both the countnes, during the 
pre-liberalisation period, the largest banks outperformed the smaller ones. Following 
Ylldinm (2002), it could be argued that large banks in India and Pakistan, were more 
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efficient due to their market power and their ability to diversify credit risk in an 
uncertain macroeconomic environment. However, as the largest group is primarily 
composed of public sector banks, it could also be argued that these banks were 
provided policy induced competitive advantages during the pre-ESRs era by 
restricting the operations of private sector banks. A more liberalised post-ESRs 
period, we submit, gradually reduced these advantages and, therefore, led to decline in 
the gap between the PTE of largest and other three groups. 
Over the years, the gap between the largest group and other groups declined, and in 
case of Pakistan, the gap virtually disappeared. The catching-up of smaller banks 
could be due to their higher flexibility, which allowed them to adapt to changes in the 
banking industry brought about by the financial liberalisation programme. In contrast, 
the declining efficiency of the largest group, which primarily constitute public sector 
banks, could be due to their complex and politically-determined bureaucratic 
organisational structure that impeded their ability to keep up with smaller private 
domestic and foreign banks, which were quicker to adopt new financial technology 
(e. g. Automated Teller Machines) and to introduce new financial products (e. g. car 
financing and credit cards) (see SBP, 2000; RBI, various issues). 
5.4 - Total factor productivity change in the Indian and Pakistani 
banking industry 
This section examines the productivity change in the Indian and Pakistani banking 
industry using the Malmquist total factor productivity index. As obvious from our 
discussion in section 5.2, the Malmquist TFP index for a time period, t, cannot be 
constructed without a reference production frontier or technology (i. e. a 
base year 
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relative to which a change in TFP is measured). This reference frontier could be that 
of any time period other than t. In this section, we calculate Malmquist TFP indices 
for the Indian and Pakistani banking industry for the period 1992 to 1998. Unlike the 
previous section, we do not include the year 1990 and 1991 because for these two 
years domestic private banks were not allowed to operate in Pakistan. For our 
calculations, we use the frontier of period t-I as a reference frontier for the period t. 
For example, for the year 1994,1993 is used the reference technology. We will also 
construct a cumulative TFP index that will enable us to examine the evolution of TFP 
over the whole sample period (i. e. 1992-1998). In addition, as mentioned previously, 
we will decompose TFP change (TFPCH) into its two components, namely efficiency 
change (EFCH) and technological change (TCH). Also, the efficiency change will be 
decomposed into scale efficiency change (SECH) and pure technical efficiency 
change (PTECH). As noted earlier, the Malmquist TFP index between two time 
periods is given by: 
-v 
D, '(yt , x, 
) Do (y x, ) Do (y x, ) 
/-2 
mo (YS 1 xs, Yt' 
Xt )= 
Ds(yxs) D'(yxt) 
x. 
D'(y x, ) 
_ 0100 
A value of M,, greater (less) than I suggests an improvement (deterioration) in TFP 
from period t-I to t. Similarly, for the constituents of TFP change (i. e. efficiency 
change and technological change), a value higher (lower) than I implies improvement 
(deterioration). Our primary objective in this section, like in the previous section, is to 
examine whether the financial liberalisation implemented in 1991-1992 enhanced the 
TFP of banks. Furthermore, we seek to examine whether this improvement, if any, is 
due to improvement in the technology that banks employ or due to improved 
utilisation of the existing technology. 
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Table 5.11 and Table 5.12 report the Malmquist TFP indices for India and Pakistan 
for the loan-based and income-based models, respectively. Like in the section on 
technical efficiency, based on ownership structure the commercial banking industry in 
both countries is categorised into three groups, i. e. public banks, domestic private 
banks and foreign banks, and the post-liberalisation period (i. e. 1992-1998) is divided 
into two sub-periods: 1992-1995 represents the initial period when both governments 
introduced the new deregulatory policies, and 1996-1998 represents the post 
deregulatory period when these policies should have started to realise tangible 
benefits in the form of greater flexibility and higher levels of competitiveness. 
5.4.1 - The loan based model 
The results shown in Table 5.11 indicate that over the entire sample period (1992- 
1998), average total factor productivity change (TFPCH) in the Indian commercial 
banking sector was 4.6%. The constituent parts of TFPCH, i. e. efficiency change 
(EFCH) and technical change (TCH), were 4.2% and 0.3%, respectively. The most 
interesting feature of these results, however, was the mere 0.3 % improvement in 
technology. An examination of the individual years shows that this small 
improvement was primarily due to technological regress during 1995 (10%) and 1996 
(6.7%). However, these two years also revealed the highest improvement in 
efficiency. It could be argued that initially the Indian banks invested heavily in new 
technology with the expectation that it would allow them to take full advantage of the 
competitive opportunities in the recently liberalised markets (see Isik and Hassan, 
2003). However, it was only in subsequent years that this investment translated into 
increased efficiency and improved productivity. 
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Table 5.11 - Total factor p roductivity chang e uring 1992-1998 (loan-based model) 
India Pakistan 
EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH 
All Banks 
1993 0.964 0.991 0.971 1.022 0.985 1.053 1.030 1.021 0.943 0.994 
1994 0.888 0.969 0.921 1.087 0.965 1.076 1.054 1.023 0.959 1.031 
1995 1.171 1.039 1.135 0.900 1.054 1.066 0.990 1.078 0.988 1.054 
1996 1.212 1.088 1.115 0.943 1.143 1.067 1.018 1.049 0.978 1.044 
1997 1.052 1.013 1.037 1.029 1.082 1.073 1.030 1.041 0.999 1.073 
1998 
.................. . ........ ........ . ........ . 
1.021 
..... . ....... ................... 
0.976 
............................................ 
1.047 
................................. 
1.035 
.... .............. . 
1.057 0.998 0.999 0.992 1.027 1.025 
Public Sector Banks .. .................... ...... ............... ..... . ...... . .... ............. ....... ........... ...... .... ......... . ............... ............... ....... ................ 
1993 0.934 1.000 0.935 1.019 0.951 1.015 1.018 0.997 0.892 0.906 
1994 0.886 0.984 0.901 1.083 0.960 1.007 1.009 0.999 0.936 0.942 
1995 1.161 1.041 1.115 0.898 1.042 1.129 1.003 1.126 0.978 1.104 
1996 1.157 1.004 1.153 0.942 1.089 1.033 0.997 1.036 0.958 0.990 
1997 1.011 1.008 1.003 1.040 1.051 1.072 1.013 1.058 0.989 1.060 
1998 
......................................... ... 
1.026 
................................... 
1.014 
............................................ 
1.012 
................................. 
1.044 
...... . 
1.071 1.022 0.998 1.025 1.045 1.068 
Domestic Private Banks . .................................. ........................................... ........... ........ . ...................... ... . ......................................... .... .... ................................. ............ . .... . ........... .......................... .............. 
1993 0.889 0.949 0.937 1.003 0.892 1.058 1.054 1.004 0.887 0.939 
1994 0.975 0.997 0.975 1.062 0.844 1.040 1.029 1.010 0.919 0.955 
1995 1.348 1.144 1.178 0.858 1.156 1.017 0.979 1.039 0.981 0.998 
1996 1.240 1.130 1.091 0.927 1.150 1.051 1.031 1.020 0.999 1.050 
1997 1.035 1.011 1.023 0.980 1.014 1.108 1.088 1.018 1.020 1.129 
1998 
............... .................. ......... 
0.987 
.. I........................... 
0.988 
............................................ 
0.999 
................................. 
1.044 
.......................................... 
1.031 
........ .... ... . .. . .. . .. . 
0.949 0.953 0.995 1.002 0.951 
Foreien Banks . .. . . . . . ..... .... . ........... .................... ........... .............................................. ............................................ ......... ................. . .... ............................................ 
1993 1.075 1.088 0.988 1.047 1.126 1.087 1.051 1.035 0.943 1.025 
1994 0.959 1.011 0.949 1.155 1.108 1.189 1.101 1.080 0.977 1.162 
1995 1.050 0.991 1.060 0.948 0.996 1.056 0.985 1.072 1.003 1.059 
1996 1.295 1.155 1.122 0.947 1.226 1.118 1.034 1.082 1.018 1.138 
1997 1.105 1.020 1.084 1.071 1.184 1.042 1.017 1.025 1.026 1.069 
1998 1.050 0.936 1.122 1.010 1.061 1.026 1.017 1.007 1.060 1.087 
EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH 
All Banks 
1992-98 1.042 1.012 1.035 1.003 1.046 1.055 1.020 1.034 0.982 1.037 
1992-95 1.001 0.999 1.005 1.000 1.001 1.065 1.024 1.040 0.963 1.026 
1996-98 
- ................................... 
1.092 
.................................. 
1.024 
........ .................................... 
1.066 
.... ............................ 
1.001 
......................................... 
1.093 
........................................... ........... 
1.046 
................................ 
1.016 
........... . ....................... .......... 
1.027 
.............. ............................. 
1.001 
.... . ........................... 
1.047 
..... ..... ........ ..................... Public Sector Banks 
1992-98 1.024 1.008 1.016 1.002 1.026 1.046 1.006 1.039 0.965 1.009 
1992-95 0.987 1.008 0.980 0.997 0.984 1.049 1.010 1.039 0.935 0.981 
1996-98 
I ................. ... ..... ........... 
1.063 
.................................. 
1.009 
. ..................................... 
1.054 
................................. 
1.007 
.......................................... 
1.070 
.......................................... ........... 
1.042 
................................ 
1.003 
................................ . ............ 
1.039 
................................. ........ 
0.997 
.................................. 
1.039 
........................................... .. . . Domestic Private Banks 
1992-98 1.032 1.034 1.031 0.976 1.008 1.036 1.022 1.014 0.967 1.001 
1992-95 0.984 1.027 1.025 0.970 0.955 1.038 1.020 1.017 0.928 0.964 
1996-98 
................... ................................ 
1.082 
................... ............ 
1.042 
........... . ............................... 
1.037 
............................... . 
0.983 
.......................................... 
1.063 
.......................................... .......... 
1.034 
.................. .......... . .. 
1.023 
.............................................. 
1.011 
...................................... .. 
1.007 
. .......................... . .... 
1.041 
... ........ . ................. Foreii! n Banks 
1992-98 1.084 1.031 1.052 1.027 1.114 1.085 1.034 1.050 1.004 1.089 
1992-95 1.027 1.029 0.998 1.047 1.075 1.110 1.045 1.062 0.974 1.081 
1996-98 1.146 1.033 1.109 1.008 1.155 1.061 1.023 1.037 1.034 1.098 
EFCH = Efficiency Change; TCH = Technical Change; PTECH = Pure Technical Efficiency Change; SECH 
Scale Efficiency Change; TFPCH = Total Factor Productivity Change 
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Fijzure 5.8 - Cumulative TFP chanize for banks in India and Pakistan (1992=1) 
Model A 
India Pakistan 
All Banks 
Public Sector Banks 
Domestic Private Banks 
Foreign Banks 
Efficiency Change 
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The commercial banking industry in Pakistan had an average improvement in TFP of 
around 3.7% over the entire period. During this period EFCH was around 5.5%. In 
this respect the findings are not that dissimilar to the results relating to India. 
However, in contrast to the Indian commercial banking industry, Pakistani banks 
experienced a technological regress: decline in technology was around 1.8% over the 
entire study period. This decrease is explained by the fact that the Pakistani 
commercial banks experienced technological regress in all of the post-liberalisation 
years except in 1998. 
Although this technological regress was more evident in Pakistan, both countries 
exhibited low technological improvement and the findings shown in Table 5.11 
indicate that this was primarily due to the inability of public sector banks to adopt new 
technology in the new liberalised environment. As public sector banks play a crucial 
role in the creation and dispersal of loans and advances, it is important to ascertain 
whether the liberalisation process had any positive impact on their productivity. In 
this respect, the above table indicates that throughout the post- ESRs period, TFP of 
the public sector banks improved by 2.6% in India and by a mere 0.9% in Pakistan. 
However, most of this improvement occurred in the second half (1996-98) of the 
period. The results also reveal technological regress of 3.5% amongst the public 
sector banks in Pakistan and only a slight technological improvement of 0.7% in 
India. These findings, therefore, lend support to Kumbhakar and Sarkar's (2003) 
conclusions that the benefits of the financial liberalisation are essentially long term 
and that the large size of public sector banks in developing countries makes them 
impervious to change. As noted above, public sector banks controlled around 88% of 
the assets of the banking industry in India and Pakistan. It could be argued, therefore, 
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that the large market share of public sector banks makes them less responsive to new 
competition from the emerging private sector. 
The results also show that foreign banks in both countries witnessed the highest 
improvement in TFP. These improvements were attributable to both technological 
improvements (TCH) and efficiency increases (EFCH). This trend is consistent with 
other developing countries, where recent foreign bank entrants typically introduce 
new financial products such as credit cards, automated teller machines (ATMs) and 
consumer credit, etc. In contrast, and again in common with the experiences of other 
developing countries, domestic banks in India and Pakistan, especially the public 
sector banks, were slow to adopt and emulate these new technologies. For example, a 
recent study by the 'Off-Site Monitoring and Surveillance Division' of the 
Department of Banking Supervision in India shows that average IT expenditures as a 
percentage of total expenses during 1996-2000 in public sector banks, domestic 
private banks, and foreign banks were 4.5%, 7%, and 8.6%, respectively I. 
5.4.2 - The Income-Based Model 
The income-based model postulates that banks seek to generate income from their 
financial activities and could be seen as consistent with banks' profit rnaxin-ýisation 
objective (Leightner and Lovell, 1998). The results based on the income-based model 
are shown in Table 5.12, which shows an improvement in commercial banks' TFP in 
both India and Pakistan. However, the income-based model generally reveals lower 
Ai _&. 
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improvements in TFP than the loan-based model. For example, over the entire period, 
income-based TFPCH in the Indian commercial banks was on average 4.2% (4.6% 
Loan based model) and mean EFCH was 2.8% (4.2% in the income-based model). 
Technological improvement was the only exception to this trend being slightly higher 
at 1.4% (0.3% in loan-based model). However, like the loan-based model, it regressed 
by 0.8% in 1995 and 1.8% in 1996. Similarly, in Pakistan, TFP improved by 2.9% 
(3.7%) throughout the period, with EFCH increasing by 3.4% (5.5%) and TCH 
regressing by 0.5% (1.8%). 
The biggest disparity between the two models was revealed by the changes in TFP in 
the public sector banks. In India, for example, the loan-based model indicates a 2.6% 
increase in TFP, where as the income-based model reveals a mere 0.4% increase. 
Likewise, the loan-based model reveals a 0.9% increase in TFP for public sector 
banks in Pakistan, compared to a decline of 2.5% in the income-based model. This 
divergence between the two models is consistent with our results in section 5.2 where 
we calculated CRS and VRS technical efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. 
In the section on technical efficiency, we attributed the divergence in the efficiency 
obtained from the two input-output models to the presence of non-performing loans. 
Similar reasons could be forwarded for the divergence in the TFP changes from the 
two models. For example, following Hardi and de Pati (2001), it could be argued that 
the banks transferred productivity gains to their customers, i. e. borrowers and 
depositors. In other words, with a given level of resources the banks generated higher 
volumes of loans but reduced net interest income by paying higher interest to 
depositors and levying lower interest for loans and related services. 
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Table 5.12 - Total factor productivity change uring 1992-1998 (income-based model) 
India Pakistan 
EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH 
All Banks 
1993 0.922 0.990 0.939 1.033 0.952 1.026 1.026 1.000 0.986 1.012 
1994 1.007 1.003 1.004 1.033 1.041 1.016 1.009 1.008 0.955 0.969 
1995 0.994 1.002 0.992 0.992 1.003 1.082 1.043 1.038 1.000 1.082 
1996 1.078 1.067 1.010 0.982 1.059 1.078 1.049 1.028 0.984 1.061 
1997 1.021 1.003 1.017 1.021 1.042 1.038 1.015 1.022 1.009 1.047 
1998 1.040 1.019 1.027 1.025 1.066 0.969 0.998 0.970 1.039 1.007 
Public Sector Ban ks 
1993 0.907 0.981 0.925 1.042 0.945 1.028 0.990 1.039 0.923 0.949 
1994 1.003 1.000 1.003 1.006 1.008 1.036 0.997 1.040 0.908 0.940 
1995 0.994 0.990 1.005 0.987 0.981 1.065 1.039 1.026 0.978 1.041 
1996 1.020 1.004 1.019 0.973 0.993 0.954 0.952 1.010 0.952 0.908 
1997 1.019 1.009 1.010 0.993 1.012 1.033 1.002 1.031 0.980 1.012 
1998 1.005 1.003 1.003 1.021 1.027 0.974 1.016 0.962 1.032 1.005 
Domestic Private Banks 
1993 0.900 0.970 0.997 1.004 0.903 1.036 1.015 1.020 1.047 1.084 
1994 0.973 0.909 1.070 1.080 1.051 0.958 1.003 0.955 0.980 0.938 
1995 1.055 1.086 0.972 0.993 1.049 1.083 1.081 1.002 0.998 1.081 
1996 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.001 1.002 1.197 1.093 1.096 1.003 1.201 
1997 0.951 0.957 1.001 1.031 0.980 1.000 1.002 0.998 1.011 1.012 
1998 1.016 1.009 1.008 1.013 1.030 0.920 0.949 0.972 1.041 0.958 
Foreign Banks 
1993 0.959 0.961 0.992 1.054 1.010 1.012 1.012 1.000 0.994 1.006 
1994 1.047 1.000 1.048 1.016 1.064 1.055 1.045 1.010 0.978 1.033 
1995 0.937 0.961 0.975 1.048 0.982 1.100 1.034 1.072 1.024 1.126 
1996 1.226 1.142 1.073 0.973 1.192 1.097 1.108 0.990 0.998 1.095 
1997 1.097 1.101 0.996 1.039 1.139 1.082 1.078 1.005 1.036 1.121 
1998 1.100 1.025 1.079 1.040 1.145 1.017 1.014 1.005 1.043 1.060 
EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH EFCH PTECH SECH TCH TFPCH 
All Banks 
1992-98 1.028 1.014 0.998 1.014 1.042 1.034 1.023 1.011 0.995 1.029 
1992-95 1.026 0.998 0.978 1.008 1.034 1.041 1.026 1.015 0.980 1.020 
1996-98 1.030 1.029 1.018 1.023 1.054 1.027 1.021 1.006 1.010 1.038 
Public Sector Ban ks 
1992-98 1.008 0.998 0.994 0.996 1.004 1.014 0.999 1.018 0.961 0.975 
1992-95 1.006 0.990 0.977 0.988 0.994 1.043 1.009 1.035 0.936 0.976 
1996-98 1.012 1.005 1.011 1.007 1.020 0.987 0.989 1.001 0.987 0.974 
Domestic Private Banks 
1992-98 0.999 0.987 1.008 1.023 1.022 1.028 1.023 1,006 1.013 1.042 
1992-95 1.009 0.986 1.012 1.024 1.034 1.024 1.033 0.992 1.008 1.032 
1996-98 0.983 0.989 1.003 1.022 1.005 1.033 1.013 1.021 1.018 1.052 
Foreign B anks 
1992-98 1.077 1.029 1.026 1.023 1.102 1.060 1.048 1.013 1.012 1.073 
1992-95 1.063 0.974 1.005 1.012 1.076 1.055 1.030 1.027 0.999 1.054 
1996-98 1.099 1.088 1.049 1.039 1.142 1.065 1.066 1.000 1.026 1.092 
EFCH = Efficiency Change; TCH Technical Change; PTECH Pure Technical Efficiency Change; SECH 
Scale Efficiency Change; TFPCH Total Factor Productivity Change 
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Figure 5.9 - Cumulative TFP change for banks in India and Pakistan (1992=1) 
Model B 
Public Sector Banks 
Domestic Private Banks 
I- 
E 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
Year 
Foreign Banks 
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As we argued in section 5.3, this explanation, however, may not be consistent with the 
prevailing conditions in the commercial banking industry of India and Pakistan during 
the 1990s. During this period interest rate spreads in both countries remained fairly 
constant and even increased for the public sector banks (see SBP, 2000, and Bhide et 
al., 2002). This means that although there is some evidence to suggest that smaller 
private and foreign banks did transfer some of their productivity improvements to 
their customers (e. g. in terms of higher interest to their depositors), the dominant 
public sector banks did not. 
Another possible explanation is based on the argument that the presence of high non- 
performing loans (NPLs) could have contributed to the difference between the two 
models. In the case of public sector banks, the average value of NPLs as a percentage 
of total loans was around 20% in both countries throughout this period (see Bhide et 
al. 2002, SBP, 2001). This suggests that although public sector banks became more 
productive in generating loans and advances with a given level of inputs, the high 
incidence of NPLs restricted their ability to generate high levels of income. It could be 
argued, therefore, that the highly competitive and flexible post liberalised 
environment, merely encouraged the public sector banks to increase the quantity of 
their loans rather than the quality. Government in both countries pledged to help 
banks to recover their NPLs by setting up special tribunals. However, these special 
tribunals were not very effective. In India, for example, the establishment of the 
Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BEFR) and the Debt Recovery 
Tribunals (DRTs) had only modest success until 1999 (see Bhide et al., 2002). 
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5.5 - Summary and conclusion 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of the evolution of the technical 
efficiency of the banking industry in India and Pakistan before and after the 
implementation of the financial liberalisation programme in the early 1990s. Using 
non-parametric DEA, we find that the overall technical efficiency of the banking 
industry improved following the financial liberalisation, especially after 1995-1996. 
In the case of India, efficiency increased due to improvement in both pure technical 
efficiency and scale efficiency. In Pakistan, however, the increase in overall technical 
efficiency was due primarily to an improvement in scale efficiency. 
The results indicate that total factor productivity in both the countries improved 
slowly and, therefore, they reflect the gradual or long term impact of the financial 
liberalisation. In India, the loan-based model revealed an improvement in TFP of 
around 4.6% for the entire study period and the income-based model showed a 
comparable improvement of 4.2%. In Pakistan, the improvement was less marked 
with TFP improving by 3.7% in the loan-based model, and 2.9% in the income-based 
model. The study also revealed that TFP in both countries was adversely affected by 
the slow improvement, or lack of improvement, in the TFP of public sector banks. In 
contrast, however, foreign banks in both the countries witnessed the highest 
productivity gains. 
Our results suggest that the efficiency of commercial banks is much higher in Model 
A, which uses earning assets as outputs, than in Model B, which uses income as 
output. This gap in efficiency scores obtained from the two models could be due to 
the presence of high non-performing loans in the asset portfolios of banks in the two 
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countries. We argue that even when banks are becoming more efficient in increasing 
the quantity of loans, advances and investments, this efficiency is not being translated 
into higher efficiency in generating income. The results also suggest that the 
implementation of the financial liberalisation closed the efficiency gap between large 
and small banks. 
In the following chapter, we augment our analysis by employing grand-frontier DEA, 
and by using regression analysis to examine the external environmental and internal 
banks specific factors that may explain inter-temporal and intra-temporal variations in 
the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan during the post-ESRs period. 
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Chapter 6- Factors Explaining the Variations in the 
Efficiency of Banks during the post-ESRs Period' 
6.1 - Introduction 
The preceding chapter measured the technical efficiency of banks in India and 
Pakistan during 1990-1998. The DEA was employed to construct a best-practice 
frontier for each year in the sample, and then the efficiency of each bank in each year 
was measured relative to the best-practice frontier for that year 2. We found that in the 
case of India, all three groups (i. e. public, domestic private, and foreign) witnessed 
improvement in both their scale and pure technical efficiencies. On the other hand, 
only foreign and domestic private banks in Pakistan achieved improvement in their 
scale and pure technical efficiencies; public sector banks witnessed some 
improvement in the scale efficiency only. 
This chapter extends the analysis of the preceding chapter in two ways. First, 
following Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) we employ the DEA to construct a single 
4 grand-frontier' that envelops the pooled input-output data of all banks in the sample 
for all the post-ESRs years, i. e. 1992-1998. This grand-frontier provides a best- 
practice benchmark against which the efficiency of each bank in each year is 
calculated. The key advantage of the grand-frontier approach is that it will provide a 
trend in the efficiency of banks, which was not available in the previous chapter 
when we calculated the efficiency of banks using a separate frontier for each year. 
1A paper on the factors explaining the efficiency of banks in India during 1992-1998 based on this 
chapter has been circulated for comments and criticism. 
2 Stochastic frontier analysis was also employed to check the robustness of our DEA results. 
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This approach, therefore, provides variations in the efficiency of banks over both 
time and space. 
An additional benefit of using the grand-frontier rather than annual frontiers is 6an 
increase in the number of observations' that are crucial for the calculation of 
efficiency using the DEA (Bhattacharyya et al., 1997; p. 335). Furthermore, this 
approach could enable us to capture the impact of the implementation of the 
economic and structural reforms (ESRs) by examining the number of banks forming 
the best-practice grand-frontier. If a large number of efficient observations are of 
recent vintage, then we could argue that the implementation of the ESRs has created 
an environment that enabled banks to improve their resource utilisation. In addition, 
this grand-frontier technique will enable us to check the robustness of the annual 
frontier results. 
Second, in the previous chapter, we attributed variations in the efficiency of banks to 
the changes brought about by the ESRs, particularly by the financial liberalisation 
programme. In this chapter, we adopt a more systematic approach to examine the 
possibility of a relationship between the efficiency of banks and various 
macroeconomic and industry-specific variables that are directly related to the ESRs 
in India and Pakistan. Specifically, we use the two-step procedure outlined in chapter 
3 in which we regress the efficiency scores obtained from the grand-frontier DEA on 
various external environmental factors, as well as, bank-specific characteristics. This 
two-step procedure will enable us to test the hypotheses regarding the possibility of a 
relationship between bank efficiency and various elements of the ESRs in India and 
Pakistan. 
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The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 outlines the hypothesis 
regarding a relationship between bank efficiency and four factors, namely fiscal 
deficits, investment liberalisation, competition, and the presence of foreign banks. 
Section 6.3 outlines the techniques used in this chapter. Section 6.4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6.5 summarises and concludes the chapter. 
6.2 - Factors explaining variations in the efficiency of banks in India 
and Pakistan 
As we noted in chapter 3, the traditional theory of the firm reveals little curiosity 
regarding the factors explaining variations in the efficiency of firms over space and 
time because, by assumption, the firm always produces according to a known 
relationship between inputs and outputs (i. e. the production function). We also 
reviewed more recent approaches that extend this simplistic view by considering the 
firm as a nexus of contracts among various 'opportunistic' individuals who may not 
be 'rational' utility maximisers (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; 
Leibenstein, 1979; Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975). The ability of 
firms to transform inputs into outputs (i. e. their efficiency) in these frameworks 
varies, over time and space, due to internal firm-specific characteristics (e. g. 
ownership) and/or external environmental factors (e. g. the level of competition and 
government regulations). These internal and external factors affect the finn's 
efficiency by influencing the ability/motivation of individual agents associated with 
the firm. 
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In the context of banking firms, a large number of recent empirical studies have 
found substantial inter-temporal and intra-temporal variations in the efficiency of 
banks in both developed and developing countries (see, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; 
Isik and Hassan, 2003; Hasan and Marton, 2003). In the previous chapter, we also 
found considerable variations in the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. As 
Berger and Mester (1997) point out, the next useful step for public policy and 
academic research is to explore factors that could explain these measured variations. 
In the case of developed countries, some recent studies have empirically investigated 
the factors that may explain the variations in the efficiency of banks (see, for 
example, Mester, 1996; Berger and Mester, 1997; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; 
Akhigbe and McNulty, 2003; Girardone et al., 2004; Altunbas et al., 2001; Dietsch 
and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). These studies have found various bank-specific 
characteristics (e. g. ownership and size) and external environmental factors (e. g. the 
level of competition, demand for financial services, and government regulations) to 
have a significant relationship with banks' efficiency. While this research on 
developed countries may be instructive, there is a strong case for investigating 
factors that could explain variations in the efficiency of banks in developing 
countries, which have implemented the financial liberalisation programme to 
enhance the resource utilisation in the banking industry (see chapter 4). 
Although some recent studies have attempted to address this issue, these studies have 
only investigated the possibility of a relationship between banks' efficiency and a 
handful of internal bank-specific factors - such as ownership and size (see, for 
example, Hao et al., 2001; Yildirim, 2002; Hasan and Marton, 2003); the importance 
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of changes due to the ESRs, though recognised, has not been explicitly investigated. 
The present chapter contributes to this recent empirical literature by presenting a 
relatively more comprehensive analysis of a relationship between banks' efficiency 
and factors associated with the three elements of the ESRs, namely, the financial 
liberalisation, fiscal reforms, and investment liberalisation. 
More specifically, we first present hypotheses regarding the possibility of a 
relationship between the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan and fiscal deficits, 
private investment, competition, and the presence of foreign banks. The first two 
factors are associated with the on-going fiscal reforms and investment liberalisation, 
respectively; while the last two factors are associated with the financial liberalisation 
programme. We test these hypotheses using two predominant econometric 
techniques, namely, the Ordinary Least Squares estimation and the Generalised 
Method of Moments estimation. Besides these factors, we also include bank-specific 
variables in our model. Although our empirical analysis is based on the banking 
industry in India and Pakistan, insights from this chapter could be useful for other 
developing countries, which have followed similar ESRs during the 1990s. 
6.2.1 - The ESRs and bank efficiency in India and Pakistan 
a- Fiscal deficits, fiscal reforms and banks' efficiency 
In this study, we hypothesise that there is a negative relationship between 
government's fiscal deficits and the efficiency of commercial banks in developing 
countries like India and Pakistan. At least three reasons could be forwarded for this 
negative relationship. First, due to an undeveloped debt market, governments in 
developing countries finance their fiscal deficits by making it mandatory for 
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commercial banks to hold a large amount of government securities (Fry, 1995). For 
example, to finance its high fiscal deficits, the government of India required 
commercial banks to invest more than 30% of their loanable funds in the low earning 
government securities (see chapter 4). As the interest rate on government securities is 
deliberately kept lower than the market clearing rate, it could be argued that such a 
requirement negatively influences banks' efficiency to channel their investible funds 
to higher eaming assets. 
Second, the presence of high fiscal deficits acts as a key constraint on the 
government's ability to lower the high cash reserve requirement imposed on banks. 
For example, in the case of India and Pakistan, banks were required to maintain the 
cash reserve ratio of 15% before the implementation of the ESRs (see chapter 4). 
Once again, the key reason behind this high reserve requirement was the 
government's high fiscal deficits. This high reserve requirement, in turn, may act as a 
cost imposed on banks because it restricts their capacity to produce maximum 
earning assets with their mobilised funds. 
Finally, high fiscal deficits lead governments in many developing countries to draw 
on domestic savings by launching government sponsored saving schemes, which act 
as a substitute to banks' deposits (see, for example, Feltenstein and Iwata, 2002). In 
the presence of these saving schemes, banks may find it more expensive to acquire 
the scarce investible funds in the economy. This, in turn, could hamper banks' ability 
to produce the quantity of earning assets and, hence, income. In this context, it could 
be argued that the implementation of fiscal reforms that endeavour to lower 
governments' fiscal deficits may lead to an environment that enables and encourages 
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banks to enhance their ability to mobilise investible funds and to generate eaming 
assets from these funds. 
b- Banks' efficiency and investment liberalisation 
A growth in demand for the products/services of an industry has been pointed out as 
an important factor that may affect the efficiency of firms in that industry. For 
example, Perelman (1995) suggests that the expansion of the market can be seen as 
an economic opportunity for firms that leads to investment in new products or 
production processes, which would improve their efficiency. A growth in demand 
may also influence the efficiency of firms by making the higher utilisation of 
installed productive capacity possible. In the context of banking firms, some recent 
empirical studies have examined the relationship between banks' efficiency and 
demand for services provided by banks. For example, Berger and Mester (1997) 
examine this relationship for 6000 banks in United States during 1990-1995. They 
find a significant positive relationship between demand for banking services and the 
efficiency of banks. 
Prior to the implementation of the ESRs, when governments imposed restrictions on 
private investment, besides government securities and loans to a few large state- 
owned enterprises (usually inefficient and loss-making 
3) 
, banks 
had limited options 
to transform their loanable funds into earning assets due to the lack of demand for 
bank credit. For example, as we noted in chapter 4 (p. 116), Bhaumik and 
Mukhopadhyay (1997) suggest that the high proportion of government securities in 
the assets portfolios of banks in India was due to the lack of adequate demand for 
3 See, for example, Omran (2004). 
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bank credit in the Indian economy. In this study, we postulate that, in the case of the 
banking industry in developing countries, the liberalisation of private investment that 
enlarges the real sector augments the demand for financial services (e. g. loans and 
advances) provided by banks. Following Perelman (1995), this increase in the 
demand could create economic opportunities for banks to transform their loanable 
assets into earning assets more efficiently. In addition, with an anticipation of growth 
in the demand for their loans and advances, brought about by the liberalised regime, 
banks may engage in investing in new technologies (e. g. investment in infon-nation 
technology) that, in turn, could enhance their efficiency 4. 
c- The financial liberalisation, competition, and banks' efficiency 
The financial liberalisation attempts to enhance the level of competition in the 
banking industry in order to encourage banks to exert greater effort to utilise their 
resources. This is based on economic theories that suggest a positive relationship 
between competition and efficiency (see, for example, Leibenstein, 1979). Recent 
empirical studies on banks in developed countries provide some support for a 
positive relationship between banks' efficiency and the level of competition (see, 
Berger and Mester, 1997). However, in the context of developing countries, no 
empirical study has explicitly evaluated the relationship between banks' efficiency 
and the level of competition. We fill this gap by examining whether the increased 
level of competition, brought about by the implementation of the financial 
liberalisation programme, is associated with the higher level of efficiency of banks in 
India and Pakistan dunng 1992-1998. 
4 Another channel through which the liberalisation of private investment can have positive impacts is 
entry of foreign firms that bring new technical skills that can 
be spilled over to other sector including 
banking sector. 
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d- The financial liberalisation, foreign banks'participation, and banks' efficiency 
Finally, an important component of the financial liberalisation in India and Pakistan, 
like in other developing countries, is reduced restrictions on the entry and operations 
of foreign banks (see, RBI, various issues; SBP, 2000). Again like in other 
developing countries, the reduced restrictions have led to an increase in the scale and 
scope of the operations of foreign banks in India and Pakistan (see chapter 4). In this 
chapter, we hypothesise that this increase in the presence of foreign banks enhances 
the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. Besides making the banking industry 
more competitive, an increase in the presence of foreign banks can positively 
influence the efficiency of banks in two ways. 
First, foreign banks operating in developing countries, especially those from 
developed economies, may introduce modem and more efficient banking techniques, 
which may be copied by domestic banks (Lensink and Hermes, 2004). Second, as 
Lensink and Hermes (2004, p. 556) point out, foreign banks may increase the quality 
of human capital in the domestic banking industry by (a) importing high-skilled bank 
managers to work in their foreign branches in developing countries, and (b) investing 
in the training of local employees. The improved quality of human capital enables 
banks to enhance their ability to transform inputs into outputs. 
However, Lensink and Hermes (2004) add, the realisation of this positive 
relationship between the presence of foreign banks and the efficiency of banks may 
depend on the level of economic development of the host developing country: at a 
lower level of economic development, banking markets are generally less developed, 
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which means implementing new techniques (introduced by foreign banks) raises 
costs in the short-run. In this context, therefore, we seek to examine whether the 
increased presence of foreign banks has a positive or negative impact on the 
efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan during the post-ESRs period. 
6.3 - Methodology and Data 
In this chapter, we employ the two-step procedure. In the first step, we use the grand- 
frontier DEA to measure the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan during 1992- 
1998. The measured efficiency scores are then regressed on external and internal 
factors using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation and the Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. 
6.3.1 - The two-step procedure 
Step I- The estimation of efficiency using grand-frontier DEA 
As highlighted earlier, following Bhattacharyya et al. (1997), we employ the DEA to 
construct a single 'grand frontier' that envelops the pooled input-output data for all 
the years (i. e. separately for each of the two countries. ) This grand frontier would 
provide a benchmark against which the efficiency of each bank in each year is 
calculated. Following the notations used by Bhattacharyya et al. (1997; p. 335), let 
0; the input data for commercial banks be represented by x= (x, I ... IXr I... I 
XR 
where f=1,2,..., F indexes banks, t=1,2,..., T indexes time periods, and r=1,2, 
..., R 
indexes inputs that banks use. Let the output data be represented by 
P indexes outputs that banks ft = (yft ft 
ft 0; where p=1,2,.. yI YP 9... ly, 
produce. The pooled production possibility set for all the years for all the 
banks in 
the sample can be expressed as: 
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T 
/ift x 
ft 
r 
t=I 
Aft >0 
FT 
f 
9 
9 r=1,2,..., R (6.1) 
f1,2,..., F; t=1,2,..., T 
where the IV' are intensity variables allowing the creation of convex combinations of 
observed (yft, xft). The production technology represented by S is assumed to 
display variable returns to scale. Like in chapter 5, we postulate that banks seek to 
maximise their outputs, given the inputs at their disposal. An output-oriented 
efficiency of each bank f in year t, EFF , is calculated as the reciprocal of the ft 
solution to the DEA problem: 
Max 0= [EFF ft 1-1 
subject to 
FT 
Oy ft <Y Aft y it 
pp 
f =1 t=l 
T 
Aftxft 
r 
t=l 
>0 
T 
y Aft 
t=l 
xft r 
 
2,..., F; 
(6.2) 
1,2,..., P; 
1,2,. .., 
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The above problem is solved once for each bank in each year. The optimal value of 
0 is the factor by which yftmust be scaled up in order for a bank with data 
(xft, yft) to reach the grand frontier. Since 0 ý! 1,0:! ý EFFf, :51 (see Bhattacharyya 
et al., 1997; p. 335 and Thanassoulis, 2001). Like before, a bank with an efficiency 
score of 0.9, for instance, is considered as producing only 90% of the output that it 
should be producing if it were achieving the best-practice in the industry. 
Step II - Regression analysis using the OLS and the GMM estimation 
Once the efficiency of banks is measured during the post-ESRs period, our next step 
is to explore factors, including those associated with the ESRs, which may explain 
the variations in the measured efficiency using the following model: 
EFFf, =f (BQft, MK, 
) (6.3) 
Where EFFft is the output-oriented technical efficiency of f-th banks in t-th time 
period; BQft is the set of Q bank-specific variables; MK, is the set of K macroeconomic 
variables. One feature of this model needs some explanation. Since EFFft is a 
variable ranging from 0 to 1 (1 being fully efficient), it is necessary to use a non- 
linear functional form for the above model that captures this characteristic of the 
efficiency scores (see Mester, 1993,1996). In this regards, the logistical functional 
form has been used by the existing empirical studies 5. Following Gumbau-Albert and 
Maudos (2002), we use the logistic functional form for (6.3): 
5 See Appendix 6.1 for a brief summary of the logistical functional form. 
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EFF 
where y and (p are the vectors of parameters to be estimated; pf are the individual 
B Qft + (P M Kt +, " 
,Y Qf, 
+ (p M K, +, a f+vf (6.4) 
bank effects; and vf, are white-noise error term. We can rewrite (6.4) as follows: 
In 
EFFft 
I- EFF ft 
=(Dft =yBQft + (P M Kt + Alf + Vft (6.5) 
where the term Oft = (In 
EFFft 
) is called the log-odds and could be used as a I- EFFft 
proxy for output-oriented technical efficiency (see Gumbau-Albert and Maudos, 
2002). 
As we mentioned above, our primary aim is to examine the impacts of fiscal deficits, 
investment liberalisation, competition, and foreign banks' presence on the efficiency 
of banks. Towards this end, the external environmental factors in our model include: 
fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP (DEF), private investment as a percentage of 
GDP (PI); the Herfindahl index of concentration (HERF) representing the level of 
competition; and the share of foreign banks in total credit (FOR) representing the 
presence of foreign banks. In the case of Pakistan, domestic investment as a 
percentage of GDP (DI) is used because data on private investment are not available. 
Besides the external environmental factors, the efficiency of banks may also vary due 
to internal bank-specific factors (see Berger and Mester, 1997; Hao et al., 2001; Casu 
and Molyneux, 2003; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Girardone et al., 2004). Based on the 
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existing empirical studies, we specify the following four internal bank-specific 
factors (see Berger and Mester, 1997; Hao et al., 2001; Hasan and Marton, 2003): 
logarithm of total assets (TA) of each bank representing bank size; operating 
expenses as a ratio of total income (OE/TI); investments as a share of total assets 
(INVEST/TA); and return on assets (ROA). These internal bank-specific factors 
could enable us to determine the characteristics that distinguish efficient banks from 
the inefficient ones. 
It should be noted here that we are not proposing any hypothesis regarding the 
direction of the relationship between the efficiency of banks and these bank-specific 
variables. For example, as we noted in chapter 5, size may have either a positive 
relationship (due possibly to larger banks' market power and ability to diversify risk) 
or a negative relationship (due possibly to complexity of the operation of larger 
banks) with the efficiency. 
Besides these bank-specific variables, we also include the efficiency of the previous 
year (EFFI) as an independent variable. By including the lagged value of bank 
efficiency, we attempt to capture the dynamic nature of the efficiency of banks. That 
is, the efficiency of the previous year indicates a certain level of accumulated 
knowledge and technological endowment that may help banks to generate higher 
outputs with their inputs by adapting relatively quickly to the changes brought about 
by the ESRs. We, therefore, expect a positive relationship between the efficiency of 
the previous year and the efficiency of the present year. 
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We estimate the parameters of equation (6.5) using the OLS and the GMM 
estimation 6. The use of the GMM is appropriate due to the possibility of enclogenity 
in the above model. That is, as we noted in chapter 3, it is likely that the bank- 
specific factors that are used to explain variations in the efficiency of banks are 
endogenous (see Mester, 1993,1996; Berger and Mester, 1997). The endogeneity of 
explanatory variables can make the coefficient estimates obtained through the 
traditional OLS estimation biased and inconsistent (see Berger and Mester, 1997; 
Judge et al., 1988; Greene 2000). 
To take into account the possibility of endogeneity, following Arellano and Bond 
(1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), we apply the 
GMM framework to obtain first-differenced and system-GMM estimatorS7. Using 
the previous observations of variables, i. e. the time-series dimension of panel data, as 
instruments, the GNM framework takes into account the fact that explanatory 
variables may be endogenous or at least weakly exogenous, and provides unbiased 
coefficient estimates. This, therefore, makes our analysis about the impacts of bank- 
specific and macroeconomic variables on bank efficiency more reliable. 
In the first-differenced GMM procedure, we treat bank-specific variables as 
enclogenous, and, therefore, values of these variables lagged two periods or more are 
valid instruments. Macroeconomic variables are treated as at least weakly 
exogenous, and thus values of these variables lagged one period or more are valid 
instruments. The first-differenced GMM estimator, however, can suffer from serious 
efficiency loss, small sample biases and imprecision for there are potentially 
6 See Judge et al. (1988) for OLS and Greene (2000) for GMM. 
' See Appendix 6.2 
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informative moment restrictions that are ignored (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). To 
improve the properties of the first-differenced GMM estimator, we use the system- 
GMM estimator. This estimator, in addition to the first-differenced instruments, 
employs lagged differences of bank-specific variables and differences of 
macroeconomic variables as instruments. It should be noted that time dummies are 
usually included in the GMM estimation to account for time-variant but individual- 
invariant factors. The inclusion of macroeconomic variables allows such dummies to 
be dropped from our estimation. 
6.3.2 - Data 
Like in chapter 5, we measure the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan based on 
two input-output models. In Model A (Loan-based model), we postulate that banks 
incur operating and interest expenses to produce loans and advances, and 
investments. In Model B (Income-based model), banks incur operating and interest 
expenses to produce interest and non-interest income. The same data sets that were 
used in chapter 5 are used for the measurement of efficiency using the grand-frontier 
DEA. The data on the Herfindhal index and the share of foreign banks in total credit 
are from the chapter 4 of the present study. The data on fiscal deficits are obtained 
from the Key Indicator of the Asian Development Bank (2003). In the case of India, 
data on private investment are obtained from the Economic Surveys published by the 
Indian Ministry of Finance 8. In the case of Pakistan, the data on domestic investment 
were obtained from the World Development Indicators (2003) published by the 
World Bank. 
8 Available at http: //finmin. nic. in/ 
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6.4 - Empirical findings 
6.4.1 - The technical efficiency of Indian banks during 1992-1998 
Table 6.1 presents the average variable returns to scale (VRS) technical efficiency 
scores for the banking industry in India during 1992-1998. Similar to the DEA 
results in the previous chapter, the grand-frontier DEA results suggest that the 
efficiency of the banking industry improved during the post-ESRs period. According 
to the results of Model A, the average efficiency of the whole banking industry 
improved from 60.69% in 1992 to 67.68% in 1998. Similarly, according to the 
results of Model B, the average efficiency of the whole banking industry improved 
from 75.56% in 1992 to 87.62% in 1998. The standard deviations for both the 
models suggest high variations in each of the sample year. 
As in the previous chapter, the results in Table 6.1 suggest that on average the public 
sector banks were more efficient than private banks, according to the loan-based 
model (i. e. Model A), especially during the early years. This could be due to the fact 
that during the pre-ESRs era, the government of India imposed restrictions on the 
operations and entry of private sector banks. However, the results also suggest that 
this gap between the loan-based efficiency of public sector banks and private sector 
banks declined during the post-ESRs era. For example, in 1992, the loan-based 
efficiency gap between public sector banks and foreign banks was around 26%. This 
gap declined to around 14% in 1998. It could be argued that the changes in the 
economic environment brought about by the ESRs enabled private sector banks to 
enhance their resource utilisation in tenns of the production of earning assets (i. e. 
loans and advances, and investments). 
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DEA Model A DEA Model B 
The results of Model B are also consistent with our results in the previous chapter. 
We find that the efficiency of public sector banks is lower according to the income 
based-model as compared to the efficiency according to the loan-based model. On 
the other hand, the converse is true for private sector banks. As in the previous 
chapter, we argue that although public sector banks were relatively more efficient in 
generating loans and advances, due to higher ratio of non-performing loans, they 
were less successful in generating income from their earning assets. This is 
consistent with the condition prevailing in the Indian banking industry prior to the 
implementation of the ESRs when the key objective of public sector banks was not to 
produce revenues but to channel funds to the so-called priority sectors in the 
economy. 
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Public Sector Banks Domestic Private Banks 
Foreign BanKS 
I 
According to the results from both the models, public sector banks exhibit less 
variability in their performance than do domestic private and foreign banks. This 
finding is not surprising given the fact that public sector banks have similar 
organisational structures and managerial philosophies that are devised by the 
government. Private sector banks, both foreign and domestic, are expected to exhibit 
greater variability due to different ownership, and different management practices. 
This is specially the case for foreign banks, which exhibit the highest variability, 
perhaps due to the fact that they come from different countries that may lead to 
different management practices. 
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6.4.2 - Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) frontier bank approach 
Table 6.2 presents the number of banks forming the grand-frontier for Model A 
(Panel I) and Model B (Panel 11). In the case of Model A, out of 566 bank 
observations, a total of 42 are found to be radially efficient. In other words, 42 banks 
form the best practice grand-frontier for the period 1992-1998. Out of 42 efficient 
observations, 31 come from the final three years of the sample period. This suggests 
that as the ESRs gradually created an environment that enabled banks to improve 
their efficiency relative to the early years. A similar trend is apparent from the results 
obtained from Model B (Panel 11). Out of 566 bank observations, 38 form the best 
practice grand-frontier for the period 1992-1998. Out of these 38 efficient 
observations, 25 come from the final three years of the sample period. 
It should be noted here that as we pool the data for all the years, effectively we 
assume that the best-practice frontier does not shift over time. Therefore, the 
improvement in the efficiency - suggested by both improvements in average 
efficiency and identity of final years' observation forming the frontier - could be due 
to improvement in efficiency and/or improvement in the banking technology. 
Therefore, these results should be seen in conjunction with our Malmquist TFP 
indices (chapter 5), which suggest that the improvement in banks' performance was 
due to a mix of efficiency improvement (catching-up) and technological 
improvements. 
Panel I in Table 6.2 reveals that during the initial years, public sector banks dominate 
the other two groups. However, during the last three years, all the three groups have 
almost equal participation in the best practice frontier. The results for Model B tell a 
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different story. According to the results of Model B, foreign banks determine the best 
practices in the banking industry, especially during the last three years. This is 
consistent with the fact that foreign banks in India were relatively more successful in 
generating profits from their operation as compared to their domestic counterparts 
(see Chapter 4). 
Table 6.2 - Frontier banks b y ownership (1992-1998) 
Panel I- Model A 
Number of efficient banks______ 
19 92 1993 1994 19 95 1996 1997 1998 Total 
PSBs -2 2 2 3 3 5 17 
DPBs -- 1 1 4 4 10 
FBs 1- 1 2 4 3 4 15 
Total 12 4 4 8 10 13 42 
__ _ -------- ------- Proportion of efficient-banks-% 
-(number 
of efficient-banksltotal numb_er of banks) 
...... 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
PSBs - 7.1 7.4 7.4 11.1 11.1 18.5 
DPBs -- 4.2 0.0 3.0 11.8 11.8 
FBs 4.3 4.5 8.0 15.4 10.7 14.3 
Panel II - Model B 
Number of efficient banks 
....................................................................................................................... .................................... ..................................... ................................... I .................. I .................. .................................... ......................... I ............................. ................. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
PSBs - 1 1 1 1 1 16 
DPBs I - - 1 2 - 15 
FBs 1 3 2 2 6 6 7 27 
Total 2 4 3 
--- - 
4 
---- 
9 
----- 
7 
---- 
9 38 
---------- --- ---------------- - Proportion of efficient banks % (number of efficient banks1total number of banks) 
------------------------------------------------ 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
PSBs - 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 
DPBs 4.0 - - 3.8 6.1 - 2.9 
FBs 4.3 13.0 9.1 8.0 23.1 21.4 25.0 
ABs= All Banks; PSBs= Public Sector Banks; DPBs= Domestic Private Banks; FBs= Foreign 
Banks 
6.4.3 - Technical efficiency of Pakistani banks during 1992-1998 
Table 6.3 presents the average VRS technical efficiency scores for the banking 
industry in Pakistan during 1992-1998. Similar to the DEA results in the previous 
chapter, the grand-frontier DEA results suggest that the efficiency of the banking 
industry improves during the post-ESRs period. According to the results of Model A, 
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the average efficiency of the whole banking industry improved from 67.68% in 1992 
to 73.40% in 1998. It should be noted, however, most of this improvement occurred 
in the last two years of the sample period. Similarly, according to the results of 
Model B, the average efficiency of the whole banking industry improved from 
57.64% in 1992 to 70.22% in 1998. 
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As in the previous chapter, the results from Model A in Table 6.3 suggest that during 
the initial years, on average public sector banks were more efficient than the other 
two groups, i. e. foreign banks and domestic private banks. However, over the years, 
this gap between the loan-based efficiency of public sector banks and private sector 
banks declined during the post-ESRs era. For example, in 1992, the loan-based 
efficiency gap between public sector banks and foreign banks was around 18%. This 
gap virtually disappeared in 1998 when foreign banks attained higher efficiency than 
public sector banks. This should be compared with the experience in the Indian 
banking industry where although the gap between public and private sector banks 
gradually declined, the former maintained relatively higher efficiency in generating 
loans and advances with given operating and interest expenses. It could be argued 
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that, compared with public sector banks in Pakistan, public sector banks in India 
were more adaptive to the changes brought about by the ESRs. 
Public Sector Banks Domestic Private Banks 
Foreign Banks I 
The results of Model B in Table 6.3 are also consistent with our results in the 
previous chapter. We find that the efficiency of public sector banks was lower 
according to the income based-model as compared to the efficiency according to the 
loan-based model. As in the previous chapter, we argue that although public sector 
banks were relatively more efficient in generating loans and advances, the presence 
of large non-performing loans hindered their ability to translate this into generating 
higher income from their earning assets. As in the case of public sector banks in 
India, this is consistent with the condition prevailing in Pakistan prior to the 
implementation of the ESRs when the key objective of public sector banks was not to 
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produce revenues but to channel funds to the so-called priority sectors in the 
economy. 
6.4.4 - Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) frontier bank approach 
Table 6.4 presents the number of banks forming the grand-frontier. Like in the Indian 
banking industry, Table 6.4 reveals that during the initial years, public sector banks 
dominated the other two groups according to the results of Model A. However, 
during the last three years, private sector banks outperformed public sector banks in 
terms of defining the best-practice frontier. The results for Model B reveal that 
public sector banks failed to produce according to the best-practices. According to 
the results of Model B, foreign banks determined the best practices in the banking 
industry, especially during the last three years. This is consistent with the fact that 
foreign banks in Pakistan were relatively more successful in generating profits from 
their operation as compared to their domestic counterparts (see Chapter 4). 
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Table 6.4 - Frontier banks b y ownership (1992-1998) 
Panel I- Model A _ 
Number of efficient banks 
1992 
_ _1993_1994 
1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
PSBs 12 2 1 1 2 9 
DPBs 2 3 5 
FBs 1 1 1 3 3 3 12 
Total 1 13 3 4 6 8 26 
Proportion of efficient banks % (number of efficient banksltotal number of banks) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
PSBs 25.0 50.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 
DPBs 11.8 17.6 
FBs 5.6 0.0 5.6 5.6 15.8 16.7 16.7 
Panel II - Model B 
Number of efficient banks 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
PSBs 1 1 1 3 
DPBs I 1 1 3 3 9 
FBs 12 1 24 5 4 19 
Total 13 2 26 9 8 31 
Proportion of efficient banks % (number of efficient banks1total number of banks) 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
PSBs 25.0 25.0 
DPBs 9.1 7.1 0.0 5.9 17.6 17.6 
FBs 5.6 11.1 5.6 11.1 21.1 27.8 22.2 
ABs= All Banks; PSBs= Public Sector Banks; DPBs= Domestic Private Banks; FBs= Foreign 
Banks 
6.4.5 - Correlates of banks efficiency in India and Pakistan during 1992-1998 
Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 report the estimation results for India and Pakistan, 
respectively, using the methods of pooled OLS, first-differenced GMM and system- 
GMM. Compared to the first-differenced and system-GMM estimates, there is a 
serious upward bias in the OLS estimates of the efficiency of the previous period, i. e. 
EFFI. This suggests the presence of bank-specific effects and endogeneity, which are 
not taken into account by the OLS method. The results of the specification tests, i. e. 
Sargan test and ml andM2 statistics, for the first-differenced and system-GNIN4 
estimators confirm the possibility of endogeneity of bank-specific variables and 
9 See Arellano and Bond (1991) 
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weak exogeneity of macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, these statistics also 
validate the use of instruments and thus the consistency of the GNIM estimators. 
Results from the Sargan difference test justify the additional instruments, and, thus, 
the advantage of the system-GMM estimator over the first-differenced GMM 
estimator. Comparing the first-differenced- and the system-GMM estimates, we find 
a substantial improvement in precision in the latter (i. e. lower standard errors), which 
is the reason why the system GMM method is recommended by Blundell and Bond 
(1998). The inference in this section, therefore, is based upon the system-GMM 
estimates. 
It should be noted again that the two input-output models (Model A and Model B) 
used to measure the efficiency of banks might represent different objectives of banks. 
Model A postulates that banks seek to mobilise financial resources to funds to 
borrowers, including those in the so-called priority sectors. Model B, on the other 
hand, could represent the profit maximisation objective of banks (see Leightner and 
Lovell, 1998). Also, it is important to note that outputs of Model B (i. e. income) 
depend largely on the outputs of Model A (i. e. loans and investment). 
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Table 6.5 - Regression analysis for India using OLS and GMM estimation 
Model A Model B 
OLS 
GMM GMM GMM GMM 
OLS 
(Level) (System) (Level) (System) 
EFF] 
0.540 0.326 0.396 0.610 0.091 0.376 
(0.063)**" (0.113)"** (0.105)*"* (0.057)*** (0.119) (0.085)*** 
TA 
0.045 0.122 0.053 0.022 -0.044 0.029 
(0.008)*** (0.055)** (0.017)*** (0.005)*** (0.081) (0.010)*** 
OEITI -0.035 -0.003- -0.189 -0.173 0.132 -0-302 
(0.025) (0.116) (0.103)* (0.116) (0.266) (0.104)*** 
0.284 0.735 0.520 0.004 -0.112 -0.220 INVESTITA 
(0.097)*** (0.211)*** (0.182)*** (0.084) (0.171) (0.180) 
-0.927 -2.657 -1.306 0.861 0.809 0.498 ROA 
(0.293)*** (0.958)*** (0.637)** (0.304)*** (0.733) (0.437) 
0.017 0.00008 -0.094 -0.129 0.048 -0.182 DEF 
(0.019) (0.062) (0.054)* (0.070)* (0.147) (0.057)*** 
0.021 0.014 -0.011 -0.018 0.024 -0.031 PI 
(0.006)*** (0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.039) (0.013)** 
0.0007 0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.001 -0.001 HERF 
(0.0002)** (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.001) (0.0004)** 
2.038 -0.391 -9.686 -11.628 5.139 -17.372 FOR 
(2.080) (5.915) (5.764)* 
- - 
(7.502) (14.39) (5-999)*** 
x2 (76) 77 (125) x2 (76) x2 (125) 
Sargan test 
51-19 63.47 50-10 69.62 
MI -2.542** -2.913 
*** -2.137 -2.734*** 
M2 -1.386 -1.347 
- 
-0.386 0.537 
Sargan X7 (4 9) 
Difference 12.28 19.52 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in 2 
parentheses. Sargan is a test of the over- identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as x under 
the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. m, and M2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(O, 1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Sargan Difference is a test for 
the validity of the additional moment restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of 
instrument validity, with degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. 
* **, *** suggests the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6.6 - Regression analysis for Pakistan using OLS and GMM estimation 
Model A Model B 
OLS 
GMM GMM GMM GMM 
OLS 
(Level) (System) (Level) (System) 
EFF] -0.556 -1-170 -0-808 0.810 -0.252 0.767 
(0.070)*** (0.893) (0.473)* (0.058)"** (1.097) (0.337)** 
TA -0-093 
0.028 -0.035 0.161 -0.082 -0.086 
(0.048)"* (0.031) (0.020)* (0.092)** (0.096) (0.041)"" 
OEITI 
0.006 0.447 0.453 -0.0006 -0.131 -0.108 
(0-007) (1.04) (0.329) (0.017) (0.159) (0.087) 
0.045 -4.407 -0.357 0.165 1.286 -0.463 INVESTITA 
(0.156) (5.486) (0.955) (0.092)* (1.522) (0.309) 
0.254 -2.166 -3.045 0.508 -0.876 0.064 ROA 
(0.297) (5.176) (1.011)*** (0.340) (1.434) (1.026) 
-0.012 -0.068 -0.039 0.008 -0.024 -0.023 DEF 
(0.030) (0.115) (0.022)* (0.019) (0.043) (0.012)** 
0.022 -0.935 0.093 -0.009 0.171 -0.054 DI 
(0.062) (1.064) (0.104) (0.030) (0.239) (0.041) 
0.00003 -0.009 0.0004 0.0001 0.002 -0.00016 HERF 
(0.0002) (0.011) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.0001) 
0.011 -0.469 -0.038 0.002 0.093 -0.020 FOR 
(0.009) (0.540) (0.019)** (0.009) (0.113) (0.011)** 
x2 (76) -T'--(125) x2 (76) (125) 
Sargan test 
31.05 34.31 24.24 28.98 
MI ..... .... ..... - -1.820 -2.179** -1.606 -2.494** 
M2 0.429 0.836 
- 
-1.641 -1.927 
-- - Sargan -T (49) ýj7 (4 9) 
Difference 3.26 4.74 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors, asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in 
parentheses. Sargan is a test of the over- identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under 
the null of instrument validity, with degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. ml and M2 are tests 
for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. Sargan Difference is a test for 
the validity of the additional moment restrictions, asymptotically distributed as X2 under the null of 
instrument validity, with degrees of freedom reported in parentheses. 
* **, *** suggests the coefficients are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 show that some of the bank-specific factors could explain 
the variations in the efficiency of the Indian and Pakistani commercial banking 
industry. That is, some bank-specific factors describe the characteristics of relatively 
more efficient banks during the sample period. In the case of India, the efficiency of 
the previous period is significantly and positively related to the efficiency of the 
current year in both the models. This suggests that banks that were more efficient in 
making loans and investment and generating income in the past tend to be relatively 
more efficient in the current period. As mentioned above, the efficiency of the 
previous year may represent a certain level of accumulated knowledge and 
technological endowment that may help banks to generate higher outputs with their 
inputs by adapting relatively quickly to the changes brought about by the ESRs. 
Therefore, in the case of India, it could be argued that more efficient banks in the 
previous year are more likely to adapt to the changes in the present year. This result 
could also be seen in conjunction with the fourth consistency condition proposed by 
Bauer et al. (1998) outlined in chapter 3 (p. 66) of the present study. Bauer et al. 
(1998) suggest that a useful approach of measuring the efficiency of banks should 
demonstrate reasonable stability over time. That is, an efficient bank this year should 
exhibit higher efficiency in the following year. 
On the other hand, in the case of Model A for the Pakistani banking industry, we find 
a negative relationship between the efficiency of the previous year and the efficiency 
of this year. It could be argued that our results do not meet the above consistency 
condition of Bauer et al. (1998). However, we argue that this negative relationship 
exhibits the prevailing situation in the Pakistani banking industry. As our results 
suggest, at the start of the ESRs, public sector banks were relatively more efficient 
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than private sector banks in generating earning assets. With government's restrictions 
on pnvate sector banks, these banks were able to generate higher earning assets with 
their given inputs especially when private sector banks were not allowed to hold 
government securities (a key output in Model A) during the pre-ESRs period. After 
the implementation of the ESRs, these banks gradually became less efficient than 
private sector banks. In the case of Pakistan, therefore, it could be argued that the 
knowledge that these banks accumulated was not very useful to adapt to a more 
market-oriented environment in the post-ESRs period. In Model B (i. e. income-base 
model), the efficiency of the previous year does have the expected positive 
relationship. This is consistent with our results that suggest that foreign banks have 
consistently outperformed the other two groups in terms of the income-based 
efficiency. 
We find different results in the two countries regarding the relationship between 
bank size and bank efficiency. In the case of India, we find a positive relationship 
between the size and efficiency of banks in both the input-output models. On the 
other hand, a negative relationship between bank size and efficiency is found in 
Pakistan. Recent empirical studies have also found different size-efficiency 
relationship for different countries. Berger and Mester (1997) note that no consistent 
picture emerges about the relationship between size and efficiency. For example, as 
we mentioned in chapter 5, some studies on developing countries such as Turkey and 
Taiwan (see Yildirim, 2000 and Huang, 2000) find a positive relationship, while 
other (e. g. Leong and Dollery, 2002) find a negative relationship between size and 
efficiency. In both India and Pakistan, the larger bank group primarily constitutes 
public sector banks. In the case of India, where there were twenty eight public sector 
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banks dominating the market at the start of the ESRs, it could be argued that their 
size was not too big to hamper their ability to adapt. On the other hand, in Pakistan 
there were only five large public sector banks dominating the market at the start of 
the ESRs. It could be argued that these banks became too large and complex to 
quickly adapt to the changing environment. That could be the reason why the 
negative relationship between size and efficiency is found in Pakistan. 
We find that investments as a ratio of total assets does not have a significant 
relationship with bank efficiency in Pakistan. In the case of India, on the other hand, 
higher investments as a ratio of total assets is associated with higher efficiency in 
Model A and lower efficiency in Model B (although in model B this variable is 
insignificant). This is consistent with the analysis of Chapter 4 that there is an 
increase in investment in riskless government securities in the banking industry. This 
enabled banks to generate more earning assets. However, the negative impact on the 
income-based efficiency might be because an increase in investments substitutes 
banks' resources away from higher-earning, albeit riskier, loans and advances. 
In the case of India, a negative relationship between the ratio of operating expenses 
to income is found. Regarding the return on asset, in the case of Model A, high ROA 
is negatively related to bank efficiency, while a positive relationship is found 
between ROA and bank efficiency in Model A. These results suggest that more 
profitable banks are better able to generate revenues from their operations than less 
profitable banks. 
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As mentioned earlier, the primary aim of this chapter is to examine the relationship 
between the efficiency of banks and four external environmental factors associated 
with the ESRs in India and Pakistan. As we hypothesised in section 6.2, we find that 
fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP have a negative relationship with bank 
efficiency in both the models in India and Pakistan. Therefore, as we outlined earlier, 
it could be argued that the government needs to implement fiscal reforms that curtail 
the level of fiscal deficits so that it can lower its reliance on the loanable funds 
mobilised by the banking industry. This, in turn, may have a positive impact on 
banks' ability to enhance their resources utilisation in mobilising scarce financial 
resources in the economy and transforming these resources into high earning assets. 
In the case of India, private investment as percentage of GDP does not have the 
hypothesised impact. It has a negative, but insignificant, coefficient in Model A, and 
a negative and significant coefficient in the case of Model B. This could be explained 
by the on-going problem of the non-perfon-ning loans (NPLs) of the banking industry 
(see Chapter 4). Although private investment could augment the demand for banking 
services, the volume of gross NPLs increased during the period of our study. This 
problem therefore undermined the loan-based and especially the income-based 
efficiency of banks. Furthermore, banks invested more in government securities 
during the pos-ESRs period perhaps to shield against the risk brought about by the 
changes in the economic environment due to the ESRs. Private investment, therefore, 
has not positively influenced banks' efficiency the way we expected. 
In the case of India, we find that the coefficient of the Herfindahl index (HERF) of 
market concentration is negative in both Models A and B, supporung the hypothes's 
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of a positive relationship between banks' efficiency and the level of competition. The 
impact of this variable is significant and stronger in Model B, suggesting that in a 
more competitive environment banks are not only under pressure to generate loans 
and investment but also to keep cost down to generate higher income. In the case of 
Pakistan, we do not find any significant relationship between the level of competition 
and bank efficiency in any of the input-output models. 
In India, the presence of foreign banks in the market is found to have a negative and 
significant relationship with both loan-based and income-based efficiency. The 
negative impact of increased presence of foreign banks is stronger in the income- 
based model. Following Lensink and Hen-nes' (2004) proposition, it could be argued 
that the Indian banking industry is still less developed where the entry of foreign 
banks leads to an increase in costs in the short-run. Thus, a positive relationship 
between the entry of foreign banks and efficiency is not realised during the sample 
period examined. A similar significant negative result is found in the Pakistani 
banking industry. 
6.5 - Summary and conclusion 
This chapter augments the analysis of chapter 5 in two ways. First, instead of an 
annual frontier for each year, we construct a grand-frontier using the pooled input- 
output data for all the post-ESRs years. This approach provides us a trend in the 
efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. We find that the efficiency of the banking 
industry in both the countries improved during the post-ESRs era. In India, this 
improvement was due to the improvement in the efficiency of all three ownership 
groups, namely, public sector banks, domestic private banks, and foreign banks. On 
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the other hand, in the case of Pakistan, improvement in the efficiency of the banking 
industry was primarily due to the improvement in the efficiency of private sector 
banks (especially that of foreign banks). 
A key objective of this chapter is to examine the relationship between bank 
efficiency and four factors associated with the ESRs. These factors are: fiscal 
deficits, private investment, competition, and the presence of foreign banks in the 
banking industry. We find that fiscal deficits have a negative relationship with banks' 
efficiency. We argue that the authorities in both India and Pakistan need to lower 
their fiscal deficits so that they can reduce their reliance on the mobilised funds of 
the banking industry. 
In the case of India, we find that the increased level of competition, brought about by 
the financial liberalisation, has a positive relationship with banks' efficiency. In the 
case of Pakistan, we failed to support the proposition that increased competition 
positively influences banks' efficiency. Furthermore, the presence of foreign banks 
has a negative relationship with the efficiency of banks. Following Lensink and 
Hennes (2004), it could be argued that the banking industry in India and Pakistan is 
still underdeveloped, and, therefore, an increased participation of foreign banks has 
increased costs in the short-run. 
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Chapter 7- Summary, Conclusions, and the Limitations of 
the Study 
7.1 - Summary and key findings 
Like many other developing countries, India and Pakistan launched a programme of 
economic and structural reforms (ESRs) in the early 1990s in areas including 
industry, trade, exchange rate, foreign investment, tax policy, government 
expenditures, and the financial sector. The objective of these ESRs was to reduce 
pervasive state-directed resource allocation and to make the economy more market 
friendly. 
The financial liberalisation programme, a key element of the ESRs, includes: freeing 
up exchange and interest rates controls, reducing state-determined credit policies, 
privatising public sector banks, relaxing entry restrictions on new domestic private 
banks and non-bank financial institutions, eliminating restrictions on the entry and 
operations of foreign banks, lowering banks' required reserve ratio, and liberalising 
the capital account. 
Prior to the financial liberalisation, to provide scarce financial resource to the so- 
called socially optimal sectors (e. g. agriculture), govemments decided the direction 
and price of financial resources mobilised by the banking industry. However, by the 
end of the 1980s, the policy of excessive government interventions confronted strong 
criticism. It was argued that the government interventions had repressed the domestic 
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financial system, and made this sector inefficient in mobilising and allocating scarce 
financial resources. 
In this context, an important objective of the financial liberalisation programme is to 
enhance the efficiency of financial institutions, especially that of commercial banks, 
in utilising their resources so that these institutions can foster the process of 
economic growth by intermediating more efficiently between savers and borrowers. 
It is argued that the increased level of competition and reduced government 
intervention, brought about by the financial liberalisation, would encourage and 
enable commercial banks in India and Pakistan to enhance their efficiency. The 
emphasis on the commercial banking industry is due to the fact that in India and 
Pakistan, like in other developing countries, most of the intermediation between 
savers and borrowers is conducted by commercial banks; other financial institutions 
and markets play a relatively insignificant role in channelling financial resources to 
the real sector. 
The ESRs, especially the financial liberalisation programme, transfon-ned the 
economic environment in which commercial banks in India and Pakistan operate. For 
example, prior to 1992, public sector banks in India and Pakistan controlled above 
92% of the total assets of the banking industry. This percentage declined gradually 
during the post-ESRs era after the authorities in India and Pakistan lowered the 
restrictions on the entry and operations of private sector banks. Also, to give banks 
more freedom over their asset portfolios, and to release banks' loanable funds, 
statutory liquidity reserves and cash reserve ratios gradually declined after 1992- 
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1993. Furthermore, banks were granted more flexibility in terms of determining 
interest rates on their loans and deposits. 
With these changes in mind, the present study attempts to examine the efficiency of 
banks in India and Pakistan during the 1990s. The key objective is to examine 
whether the efficiency of banks has improved after the implementation of the 
financial liberalisation programme in 1990-1992. Towards this end, following the 
empirical literature on developed and developing economies, we employ non- 
parametric data envelopment analysis to measure the efficiency of banks in India and 
Pakistan during 1990-1998. In addition, we employ the ordinary least squares 
estimation and the generalised method of moments estimation to determine factors 
(environmental and bank-specific) that may explain variations in the measured 
efficiency of banks during the post-ESRs period. 
Referring to the research questions outlined in chapter I of the present study (p. 4), 
we find that the banking industry in both India and Pakistan exhibits considerable 
technical inefficiencies. For example, according to our results in chapter 5, the 
average variable returns to scale efficiency of the Indian banking industry during 
1990-1998 was around 87% (Model A) and 85% (Model B). In the case of Pakistan, 
the average variable returns to scale efficiency of the Pakistani banking industry was 
around 80% (Model A) and 79% (Model B). Therefore, in the case of India, an 
average bank could improve its efficiency by at least 11 %. On the other hand, in the 
case of Pakistan, an average bank could improve its efficiency by at least 18%. This 
improvement in efficiency could lead to a more efficient intermediation as banks 
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would be able to channel more funds from savers to borrowers with their given 
resources. 
We find that the efficiency of banks in India improved gradually during the post- 
ESRs period. This may suggest that the Government of India was successful in 
achieving the key objective of the financial liberalisation programme. For example, 
referring to the grand-frontier results in chapter 6, we find that the average efficiency 
of the Indian banking industry improved from 60% (Model A) and 75% (Model B) in 
1992 to around 67% (Model A) and 87% (Model B). This improvement in the 
average efficiency of the Indian banking industry was due to improvement in the 
efficiency of all three ownership groups, namely, public sector banks, domestic 
private banks, and foreign banks. 
Similarly, the average efficiency of the Pakistani banking industry improved from 
67% (Model A) and 57% (Model B) in 1992 to 73% (Model A) and 70% (Model B) 
in 1998. However, unlike in India, the improvement in the efficiency of the banking 
industry in Pakistan was due primarily to the improvement in the efficiency of 
private sector banks, especially that of foreign banks. Large public sector banks 
achieved insignificant improvement in their efficiency. Therefore, it could be argued 
that although both the countries followed very similar policies, the liberalisation 
regime in Pakistan was not very successful in encouraging and enabling public sector 
banks to enhance their resource utilisation. 
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In both the countries, our findings suggest that foreign banks attained the highest 
improvement in their efficiency. In addition, the decomposition of total factor 
productivity change into efficiency change and technological change using the 
Malmquist total factor productivity index in chapter 5 suggests that the 
improvements in the performance of foreign banks were due to both efficiency 
improvements and technological improvements. Public sector banks in India also 
witnessed technological improvements and efficiency improvement during the more 
recent years (i. e. 1996-1998). On the other hand, public sector banks in Pakistan only 
experienced some efficiency improvements but no technological improvements. 
These findings may suggest that public sector banks were slow in adopting new 
banking technologies (e. g. automated teller machines). In the case of India, a recent 
study by the Reserve Bank of India I, substantiates our conclusion by pointing out 
that the average IT expenditures as a percentage of total expenses during 1996-2000 
in public sector banks, domestic private banks, and foreign banks were 4.5%, 7%, 
and 8.6%, respectively. 
Once the variations in the efficiency of banks are obtained through the data 
envelopment analysis, the present study then attempts to determine factors that may 
explain these measured variations. Using the generalised method of moments, we 
find a positive relationship between bank size and efficiency in the case of India. On 
the other hand, in the case of Pakistan, we find a negative relationship. Also, in the 
case of India, the efficiency of the previous year positively influences the efficiency 
of the present years. Again, in the case of Pakistan, a negative relationship is found. 
We submitted that the efficiency of the previous year could indicate a certain level of 
' Cited on page 197 of the present study. 
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accumulated knowledge and technological endowment that may help banks to 
generate higher outputs with their inputs by adapting relatively quickly to the 
changes brought about by the ESRs. Following this line of reasoning, it could be 
argued that the knowledge that Indian banks accumulated enabled them to adapt to 
the changing environment. In the case of Pakistan, this was not the case. 
We also proposed, and tested, hypotheses regarding the possibility of a relationship 
between bank efficiency and four factors associated with the ESRs. In both the 
countries, we find a negative relationship between the efficiency of banks and 
government's fiscal deficits. We proposed that high fiscal deficits negatively 
influence bank efficiency because they lead governments in developing countries to 
impose restrictions on banks (e. g. high cash reserve ratios and statutory liquidity 
reserves) that hamper banks' ability to mobilise funds and to transform these funds 
into higher earning assets. 
In the case of India, we also find a positive relationship between the level of 
competition and bank efficiency. This substantiates the claim of the Reserve Bank of 
India that a more competitive banking industry due to the financial liberalisation 
would encourage banks to exert greater effort to enhance their resource utilisation. In 
the case of Pakistan, we failed to find any significant relationship between bank 
efficiency and competition. 
In the light of the findings of the present study, it could be argued that the financial 
liberalisation programme in India during 1990-1998 was successful in enhancing the 
efficiency of banks. The implementation of the liberalisation programme enabled 
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private sector banks to catch up with dominant public sector banks by enhancing 
their efficiency and by adopting new technology. Public sector banks also responded, 
albeit gradually, by investing in new banking technology. However, in the case of 
Pakistan, though private sector banks witnessed efficiency improvement, there were 
limited (or no) improvements in the efficiency of public sector banks. We propose 
that the most important issue for the banking industry in both the countries is to 
tackle the problem of high non-performing loans, especially in public sector banks. 
The huge amount of non-performing loans in Indian and Pakistani public sector 
banks (above 20% of their earning assets) could make it difficult for this group to 
adapt to the changes brought about by the ESRs, and could make this group hesitant 
in investing in the new banking technologies. 
Also, as noted in chapter 4, tackling fiscal deficits has been a disappointing element 
of the ESRs in India and Pakistan. The presence of high and growing fiscal deficits 
may make it difficult for governments in India and Pakistan to stop appropriating 
banks' scarce investible funds. Therefore, more needs to be done on the fiscal front. 
Perhaps the most important thing for both the countries, especially for Pakistan, is to 
reduce political uncertainty. In both the countries, a reduction in statutory liquidity 
reserves was expected to increase the proportion of credit in banks' asset portfolios. 
However, during the post-ESRs period, banks invested more in low earning 
government securities. This could be due to political uncertainty that made banks 
unwilling to increase the share of risky credit in their asset portfolios. Also, the lack 
of success of the debt recovery tribunals in India and Pakistan may explain banks' 
unwillingness to increase the proportion of credit in the earning assets. Therefore, 
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reducing political uncertainty and enhancing the effectiveness of debt recovery 
tribunals should be a top priority. If banks keep on investing more in low earning 
government securities, it may not only crowd out the real sector, but also could make 
banks hesitant in investing in new banking technology, which, in turn, may hamper 
their efficiency in intermediating scarce financial resources in the economy. 
7.2 - The limitations of the study 
First, our conclusions are primarily based on the results from the data envelopment 
analysis. Though we conducted a basic stochastic frontier analysis to check the 
robustness of our results, more advanced parametric techniques with different 
functional forms and different probability distribution may give different results. 
This, in turn, may cast doubt upon our conclusions. 
Second, a very important weakness of the present study is that it has ignored the 
quality of services provided by banks. In both India and Pakistan, there has been 
constant criticism levelled against banks, especially public sector banks, regarding 
the quality of their services. For example, depositors have to queue for a long period 
of time to deposit or withdraw money, depositors (especially foreign currency 
depositors) are charged fines for not making any transactions for some period of 
time, and so forth. If these things were taken into account, then may be the efficiency 
of public sector banks would not be as high as the study suggested. 
7.3 - Avenues for future research 
First, the study has only considered data from 1990 to 1998. This was primarily due 
to the fact that by the time the empirical part of the study was started, data after 1998 
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were not available. It could be argued that a longer time period is required to 
understand the impacts of the ESRs on the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. 
A more updated data set on the annual accounts of India and Pakistan is now 
available. Therefore, researchers can now utilise this updated data to better 
understand the impacts of the financial liberalisation, and other elements of the 
economic and structural reforms, on the efficiency of banks in India and Pakistan. 
Second, parametric techniques with different production/cost/profit function 
specifications could be used to further enhance our understanding of the impact of 
the ESRs in India and Pakistan. Third, due to unavailability of data, we have not 
considered off-balance sheet items as banks' outputs. Future studies could utilise 
recent datasets to examine whether the inclusion of off-balance sheet items could 
change the conclusions of this study. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 - Data Source 
1. Macroeconomic data: 
World Bank (2003) World Development Indicators 2003, CD-ROM 
ADB (2003) Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries, 
www. adb. oriz 
2. Bank data: 
Reserve Bank of India, Banking Statistics, www. rbi. org. i 
SBP - State Bank of Pakistan (various issues) Banking 
Statistics of Pakistan 
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APPENDIX 4.2 - The Herfindahl Index of Concentration 
The Herfindahl index of concentration is a proxy about the competitive pressure in 
the market, containing information about the size of the largest firms. It will change, 
if there are shifts in market shares between the largest firms. The Herfindahl index 
can be calculated as follows: 
ur h- findahl = SUM [i=l to n; (Sih 
where Si represents the market share of firm i as a fraction of I- 
For example, the Herfindahl index of four firms sharing the market would is 
0.402+0.302+0.2 2+0.12 = 0.3 
After shifting market shares between the two largest firms the new Herfindahl index 
is 
0.45 2 +0.25 
2 
+0.2 
2+0.12 
= 0.315 
A declining index shows a declining trend of concentration or higher level of 
competition pressure. 
Source: "Concentration Ratios in Manufacturing", 1987 Census of Manufacturing, 
MC 87-S-6, Washington, DC: U. S., Department of Commerce, Economics and 
Statistics Administration, Bureau of the Census, 1992. 
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APPENDIX 4.3 - Share of Public Sector Banks in the Commercial Banking 
Industry in India (1990-1998) 
Share of Public Sector Banks in the Banking 
Industry in India (1990-1998) 
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APPENDIX 4.4 - Share of Forei2n Banks in the Commercial Bankinp_ Industry 
in India (1990-1998) 
Share of Foreign Banks in the Banking Industry in 
India (1990-2000) 
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APPENDIX 4.5 - Share of Public Sector Banks in the Commercial Bankinj! 
Industry in Pakistan (1990-1998) 
Share of Public Sector Banks in the Banking 
Industry in Pakistan (1990-1998) 
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1992 1994 1996 
1992 1994 1996 1998 
IX 5.1 - Inputs and Outputs Data for India (All rmures in Indi 
Rupees) 
PSBs - Public Sector Banks; DBs - Domestic Banks; AA - Annual Average (in million Indian Rupees); 
Variation 
Investment 
FBs - Foreign Banks 
Co V- Coefficient of 
lion 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 10,255.19 1.47 23,354-89 0.76 1,629.87 0.91 3,680.96 1.66 
1993 12,160.59 1.46 26,887.14 0.78 2,110.10 1.00 4,340.34 1.80 
1994 15,988.57 1.42 36,731.17 0.72 3,002.05 1.06 5,641.71 1.50 
1995 16,252.61 1.52 41,829.84 0.70 3,444.25 1.06 4,554.40 1.54 
1996 16,357.22 1.60 45,710-69 0.69 3,457.57 0.97 3,872.51 1.57 
1997 18,924.93 1.60 55,471-99 0.66 5,408.81 0.82 4,055.98 1.64 
1998 16,776.25 1.45 51,723.93 0.53 7,820.48 0.76 4,556.45 1.75 
Loans 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 15,693.48 1.63 36,918.47 0.87 2,578.62 1.01 4,017.15 L-54 
1993 17,385.47 1.55 39,704.99 0.83 3,326.59 1.08 4,124.78 1.43 
1994 17,486.90 1.50 40,544.88 0.80 4,088.93 1.03 4,852.54 1.22 
1995 19,874.18 1.52 49,705.99 0.76 5,252.87 1.08 5,833.03 1.20 
1996 22,177.51 1.51 56,812.93 0.76 6,580.22 0.92 7,938.55 1.30 
1997 22,805.99 1.54 60,776.07 0.78 8,421.08 0.83 7,710.97 1.49 
1998 18,560.03 1.25 50,429.93 0.48 10,417.78 0.81 7,394.21 1.72 
Interest Expenses 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 2,405.15 1.57 5,531.68 0.85 324.40 0.88 862.41 1.48 
1993 2,875.25 1.48 6,439.00 0.78 481.34 0.93 936.86 1.64 
1994 2,835.82 1.45 6,633.35 0.72 573.65 0.98 815.64 1.50 
1995 2,774.78 1.49 7,047.42 0.70 631.66 1.18 825.00 1.36 
1996 3,341.27 1.49 8,744.18 0.70 919.90 1.02 1,104.76 1.31 
1997 3,762.38 1.50 10,287.37 0.69 1,357.71 0.90 1,099.00 1.55 
1998 3,048.25 1.29 8,525.28 0.51 1,736.69 0.79 1,050.85 1.67 
255 
Operating Expenses 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA COV AA cov AA COV AA COV 
1992 898.66 1.43 2,084.26 0.69 169.68 0.77 242.15 1.59 
1993 1,053.50 1.39 2,345.29 0.68 200-99 0.74 332.61 2.09 
1994 1,175-88 1.41 2,724.73 0.68 236.69 0.76 370-00 1.77 
1995 1,314.62 1.51 3,386-53 0.69 258.06 0.90 390.75 1.68 
1996 1,512.40 1.52 4,106.11 0.66 331.08 0.81 463.51 1.69 
1997 1,550.53 1.55 4,396.18 0.66 418.42 0.70 474.91 1.90 
1998 1,244.13 1.42 3,714.43 0.53 508.16 0.67 472.44 1.94 
Interest Income 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 3,462.39 1.51 7,858.43 0.81 552.75 0.92 1,274.22 1.46 
1993 3,799.66 1.47 8,301.10 0.81 698.26 0.92 1,444.40 1.57 
1994 3,941.42 1.42 8,954.45 0.74 859.45 0.96 1,379.08 1.39 
1995 4,193.40 1.49 10,459.24 0.73 975.38 1.10 1,427.93 1.35 
1996 4,966.79 1.50 12,946.81 0.71 1,336.43 0.93 1,734.18 1.36 
1997 5,498.01 L-50 14,984.71 0.70 1,881.88 0.83 1,749.36 1.55 
1998 4,424.39 1.29 12,393.62 0.49 2,318.28 0.76 1,695.04 1.73 
Other Income 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 437.00 1.50 851.02 0.89 59.01 0.87 354.68 1.76 
1993 457.59 1.35 932.90 0.76 84.19 0.97 264.01 1.61 
1994 582.80 1.52 1,235.70 0.91 127.03 1.06 308.40 1.73 
1995 605.50 1.39 1,352.34 0.72 159.73 1.27 353.63 1.75 
1996 711.03 1.41 1,649.16 0.74 225.92 1.12 407.29 1.75 
1997 752.44 1.43 1,814.27 0.75 289.08 0.89 393.25 1.88 
1998 723.04 1.16 1,565.04 0.40 460.83 0.85 470-17 1.95 
Number of Bank Observation 
Group 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
All 76 75 73 78 86 89 89 566 
PSBs 28 28 27 27 27 27 27 191 
DPBs 25 24 24 26 33 34 34 200 
FBs 23 23 22 25 26 28 28 175 
ABs=AII Banks; PSBs= Public Sector Banks; DPBs= Domestic Private Banks; FBs=Foreig n Banks 
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APPENDIX 5.2 - Inputs andOUtDuts Data for Pakistan (All rigures in Million of' 
Pakistani Rupees) 
PSBs - Public Sector Banks; DBs - Domestic Banks; FBs - Foreign Banks AA - Annual Average (in million Pakistani Rupees); CoV- Coefficient of Variation 
Bills Purchased and Discounted 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 1,135.66 2.16 4,402.28 0.72 676.28 1.58 254.27 1.06 
1993 1,423.32 2.21 5,774.60 0.73 963.97 1.58 270.42 1.10 
1994 1,467.54 2.16 6,269.12 0.79 1,102.57 1.61 320.74 1.16 
1995 3,100.63 3.70 32,176.74 1.38 1,190.78 1.66 404.05 0.92 
1996 1,628.12 2.11 6,417.80 0.74 1,386.23 1.81 353.79 0.91 
1997 1,792.15 1.80 6,398.16 0.79 1,568.90 1.42 590.54 0.84 
1998 1,777.70 1.77 6,265.51 0.76 1,562.03 1.25 548.28 0.97 
Loans and Advances 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA cov 
1992 7,260.81 2.25 31,148.12 0.79 3,898.21 1.86 1,884.63 1.15 
1993 8,796.54 2.21 35,971.75 0.73 4,790.05 1.71 2,302.90 1.24 
1994 9,084.28 2.15 37,287.05 0.74 5,226.25 1.82 2,851.70 1.15 
1995 10,602.61 2.10 43,522.85 0.73 6,181.75 1.82 3,827.95 1.17 
1996 11,731.25 2.03 48,395.61 0.76 7,416.89 1.66 4,652.66 1.14 
1997 14,450.07 1.95 60,367.01 0.84 9,771.87 1.54 6,057.30 1.09 
1998 15,936.11 1.95 63,030.90 0.76 10,461.99 1.49 6,206.92 0.99 
Investments 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA cov AA cov AA cov AA 
1992 5,607.37 2.02 21,489.27 0.79 3,616.28 1.60 1,789.05 
1993 5,908.91 1.83 20,935.61 0.80 4,270.10 L-53 2,403.17 
1994 7,096.85 2.05 29,824.39 0.8-5 4,647.69 1.77 2,655.21 
1995 6,484.73 2.34 32,875.04 0.89 4,009.25 2.23 2,090.79 
1996 7,390.84 2.1-5 37,447.18 1.01 4,649.12 2.06 3,625.35 
1997 9,283.58 1.96 41,789.20 1.03 7,317.92 1.67 4,181.23 
1998 9,108-18 1.94 39,004.66 0.96 7,514.35 L-58 3,638.74 
cov 
1.16 
1.08 
1.19 
1.07 
1.09 
1.27 
1.48 
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Interest Expenses 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA Cov AA Cov AA Cov AA Cov 
1992 943.77 2.30 3,994.15 0.76 499.60 2.17 218.57 1.02 
1993 1,240.21 2.11 4,918.90 0.77 796.76 1.81 359.17 1.11 
1994 1,397.97 2.00 5,452.39 0.77 879.29 1.78 537.37 1.08 
1995 1,662.08 2.00 6,914.06 0.80 1,011.56 1.71 714.21 1.00 
1996 1,997.00 2.00 8,763.42 0.86 1,323.25 1.65 866.46 1.05 
1997 2,549-97 1.84 10,458.30 0.88 1,657.84 1.46 1,330.23 1.05 
1998 2,618.09 1.83 12,140.47 1.15 1,975.21 1.32 1,456.52 1.02 
Total Income 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA Cov AA Cov AA Cov AA Cov 
1992 1,798.57 2.07 6,777.46 0.73 928.54 2.00 614.48 1.03 
1993 2,335.87 1.97 8,447.32 0.73 1,512.07 1.63 796.15 1.07 
1994 2,509.21 1.92 9,214.45 0.74 1,623.11 1.66 988.46 1.08 
1995 2,828.90 1.96 11,288.75 0.78 1,851.42 1.70 1,168.69 1.04 
1996 3,057.99 1.81 11,114.90 0.77 2,252.01 1.58 1,398.21 1.08 
1997 4,516.75 1.80 15,020.66 0.68 2,958.15 1.58 2,068.47 1.08 
1998 4,386.47 1.74 16,117.72 0.84 3,278.48 1.42 2,139.53 1.06 
Operating Expenses 
All Banks PSBs DBs FBs 
AA Cov AA Cov AA Cov AA Cov 
1992 570.33 2.23 2,202-06 0.70 340.18 1.99 111.35 1.20 
1993 722.63 2.22 2,770-99 0.69 503.09 1.88 127.21 1.09 
1994 767.86 2.23 3,060.07 0.69 503.27 1.97 157.40 1.12 
1995 863.25 2.22 3,486.54 0.70 583.47 2.10 204.92 1.23 
1996 947.35 2.17 3,799-51 0.71 682.87 2.01 250.51 1.32 
1997 1,725.13 2.46 9,060-04 0.84 999.34 2.02 402.44 1.29 
1998 1,598.76 2.20 6,992.59 0.76 1,033.95 1.82 437.31 1.38 
Number of Bank Observation 
Group 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total 
All 28 29 32 35 36 35 35 230 
PSBs 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 28 
DPBs II 11 14 17 17 17 17 104 
FBs 17 18 18 18 19 18 18 126 
ABs=AII Banks; PSBs= Public Sector Banks; DPBs= Domestic Private Banks; FBs=Foreig n Banks 
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APPENDIX 6.1 - The Logistic Function 
In a model of efficiency, a set of factors, gathered in a vector x could explain firm 
efficiency. 
Prob(Efficiency=l) =EFF= f(xp) 
Prob(Efficiency=o) =]-EFF= 1- f(x, p) (A6.1) 
The set of parameters P reflects the impact of changes in x on the probability. 
Because Efficiency is a variable ranging from 0 to 1, with Efficiency =I indicates 
fully efficiency and Efficiency =0 indicates fully inefficiency, the linear probability 
model such as f(x,, 8) = 8'X +E has a number of shortcomings. A minor complication 
arises because E, the vector of white-noise error term, is heteroscedastic in a way that 
depends on, 8. The model we need is required to produce predictions consistent with 
the underlying theory of a probability model. For a given regressor vector we would 
expect: 
JiM EFF 
'8 ,x --ý +- 
and 
JiM EFF 
,6 'x --) - 
A model for a probability is sketched in Figure 1. In principle, any continuous 
probability distribution defined over the real line in Figure I will suffice. One of such 
distribution is the logistic distribution. The logistic distribution function is written as: 
EFF e 
8'x+e 
I+e 8'x+e 
(A6.2) 
It is easy to verify that as P'x +E ranges from --oo to +oo, EFF ranges between 0 and I 
and that EFF is nonlinearly related to P'x + E. We have : 
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I-EFF =I I+e 8'x+e (A6.3) 
Therefore we can write 
EFf it fi'x+e (A6.4) 
EFFýt 
If natural logarithms are taken for two sides of equation (4) we have: 
In 
EFFit 
=, 8'x +E (A6.5) I- EFFit 
The term yi, = (In 
EFFi, 
is called the log-odds, or the log of the odds ratio and I- EFFit 
could be used as a proxy for efficiency. This log-odds is not only linear in x but also 
linear in parameters, 8. 
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A he GMM Framework 
The Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) procedure is developed to estimate a 
panel regression with potentially endogenous explanatory variables. The procedure 
described below follows Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The GMM approach 
starts with a dynamic panel regression with a lagged dependent variable In the right- 
hand side. 
yit --": ýyi(t-l) + 'ýXkit +A+ vit 
where k=1, ... K-1; i=N; t=2 
Taking the first-difference of both sides of equation (1), we have: 
Ayit - ýAyi(t-l) + 
AAXkit +A vit 
where k=1,... K-1; i=I.. N, - t=3 
(A6.6) 
(A6.7) 
In (A6.7) the individual bank-specific effects A are eliminated by the differencing 
operation. In (A6.6), the error terms vit and the lagged dependent variable yi, -, are 
correlated, thus making the OLS estimation biased. Therefore pi, are assumed to have 
finite moments and E(vit vi, )=0 for t#s, i. e. residuals are serially uncorrelated. 
Under this assumption, values of y lagged two periods or more are qualified as 
instruments in the first-differenced equation (A6.7), implying the following linear 
moment restnctions: 
E(y, (, -j)Avi, 
) =0 T, -j =2 (t-1) (A6.8) 
However GN4M estimation based on (A6.8) alone can be highly inefficient. It is 
necessary to make use of the explanatory variables as additional instruments. Given 
that the problem of likely endogeneity applies to x, assume that they are strictly 
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exogenous would lead to inconsistent estimation. To take into account the problem of 
endogeneity we treat variables in x as endogenous, i. e. E(xitvis) =0 for s>t . This 
implies the following additional linear moment restrictions: 
E(xi(, 
-j)Avi, 
) =0t=3... T, -j =2... (t-1) (A6.9) 
That is values of x lagged two periods or more are valid instruments in the first- 
differenced equation. If x is assumed to be exogenous, i. e. i. e. E(xjtvj =0 for s<t , 
which implies the following additional linear moment restrictions: 
E(xI(tJ)Avl) =0 T,. j =i (t-1) (A6.10) 
(A6.8), (A6.9) and (A6.10) imply a set of a linear moment restrictions to which the 
first-differenced GMM applies to equation (A6.7). The moment restrictions (A6.8) 
and (A6.9) can be written in vector form as E[Zi'. Fi] =0 where Ei = (( Vi3 - 42) ... (( Vi7- 
are the residuals in the first-differenced regression and Zi, the instrument 
matrix, is a matrix of the form Zi = diag (yil ... yj" Xil ... Xj')' (S =I... T-2). The 
number of columns of Zi , Q, is equal to the number of available instruments. Xj, = 
(Yi(t-1) Xkid' is Kx1. The form of the GMM estimator of the KxI coefficient vector 
0--(ýA'(p')' is given by 0= (GZA-'Z'G)-l G 'ZA-'Z'y- where a bar above a variable 
denotes that it is in first differences, G is a stacked (T-2) Nxk matrix of observations 
on y 'j(, -ý) and x',, ;y 
is a stacked (T-2) NxI vector of Y'j, ; Z=(Z'i ... Z'N)' is a (T- 
2)NxQmatrix; andAis any QxQ symmetric, positive definite matrix. 
The first-differenced GMM estimator however can suffer from serious efficiency 
loss, small sample biases and imprecision for there are potentially informative 
moment restrictions that are ignored. Following Arellano and Bover (1995) and 
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Blundell and Bond (1998), to improve the properties of the first-differenced GNIM 
estimator, we consider the following additional level moment restrictions. 
E(Ay, 
(, _I)u,, 
) =0t=3... T (A6.1 1) 
E(Ax, 
(, j)v, t) =0t=3... T; j:? i (A6.12) 
E(Axi(t-j)u, 
t) =0t=3... T. j-. ->o (A6.13) 
These linear moment restrictions imply that lagged differences of y and x can be used 
as instruments in the level equation (A6.6). The system GMM estimator is then 
obtained by imposing the set of moment restrictions from (A6.8) to (A6.13). By 
exploiting more moment restrictions, the system GMM estimator is more efficient 
than the first- differenced GMM estimator that uses only (A6.8) and (A6.10). 
The consistency of the system GMM estimator described above depends on the 
validity of the moment restrictions. Below is a brief discussion of the specification 
tests that we conduct in this study for the consistency of the system GMM estimator. 
Relevant formulae and proofs of the specification tests discussed above can be found 
in more details in Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The overall validity of the moment restrictions is checked by the Sargan test for 
over-identifying restrictions. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is that the 
instruments are not correlated with the residuals in the first-difference regression, 
that is E[Zi'. Eil 0. The test is based on the following statistic 
N 
sz X6-k where c=y- OG and 0 is the GMM estimator 
'z'A^'izxI 2J 
of the coefficient vector 0 for a given Z. The null hypothesis is rejected if the 
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minimised GMM criterion function registers a large value compared with a X2 
distribution with the degree of freedom equal to the difference between the number 
of instruments and the number of parameters (Q - k). 
As the system GNM estimator exploits more moment restrictions, a further test that 
evaluates the validity of extra moment restrictions (A6.1 1) and (A6.13) is needed. 
Since the first-differenced moment restrictions are nested within the set of moment 
restrictions for the system, the Sargan difference test is used to test for the validity of 
additional moment restrictions. Let Z, be anx Q1 matrix containing the columns of Z 
which remain value instruments when the errors in levels are first-order moving 
average, and let 0, be an estimator of 0 based on Z, associated with the error terms 
N 
ZI 2ý then si = c'I ZI clic Z if the errors in levels are MA(O) -k 
or MA(1). In addition ds = (s - sj) - XQ2-Ql if the errors in levels are not serially 
correlated. 
Another necessary condition for the validity of the GMM instruments is that the level 
residuals are serially uncorrelated. The Arellano-Bond m, and M2 statistics check 
whether there is serial correlation in the level residuals. If the level residuals are 
serially uncorrelated then the first-differenced residuals in (A6.7) will follow a 
MA(I) process which implies that autocorrelation of the first-order are non-zero but 
the autocorrelation of the second-order are zero. Based on the first-differenced 
residuals, the Arellano-Bond m, andM2 statistics, both distributed as N(0,1) in large 
sample, test the null hypotheses of zero first-order and second-order autocorrelation, 
respectively. The consistency of the GNIM estimator does not 
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require E(e, t being zero, or no first-order serial correlation in the first- 
differenced residuals. It hinges heavily on the assumption that E(cj, ei(, -2) 
)=0 or no 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals. The test statistic for 
second-order serial correlationM2 is based on residuals from the first-differenced 
equation (A6.7) and takes the form: 
-2 
- N(0,1) E 
1/2 
C is the vector of residuals lagged two period; e,, is a vector of trimmed -F to where '-2 
matche-2 and similarly for G,, and 
2 G,, (G'ZAZ'G) -'G' ZA(IN Zvi ^i ^I IC6 i* Ci( i(-2) 
ýi*E 
i* 
ei(-2) 
-2 j= 
A 
F'-2G,, a var(O)G',, C-2 
The test statistic for first-order serial correlation m, can be calculated on the same 
line asM2. An insignificant m, and/or significantM2 indicate the likely presence of 
invalid moment restrictions due to serial correlation in the level residuals. 
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